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the “Supplementary Document: Ancient Conceptions of Analysis”
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• https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/, by István Bodnár (Bodnár
ڦڤڥڦ), which uses technical terminology without explaining it, has (or at least seems to have) a psychologist
methodology of interpretation (i.e.: lots of affirmations about what Aristotle had in mind or meant to do in
such-and-such circumstances, without much textual backup) and uses a lot of unnecessarily anthropomor-
phic language in the description of natural events.
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Introduction
The Aristotelian Physics
INTRO
Executive summary
I.ڥ what is more knowable and clearer to us vs what is more knowable and clearer by nature
I.ڦ change is a datum; what exists separately must be a reality;
I.ڧ against Parmenides: supervenience is anti-symmetric; grounding is irreflexive
I.ڨ ex nihilo nihil fit
I.ک change is always along a specific dimension, and always between opposites (in that dimension)
I.ڪ principles ought not be things said of something underlying, rejection of fragmentalism
I.ګ the hylomorphic account of change
I.ڬ The lack (ignorance of music) is not a constituent (of the man who comes to know music), but a potentiality.
I.ڭ against Plato: That which comes to be (the man, yet ignorant of music) is one in number, but does not have
to be one in possibility.
II.ڥ “phusis” / “nature” can be used for the matter, but also for the form
II.ڦ both form and matter are the objects of study for the student of nature; against Plato: they treat ‘a man’ as if
they were like ‘a sphere’ / ‘concave’ where in fact it is like ‘snub’.
II.ڧ four causes: (ڥ) that out of which as a constituent a things comes to be; (ڦ) the form or model: what the being
would be (to ti ēn einai), its genera and the parts which come into the logos; (ڧ) the primary source of the
change or the staying unchanged; (ڨ) the end, what something is for; and anything which comes to be on
the way to the end.
II.ڨ earlier opinions on chance
II.ک Because not everything is either of necessity or for the most part, luck plays a role as cause: when something
like this comes to be by virtue of concurrence: e.g. a pale man comes to be a builder.
II.ڪ two kinds of chance: luck and to automaton
II.ګ often, the three non-material causes coincide
II.ڬ the ‘for something’ is present in things which are and come to be due to nature
II.ڭ if there is absolute necessity, it is teleological
III.ڥ at ڦڤڥaڭ-ڥڭ: change is defined as “the actuality of that which potentially is, qua such”
III.ڦ changes are incomplete, refer to their end-state
III.ڧ the agent’s action on the patient = the change in the patient
III.ڨ an actual infinite is either a substance or a magnitude
III.ک there is no actual infinite
III.ڪ some series are potentially infinite in the sense of indeterminably extensible
III.ګ among them are number and quantity
IV.ڥ there are places
IV.ڦ places are neither matter nor form
IV.ڧ a typology of “in”
ڥ
IV.ڨ place is the outer limit of the occupying body
IV.ک where places are
IV.ڪ why people think there is void
IV.ګ what void would have to be
IV.ڬ there is no void
IV.ڭ density without void
IV.ڥڤ time is not change
IV.ڥڥ time is the number of change
IV.ڥڦ what it is to be in time
IV.ڥڧ two different nows
IV.ڥڨ where times are
V.ڥ intrinsic and extrinsic change; coming/ceasing to be and motion
V.ڦ there is only accidental change of change
V.ڧ change requires succession
V.ڨ types and tokens of change
V.ک opposing changes
V.ڪ rest is the steresis of motion
VI.ڥ the line is not composed of points
VI.ڦ solution to the paradox of the runner: both motion and time are continuous
VI.ڧ there is no motion in an instant
VI.ڨ changing things are divisible
VI.ک changing things have infinitely many parts
VI.ڪ when change takes place
VI.ګ there is no minimal or maximal velocity of change
VI.ڬ solution to the paradox of the arrow: times cannot be simultaneous
VI.ڭ solution to the paradox of the stadium: velocities are additive
VI.ڥڤ changing things are extended
VII.ڥ everything that moves must be moved by something; there must be a first mover
VII.ڦ moving requires contact, a kind of succession
VII.ڧ only material things qualitatively change
VII.ڨ only changes of the same type can be compared wrt their rate
VII.ک the rate of change is proportional to the power that originates it
VIII.ڥ there cannot be a first motion, nor can there be a last motion
VIII.ڦ there cannot be a becoming-to-be of motion
VIII.ڧ some things are always in motion, some never, some sometimes
VIII.ڨ causes of motion are active and passive
VIII.ک moving is direct or indirect; some moving is by unmoved things
VIII.ڪ because there always is motion, there must be some eternal moving and unmoved thing
VIII.ګ locomotion is the primary motion
VIII.ڬ the primary locomotion must be continuous
VIII.ڭ rotation is the primary locomotion
VIII.ڥڤ the first mover is simple and unextended
The place of the Physics in the Aristotelian corpus
TBC
ڦ
Chapter ڥ
Aristotelian science: why-questions
and archai
ڥ.ڥ What- and why-questions
ڥ.ڥ.ڥ The Socratic method
The so-called Socratic ‘method’, famously, is to ask, of a large number of phenomena x, what x is. In this way,
the Charmides asks, “What is temperance [sôphrosunê]?”, the Laches “What is courage [andreia]?”, the Euthyphro
“What is piety [hosiotês]?”, and theMeno “What is virtue [aretê]?”. In the appendix to his Stanford Encyclopedia
Entry on analysis, Michael Beaney writes:
On the whole, commentators agree that what Socrates is seeking are real rather than nominal defi-
nitions, definitions that specify the essential nature of the thing concerned rather than the properties
by means of which we can recognise it or the meaning of the term used to designate it. But there has
been more controversy over precisely what the presuppositions of the elenctic method are, and how
to respond, in particular, to the charge that Socrates commits the so-called Socratic fallacy. Socrates
appears to be committed to the principle that if one does not know what the F is, then one cannot
know if F is truly predicable of anything whatever, in which case it seems pointless to try to discover
what the F is by investigating examples of it via the elenctic method. (Beaney ڦڤڥڨ: appendix I)
According to Beaney, the Meno may be read as presenting (or at least: working on) a solution to this problem.
But what exactly is the problem? Beaney’s anachronistic terminology, contrasting – in the style of John Locke
(ڥڪڧڦ–ڥګڤڨ) – ‘nominal definitions’ (definitions capturing the meaning of a word, as in “x is a bachelor def $ x is
an unmarried [eligible, adult, human, (Western?), (heterosexual?), (etc.?)] male”) with ‘real definitions’ (definition
capturing ‘what it is to be’ a (particular or type of) thing) incorporates heavy theoretical machinery, as does the use
of “essence”.
The “Socratic Fallacy” is often said to consist in the reliance on the so-called “priority of definition” principle: if
x fails to know what F-ness is, then x fails to know anything about F-ness (cf. Benson ڥڭڭڤ: ڥڭ). If even to ask what
F is requires knowing something about F (e.g. that we are interested in its nature), it follows the Socratic method is
pointless.
More generally, we have here a version of the paradox of analysis, which may be simply put as follows: Trying to
give some philosophical analysis of “p” (which may stand for any interesting philosophical claim, such as e.g. “any
ڧ
state with an unequal income distribution is unjust”)ڥ requires finding some “q” that is at least materially equivalent
with “p” (i.e.: true if “p” is; false if “p” is). If we suppose, however, that “p” is true, any true sentence “q” will
do, which makes philosophy too easy. So something stronger is required. The paradox then lies in the apparent
impossibility to come up with some strengthening of the biconditional (abreviated by “OP”), which makes the
biconditional both non-trivial and a desirable outcome of philosophical inquiry:
(An) Op(p$ q)
It seems that Op must have at least the strength of metaphysical necessity: coinciding with “p” on its truth-value
by ‘cosmic coincidence’, as it were, does not make “q” by itself an acceptable analysis. Requiring Op to be as
strong as “it is true in virtue of the meaning of some words contained in “p”, on the other hand, is too strong, as
it would make (An) knowable on the basis of our understanding of “p” alone and so entailed that philosophical
analysis, while possible, is also pointless.
Perhaps for this reason, Alan Silverman, in another Stanford Encyclopedia entry, ties his otherwise quite similar
description of the method of the early, “Socratic” dialogues to the ‘mature’ Platonic doctrine of the so-called ‘self-
predication’ of forms as follows:
At the heart of the Socratic elenchus is the ‘What is X’ question (where ‘X’ typically names an ethical
property). The answers offered to these questions fail usually because they are too narrow or too wide.
An answer is too narrow if it fails to include all cases. An answer is too wide if, while it includes all
cases of, for instance, piety, it also includes other things, cases of justice or impiety. We can infer from
these failed definitions a set of conditions Socrates places on an adequate answer to his ‘What is X’
questions. He is seeking an answer which picks out a Socratic Property, e.g., Piety, that is a universal
such that: it is found whenever and wherever there is an instance of Piety; and it ‘causes’ or ‘makes’ the
instance to be such as it is. Piety’s power to make, e.g., Socrates, pious derives from Piety’s itself being
pious. Piety self-predicates: Piety is pious. Because it is pious, when Piety is present to/in Socrates,
Piety causes Socrates to be pious. (Silverman ڦڤڥڨ: sct. ڥ)
Independently of its intrinsic plausibility and potential theoretical benefits, the self-predicating character of Pla-
tonic forms is here said to be responsible for the fulfillment of a certain theoretical role, only quite imprecisely
characterised by “ ‘causes’ or ‘makes’ the instance to be such as it is”. But what is it about Platonic forms that
makes them suitable to play such a theoretical role? Against this backdrop, an important strand in Aristotelian
theoretising may be understood as aiming at removing the ‘scare quotes’ from “ ‘causes’ ” and “ ‘makes’ ”.
ڥ.ڥ.ڦ Finding the archai
TO DO If I find the time, I’ll add here something on the general project of the Metaphysics: finding the archai of
things, which ground their ousiai, and on the different notions of “priority” in Aristotle (cf Peramatzis ڦڤڥڥ).
According to Menn (ڦڤڥڪ: Iaڧ, p. ڥڦ), there are two families of views Aristotle opposes:
ڥ. physicists: what is prior in time is prior in ousia
ڦ. mathematicians, dialecticians: what is prior in logos (must be cited in the definition of another thing) is prior
in ousia
There is another dimension of variability in our understanding of “archē”: like “principle”, it can stand both for
what comes first in a theory of a subject matter and for what, according to a theory or by itself, comes first in the
subject matter.
Quite generally, knowledge is knowledge (of) what something is.ڦ
ڥ. The expression “p” is thus used as what is called a “schematic letter”, a typographic abbreviation of some assertoric sentence. If you want,
you can replace it anywhere with a sentence of your choice. One example, for example, would be the following: “p” abbreviates “Sam knows
that today is Monday”; “q” – the putative philosophical analysis – could then be: “Sam has the justified true belief that today is Monday”.
ڦ. Cf., e.g., Aristotle’s specification of the function of tragedy as “learning, that is, figuring out what each thing is” (Poet. ڥڨڨڬbڥڪ–ڥګ).
ڨ
ڥ.ڥ.ڧ Priority in Aristotle
TO BE DONE
ڥ.ڦ Euthyphro and the direction of explanation
ڥ.ڦ.ڥ Euthyphro questions
Socrates’ objection to Euthyphro’s proposed definition of piety as what the gods love consists in pointing out that
while
(Eu1) The gods love x because x is pious.
is true,
(Eu2) x is pious because the gods love x.
is false.
While this is an objection to a proposed definition (under the assumptions that (i) if it is not the definition of “piety”
that gives us reasons to choose between (Eu1) and (Eu2), nothing else does, and (ii) that we have reasons to think
that one, but also only one of them is true and that this itself should be explained), it also raises the more general
problem we met earlier. In what terms are we to distinguish between the two directions of explanation in the
supposedly true biconditional:
(Eu0) x is pious iff the gods love x.
This question is related, but not identical with, the question how we are to explain the (supposed) difference in
truth-value between (Eu1) and (Eu2), for this latter, but not the first, explicitly presupposes that there are no true
instances of “p because p”, the so-called “ “because” of the exasperated parent”.
Direction-of-explanation or ‘who wears the trousers’ questions are quite ubitquitous in philosophy. Perhaps they
even are what philosophy really is about, though of course that itself is a philosophical question (and it is, moreover,
unclear whether it can be put into Euthyphro form). It nonetheless is quite plausible, in my view, to take philosophy
quite generally be concerned with Euthyphro questions; Euthyphro questions ask for a specific kind of explanation,
they are requests to f some x, where
• f is some explanatory relation such as account for, make intelligible, analyse, make conceptual room for,
provide for the possibility of,
• x is some very general phenomena of the word: (the nature of things belonging to) very general metaphysical
categories [particulars, properties, substances, tropes, events, states of affairs, agents, God, space, time] and
their (essential) relations, (the nature of) important classes of properties [modal, aesthetic, normative, moral,
epistemic, mental, quantitative, colours, vectors, ], (the nature of) a broad range of mental and bodily states
[belief, desire, knowledge, expectation, hope, emotions, feelings, sensation, perception] or processes [most
importantly, qualitative and substantial change]
In recent years, it has become fashionable to ask Euthyphro questions using the idiom of “grounding”.ڧ In the
grounding literature, supposedly paradigm cases are often picked from the following list:
• the mental is grounded in the physical
• the normative is grounded in the non-normative
• the dispositional is grounded in the non-dispositional
• the legal is grounded in the social
ڧ. Introductions to contemporary discussions of grounding are Clark and Liggins (ڦڤڥڦ), Correia and Schnieder (ڦڤڥڦa), Trogdon (ڦڤڥڧ) ,
Hovda and Cross (ڦڤڥڧ), Bliss and Trogdon (ڦڤڥڨ) and Raven (ڦڤڥک).
ک
• the moral is grounded in the non-moral
• the semantic is grounded in the social
• determinable properties are grounded in their determinates
Quite often, and without apparent awareness of heterogeneity, philosophers also say things such as:
• wholes are grounded in their parts
• sets are grounded in their members
• holes are grounded in their hosts (the things in which they are holes)
ڥ.ڦ.ڦ A typology of Euthyphronic inquiry
TO DO: find a number of notable features Euthyphro questions have in common; organise them in a somewhat
elucidating way.
ڥ.ڦ.ڧ Kinds and senses of “because”
It is perhaps useful to note that merely drawing a distinction between different senses / types / kinds of “because”
does not, by itself at least, provide an answer. The Thomistic answer, e.g., distinguishes two different senses of
“because” – “the pious action is pious because the Gods love it” specifies the ratio essendi, while “the Gods love the
pious action because it is pious” talks to the ratio agendi – and so just supplants one incompatibility with another:
“But a motivational ‘because’ running in one direction is incompatible with a constitutional ‘because’ running in
the other direction, so Plato is right to see the alternatives as competing.” (van Cleve ڥڭڭڨ: کڬڥ, fn. ڭ)
MORE HAS TO BE ADDED
ڥ.ڧ Platonism and Aristotelianism
In this section, I want to paint, in rather brush strokes, a (to me, at least) plausible picture of how Aristotle’s ap-
proach tometaphysics fit into (something like) the Platonic framework, and to highlight the ‘ecumenical’ theoretical
role the so-called “doctrine of the four causes” plays in this picture.
ڥ.ڧ.ڥ Physical mathematics vs. mathematical physics
Plato’s conception of mathematics may, with some qualifications, be called ‘Pythagorean’: mathematics describes
an eternal and unchanging, entirely formal but self-subsistent structure of entities that are not dependent on, nor
grounded in, nor abstracted from the objects of empirical knowledge (if we have such knowledge at all).
Aristotle has an entirely different conception: he finds mathematical structures within the empirical world, not just
mirroring but also grounding its law-governed dynamics and making it intelligible. The way mathematical struc-
tures are present ‘in’ the empirical world is the explanandum of the form/matter distinction. While matters are
certainly very complicated, forms are certainly not ‘in’ the things they are forms of in a way that would make them
separable.ڨ Form/matter compounds should not be thought of as just thereby (i.e.: just in virtue of being com-
pounds) complex, i.e. not as composites of two individually identifiable components – their matter and their form
– but as matter-that-is-formed, where the form is not a what-is (by itself), but a special type of a how-something
(i.e. the matter)-is, namely the what-it-is-(for-the-matter-)to-be-the-kind-of-thing-this-is. While this contrasts ‘im-
manent’ Aristotelian forms with ‘transcendent’ Platonic ideas, it leaves open the type of immanence, inter alia the
question whether Aristotelian forms are (general) universals or (particular) tropes.ک
ڨ. In fact, Aristotle takes separability as a characteristic of Platonic forms and argues against it, and hence against them.
ک. Properties, if they exist at all, are entirely ‘qualitative’ entities that can be ‘exemplified’ (= had) and the exemplification of which plays
at least one of three theoretical roles: grounding resemblance, ‘making for’ qualitative identity, serve as truthmakers for quality attributions.
Universalists conceive of them as universal, i.e. numerically identical across different exemplifications, while tropists take them to be particulars,
at best exactly similar but never numerically identical.
ڪ
Aristotle distinguishes four types of ‘causes’ and criticises Plato for focussing solely on one – the formal (type of)
cause. When a builder builds a house out of bricks according to a plan, we can ask four (types of) why-questions –
all variants, with different emphasis, of the question “why did the house come about?”:ڪ
efficient cause how does the house come about? by the initiation of the (activity or process of) building, rather
than, e.g., by the initiation of a process of growing.
material cause out of what does the house come about? out of the bricks that then constitute it, rather than,
e.g., some wooden planks.
formal cause what makes it a house that comes about? a plan, account, definition of what a house is, rather
than, e.g., a plan, account, definition of what a church is.
final cause for what does a house come about? to provide shelter, rather than, e.g., to embellish the landscape.
Even at this high level of abstraction, however, the account has to be made more complicated than this:
• The theory of efficient causality has to take into account the distinction between potentiality and actuality,
which applies to (efficient) causes and effects symmetrically: in the same way as the (process of) building
actualises a way for the bricks to be – a way they previously were only potentially –, it also actualises a way
for the builder to be (being such as having built a house) she antecedently was only potentially.
• The theory of material causation has to take into account the relativity of the matter/form distinction: while
the bricks are matter-for the house, they may themselves have been formed out of mud, i.e. be themselves
formed matter. Whether the distinction ‘bottoms out’, ie. whether there is ultimate, or ‘prime’ matter, is a
disputed question.
• The theory of formal causation has to take into account that one and the same form explains why the house
is a house and why the house-builder is a house-builder, i.e. the ‘transmission’ and resultant commonality
of the form along relations of efficient causality (the problem is hairiest with respect to the conception of
perception as ‘uptake of form without matter’).
• The theory of final causation has to take into account that what it is for a house to be (to be a house) is both
what explains why the builder acts in the way she does and determines her success in doing so. Among other
things, it has to explain why a three-legged dog is possible, being both a dog and a less-than-optimal dog,
and why a house is for providing shelter and may still fail to do so (perhaps because it is incompetently built).
An important point emerges, even temporarily forgetting about such necessary qualifications: Aristotle thinks
of these four causes (or perhaps better: reasons, explanations, grounds, process-aspects?) not on the model that
contemporary theorists use when they talk, e.g., about causal overdetermination (different causes being individually
sufficient for one and the same effect) or the ‘causal closure’ of the physical (that effects of a certain – physical
– type can only have causes of that same type). Rather, it is an in principle open-ended taxonomy for talking
about the dynamics of things in the broadest sense, including not just qualitative change, but motion, qualitative
hetereogeneity, coming into being and ceasing to exist.
ڥ.ڧ.ڦ Ideas & participation vs. form and matter
I find it an attractive interpretative hypothesis that the complexity of Aristotle’s system is motivated, at least in part,
by his perceiving a need to make certain distinctions in order to avoid the roughly ‘Parmenidean’ account Plato
gives of fundamental reality. One major problem of such an account, in my own words, can be put as follows: it is
not possible that the changing reality (or at least the changing of reality) is only apparent because in order for us to
be mislead in this way (to falsely think reality changes) we ourselves (or the appearances we have) must be assumed
to change. Immutabilism is metaphysically possible, but dialectically self-undermining: if it were true, we could
never take it to be false; but we do; hence it is false.ګ
Perhaps it is this consideration that leads Aristotle to give so much critical attention to the relation Plato postulates
between the world of ideas and the empiricial world. A beautiful rose, for Plato, is beautiful in virtue of participating
ڪ. Perhaps “why did the house come about?” can be heard as a question about the efficient cause, where “why did the house come about?”
would ask for the material, “why did the house come about?” for the formal and “why did the house come about?” for the final cause.
ګ. It is also quite difficult to see how anyone could ever become convinced of immutabilism, if she was not so convinced already. Cf. p. ڦڬ
below.
ګ
/ partaking in the idea beauty (or perhaps: the idea of beauty; or even: the idea of beautiful things). Aristotle
objects (i) that the relation of participation is mysterious, (ii) that it does not explain what it was introduced to
explain and (iii) that it leads to a vicious regress. It is mysterious because it is external, i.e. not uniquely determined
by how its relata are, but depending on further factors ‘outside’ of them. It is explanatorily impotent because it
does not show how beauty makes the rose beautiful, but only states that it does: not only does the relation just by
itself provide no basis to distinguish different ideas, nor (what could come to be the same thing) does it explain
their potency in making things, e.g., beautiful. Properties are what grounds, and thereby explains, the differences
between similarities-in-respect (e.g. the difference in the way two red things and two round things are each one
similar to the other). This is why an explanation in terms of them being related to different forms just pushes the
explanatory need up the relation: we then need an explanation of the difference between the forms, which is a
difference in quality itself (and, if forms are self-predicative, even itself a qualitative difference). The participation
relation by itself also does not seem to be of the right kind to provide such an explanation: the mere existence of
a further thing will not ‘tie’ the rose appropriately to the idea; we need the relation ‘as relating’, or ‘insofar as it
relates them’, but this invites a further why-question (why does it relate the rose to the idea?) which has not yet
received an answer.
Third and most importantly, postulating (the relation of) participation for explanatory purposes leads to vicious
regresses, commonly called ‘third man’ problems. One of them may perhaps be put as follows: A minimal require-
ment for beauty to bestow, in some sense, beauty on the rose is for it to be itself beautiful (perhaps this is an instance
of “nothing can come from nothing”?). The commonality between the beautiful rose and beautiful beauty is then
part of what explains that the rose is beautiful (or, perhaps better: what it is for the rose to be beautiful). This
commonality, however, is in itself in need of explanation, for it is of the same kind as the commonality between
two beautiful roses – which to explain beauty was invoked in the first instance. No other way of explaining the
commonality between the rose and beauty is available, however, than in terms of yet another super-form super-
beauty, itself beautiful, in which both the rose and beauty participate. Unless and until we have explained this
super-form (and all the infinitely many on top of it), we have not explained the initial datum, which is just to say
that Plato’s participation account of quality-possession has no explanatory power at all.
Plato, of course, had his reasons to introduce ideas. Only ideas, hemight say, explain (i) howwe can have knowledge
of things (the problem being particularly pressing, but not limited to, a priori knowledge), (ii) why things are not
just coincidentially how we take them to be, but really do exhibit the patterns and structures we observe them to
have with some robustness or ‘necessity’, and finally (iii) that there are, or at least could be, eternal and unchanging
things. To the extent that the interpretative hypothesis sketched above is on the right track, wemay expect Aristotle
to address these problems.
ڥ.ڧ.ڧ Mere appearance vs. the reality of change
Plato is an anti-realist or at least a reductionist about change: change is, or even must be, wholly explainable
in terms of unchanging things and is, at least to this extent, only apparent. Aristotle’s world, on the contrary, is
fundamentally dynamic: he takes the actuality of qualitative change (from red to non-red), intensification (from
slower to faster), growth (from thinner to fatter) and of substantial change (coming to be, ceasing to be) as a datum;
on the other hand, he also accepts “ex nihil nihilo fit”: all change is change of something, something happening
to something else, i.e. in all change, something must ‘underlie’.
His hylomorphic account of change in terms of an underlying matter changing its form between opposites aspires
to reconcile these opposing tendencies by providing a middle way between (i) the atomists who have unchanging
things and cannot explain how change emerges from their interaction because they falsely suppose that all change
is qualitative and (ii) the Platonists who admit only opposites, and nothing underlying and hence are committed
to construe all change as either extrinsic or existential (and hence, given further Parmenidean assumptions, im-
possible). We are thus drawn into different directions: to satisfy the incompatibility condition on change, we need
a succession of two different things; to satisfy the proper subject condition, we need an unchanging thing. If we
have only one of them, we do not have change. But do we have change if we have both? We call the first “form”,
ڬ
the latter “matter”. Crucial question: in what sense does changing form + unchanging matter result in changing
compound? Two subquestions:
(i) what are the relations between (i-a) form and the compound, (i-b) matter and the compound, (i-c) form
and matter? they must be of the type that underwrites our epistemic right to infer what happens with the
compound from (and, more ambitiously, explain it by) what happens with matter and form;
(ii) in what sense is the situation asymmetric enough to ascribe change to the compound? why do we privilege
the change in the form over the constancy in the matter?
“Parthood” as an answer to the first two questions of (i) has problems with (ii). This has to do with it’s not directly
answering (i-c), ie. it’s not giving us a real, direct, relation between the form and the matter. But if the form is not
part of compound, in what way is it its form?
Aristotelian dynamics operates with a crucial, but unfortunately quite opaque, distinction between two modes of
being: potentiality, power or ground of possibility – dunamis – on the one side, and actuality, realisation or reality
– energeia – on the other. Though the distinction is supposed to have a much more general application (and its
difficulty is partly due to its very high degree of generality), perhaps the clearest case of the dunamis/energeia
distinction is the relation between a capacity for change and the changes to which it gives rise. All change is due
to a capacity for change, a dunamis: what there is constrains what must have been possible. Conversely, some
dunamis also explains the energeia it is a dunamis-for: what can be constrains what there is. Even in this perhaps
simplest case, however, the distinction is not the one we are perhaps more familiar with between a disposition
(dispositional property, ‘potentiality’, ‘power’) like fragility and its manifestation, the shattering of a particular glass.
Dunamis and energeia are correlative, and the dunamis by itself explains or grounds its actualisation. Neither does
Aristotle have a simple counterfactual analysis: the dunamis is not what a thing would be under such-and-such
circumstances, but a way the thing is in the here and now.ڬ
Aristotle’s realism about change is also a realism about our perception of it: when we start to see the redness of the
rose, we become related to redness – in a similar, though different way in which the rose becomes related to redness
when it itself becomes red. Cashing out the sense in which redness figures in its perceiver not just apparently, but
really, is in my view one of the hardest problems of Aristotle exegesis.
ڬ. As with the matter/form distinction, the issue is further complicated by the fact that this distinction too is relative: something may, e.g.,
have a dunamis to have another dunamis.
ڭ
Chapter ڦ
Physics I: Beginnings and Causes
ڦ.ڥ The argumentative strategy of Physics I
In his introduction to the Clarendon Aristotle Series edition of the first two books, Charlton (ڥڭڭڦ) gives the following
overview of what is, according to him, a dialectical investigation of the things that are subject to change (as such,
i.e. insofar as they are subject to change). According to Charlton, the guiding question of Physics I is: What is there
/ what is in the world? (ti to on?), more specifically: what must there be if there is coming to be, passing away and
alteration? It is as a response to this question, that the form / matter distinction is introduced:
I.ڥ intro
I.ڦ+ڧ there is becoming (against the Eleatic monists)
I.ڨ review of the Presocratics
I.ک among the principles of any physical thing are a pair of opposites
I.ڪ among the principles of any physical thing is a third thing
I.ګ an analysis of becoming: if physical things have a form and are constituted by a underlying thing, we can
accept the results both of I.ک and I.ڪ
I.ڬ+ڭ this analysis explains the mistakes and the difficulties of the alternative theories
More specifically, we have the following dialectic (my interpretation):
I.ڥ When we want to know a thing, we are interested in a thing’s “primary causes” (archai), its “principles” (aitia)
and its “elements” (stoicheia). We should start with “what is clearer and more knowable to us” and proceed, by
analysis, to “what is more knowable and clear by nature”. This transition is from the compound to the elements
and from the universal to the particular.
I.ڦ There are four possibilities:
ڥ. There is just one primary cause (arche) and it does not change [Parmenides, Melissus].
ڦ. There is just one primary cause and it does change [‘physicists’, physikoi].
ڧ. There are a finite number of primary causes.
ڨ. There are an infinite number of primary causes.
With (ڥ), this one unchanging primary cause cannot be a quality or a quantity, but must be a thing (ousia); but then
it cannot have any qualities and cannot have any parts.
I.ڧ Ad (ڥ). If there is just one primary cause, nothing can be predicated of it, and it cannot even be said to be. This
is absurd.
I.ڨ Ad (ڦ). To explain the change in an underlying one, the physicists need notions of ‘mixture’ and of ‘separation’.
But these notions only apply to things that have parts, i.e. are complex. But if there is just one primary cause, it
cannot have parts.
ڥڤ
I.ک Ad (ڧ). If primary causes are finite in number and are to explain change, we must assume that at least some of
them come in pairs of opposites.
[Ad (ڨ): why assume there is an infinite number if we can ‘get by’ with a finite number?]
I.ڪ If there were just two primary causes, they would have to be opposites. But opposites must qualify something:
they are opposite ways to be, i.e. presuppose something which is a certain way and also is another, opposite, way.
I.ګ Aristotle presents his own account: in one sense, there are two principles (form and matter), in another sense
there are three (for the matter is “two in account”, and the form is “one in account”).
I.ڬ That the matter is “two in account” and that there is change between opposites, i.e. from what is not towards
what is (e.g. from cold, which is a privation, to hot) explains how we must qualify “ex nihilo nihil fit”: the lack of
hot, out of which something becomes hot, is something which is not, but it is also not a constituent.
I.ڭ The Platonists rightly see that change is between opposites, but because they do not have an underlying thing,
have to say that they ‘yearn for their own destruction’, i.e. have an inner dynamic principle.
ڦ.ڥ.ڥ “Better known by nature”
That the aim of science is to uncover what is “more intelligible by nature” is first stated in the Posterior Analytics
(APo ګڥbڧڧ–ګڦaک). Whatever else it is, the epistemic characterisation serves as an adequacy criterion for scientific
arguments: they not only have to be valid syllogisms, but their premisses have to be better known-by-nature than
their conclusions. Science (episteme) is said to be characterised by this aim: it not only reports the facts but explains
them by displaying their priority relations (APo. ګڬaڦڦ–ڦڬ). The criterion also restricts the proper objects of science:
Only what is necessary can be known, properly speaking. whatever is known without qualification cannot be
otherwise (APo. ګڥbڭ–ڥڪ).
This characterisation recurs at the beginning of the Physics:
πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ
ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ
φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν
τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς. (ڥڬڨaڥڪ–ڥڬ)
The natural way of doing this is to start from
the things which aremore knowable and clear
to us and proceed towards those which are
clearer and more knowable by nature; for the
same things are not knowable relatively to us
and knowable without qualification. (Aristo-
tle ڦڤڥڨ: ڪڭڭ)
The natural course is to proceed from what is
clearer and more knowable to us, to what is
more knowable and clear by nature; for the
two are not the same. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڥ)
Somewhat ironically, Aristotle thus opens his treatise on natural things by a claim about what is natural to us (ἡ
ὁδὸς . . . πέφυκε): to proceed from what is more knowable (γνωριμωτέρον) and clearer to us to the things that are
so by nature (φύσει) or simpliciter (ἁπλῶς).
ڦ.ڥ.ڦ Against monism
Physics I.ڦ and I.ڧ present an argument (or two arguments) against Eleatic monism. Aristotle starts by noting that
being is said in many ways (πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν: that what it is for a thing / ousia like a dog to be is one thing,
while that what it is for a quality like pale to be is another thing) and asks in what way the Eleatics want their claim
that everything is of one type to be understood: are they claiming that there are only things (like dogs), or only
qualities (like pale), or only quantities (like )? They must mean the first, because it is impossible that there be only
qualities and nothing having them:
οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν
οὐσίαν· πάντα γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται
τῆς οὐσίας. (ڥڬکaڦګ-ڧڦ)
For none of the others can exist independently
except substance; for everything is predicated
of substance as subject. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڤڦ)
Nothing can exist separately except a reality;
everything else is said of a reality as underly-
ing thing. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڧ)
In what sense do they mean their claim that all things are one – as parts identical to one whole, as indivisible or as
having the same essence? It cannot be the first, because the whole is a whole only if it has several parts and these
ڥڥ
cannot be all identical to it. It cannot be the second because what is indivisible is point-sized. If they mean the
third, they claim – like Heraclitus – that there are true contradictions, that something e.g. may be hot and cold.
Aristotle’s discussion of a variant of this view by the “more recent of the ancient thinkers” is very interesting:
διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἐστὶν ἀφεῖλον, ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων,
οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρω-
πος οὐ λευκός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ λελεύκωται, οὐδὲ
βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει, ἵνα μή ποτε τὸ
ἐστὶ προσάπτοντες πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἕν,
ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῦ ὄντος.
πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ λόγῳ (οἷον ἄλλο τὸ λευκῷ
εἶναι καὶ μουσικῷ, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἄμφω· πολλὰ
ἄρα τὸ ἕν) ἢ διαιρέσει, ὥσπερ τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὰ
μέρη. ἐνταῦθα (186a.) δὲ ἤδη ἠπόρουν, καὶ
ὡμολόγουν τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι—ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐν-
δεχόμενον ταὐτὸν ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, μὴ
τἀντικείμενα δέ· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἓν καὶ δυνάμει
καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ. (ڥڬکbڦګ-ڥڬڪaڨ)
So some, like Lycophron, were led to omit ‘is’,
others to change the mode of expression and
say ‘the man has been whitened’ instead of
‘is white’, and ‘walks’ instead of ‘is walking’,
for fear that if they added the word ‘is’ they
should be making the one to be many – as if
‘one’ and ‘is’ were always used in one and the
same way. What is may be many either in def-
inition (for example to be white is one thing,
to be musical another, yet the same thing may
be both, so the one is many) or by division, as
the whole and its parts. On this point, indeed,
they were already getting into difficulties and
admitted that the one was many – as if there
was any difficulty about the same thing be-
ing both one and many, provided that these
are not opposites; for what is one may be ei-
ther potentially one or actually one. (Aristotle
ڦڤڥڨ: ګڤڨ)
Some, like Lycophron, did away with the
word ‘is’; others sought to remodel the lan-
guage, and replace ‘That man is pale’ ‘That
man is walking’, by ‘That man pales’ ‘That
man walks’, for fear that by inserting ‘is’ they
would render the one many – as if things were
said to be or be one in only one way. Things,
however, are many, either in account (as the
being of pale is different from the being of a
musician, though the same thingmay be both:
so the one is many), or by division, like the
parts of a whole. At this point they got stuck,
and began to admit that the one was many;
as if it were not possible for the same thing to
be both one and many, so long as the two are
not opposed: a thing can be one in possibility
and in actuality. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڧ)
Lycophron’s worry, as reported by Aristotle, is that the copula would separate the subject and the predicable of
the predication and that this was incompatible with its truth, as its truth would require them to be one.ڥ
I.ڧ reinforces this criticism by construing Parmenides as denying that being is said in many ways, i.e. holding that
being – what it is to be – is unitary, that there is just one way to be (this does not, as Aristotle points out, rule out
that there are many things, so yields only a weak form of monism). The problem with even this weak position that
Aristotle points out is that being certainly is, but that it has another way of being than that to which it applies. The
reasoning may perhaps be reconstructed as follows: if being (i.e. the property of being) is unitary and is, then it is
the only thing that is; but then it cannot be a property of anything, for if it were a property of some x, then it would
be different from x, and because it is the only thing there is, x would not exist.
ڦ.ڥ.ڧ Against the physicists
In I.ڨ and I.ک, Aristotle considers two types of physicists: the first postulating intrinsically uniform matter, the
second postulating intrinsically multiform matter; the first reducing qualitative change to existential change, the
second existential change to qualitative change. In I.ڨ, he argues agains the second (Anaximander, Empedocles,
Anaxagoras) that they cannot allow for alteration of their elements (for their qualitative characteristics is what
makes matter multiform, and matter cannot be multiform only contingently), so that everything there is is charac-
terised by a fixed propertion of different kinds of matter. This, however, is impossible, because some thing have a
minimal size and may still undergo change (just not qualitative change, but existential change): such change can
then not be explained by their losing any of the elements that make it up.
The argument against the physicists postulating uniform matter (Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus) can perhaps
be inferred on the basis of I.ک. It is that they have the opposite problem: their only principle of change is a the
opposing pair of densification and rarefaction; these produce the things as they are. Hence for them all qualitative
change is a production of something new. But this new thing which is, e.g., hot is not a result of a change that is
from the non-hot, for it is wrong to say that it was not hot before.
ڥ. Aquinas elaborates on this, making Lycophron first propose “homo albus”, and then proceed to “homo albatur”, ascribing to him the
view that in this latter sense “per hoc quod est albari, non intelligitur res aliqua, […] sed quaedam subiecti transmutatio” (Commentaria in
octo libros Physicorum liber I lectio IV, §§ڦڪ, Leoninum edition). “Homo albatur” would thus, for Aquinas’ Lycophron, not properly speaking
be a predication, but would perhaps be a ‘feature-placing’ sentence in Strawson’s sense.
ڥڦ
ڦ.ڦ The problem of change
”ARISTOTLE-FORMS.TEX”
ڦ.ڦ.ڥ Variation and constancy in change
According to Haslanger (ڦڤڤڧ), the puzzle of change arises from the inconsistency of the following five claims:
ڥ. Persistence condition: Objects persist trough change.
ڦ. Incompatibility condition: The properties involved in a change are incompatible.
ڧ. Law of non-contradiction: Nothing can have incompatible properties, i.e. nothing can be both P and not
P.
ڨ. Identity condition: if an object persists trough change, then the object existing before change is one and
the same object as the one existing after the change; that is, the original object continues to exist through
change.
ک. Proper subject condition: The object undergoing change is itself the proper subject of the properties involved
in change.
Because there is change (ڥ), objects persist (ڨ) and the properties which they (ک) have are incompatible (ڦ) which is
impossible (ڧ).
The two main families of ‘solutions’ to the problem of change replace one of the blue lines above by a red one,
denying either the incompatibility of the properties involved (ڦ) or the numerical identity of the persisting object (ڨ).
The first view – endurantism – typically time-indexes the property: the thing is then said to ‘change’ from having
F-at-t1 to lacking F-at-t2. This turns line ڥ red: the two properties, having F-at-t1 and having F-at-t2 are not the same
– what is had before the change is not what is lacked after it.ڦ The second view either postulates temporal parts
and attributes the properties to their whole (perdurantism: a is said to ‘change’ by having a temporal part that is
F at t1 and another temporal part that is not F at t2) or postulates temporal parts and attributes the properties to
them (exdurantism: a is said to ‘change’ by there being short-lived things a-at-t1 and a-at-t2 that are and are not
F respectively). The problem with these solutions that none of them leaves room for change – which is why the
occurrences of this word above are in scare quotes.
Aristotle has a different, more subtle and in my view also more plausible account of change: the change from the
a-that-is-F to the a-that-is-not-F is explained in terms of them having two aspects, one material one in which they
are one and another formal one in which they are not one. We discuss first the first, then the second aspect of this
view.
ڦ.ڦ.ڦ Hylomorphic change
It is a curious fact that when reviewing the theories of his predecessors in fundamental physics, Aristotle is more
interested in the number of principles they ‘used’ to ‘generate’ things than in their nature. He criticises the Eleatics,
who ‘use’ just one (chapters I.ڦ and I.ڨ) and Anaxagoras, who ‘used’ infinitely many (I.ڨ), concludes (I.ک) that one
thing they got right is to use opposites (enantia) and argues that one pair of opposites will suffice (I.ڪ). But which
one? As Bostock (ڥڭڭک: ڧ–ڨ) notes, Aristotle shows no interest in the question, but rather offers, in I.ګ, a typology
of opposites, in terms of “form” (eidos) and “privation” (sterēsis), which must be ‘added’ to the underlying thing
(hupokeimenon) to account for change. While form and privation are not, in general, opposites,ڧ, all opposites fall
within the form/privation dichotomy. All opposites need to be predicated of some subject which, according to
the Categories must always (ultimately) be a substance, and such a predication either predicates the having or the
lacking of some form.
ڦ. Or rather: if it is lacked after it, it is not because there was a change – having F-at-t1 is also lacked, at t2, by a thing that remained F
throughout.
ڧ. Quantitative properties and their relative lacks are (e.g. hot and cold), but properties in the category of substance are not (e.g. a tree, a
house, a statue, vinegar), because substances have no opposites (cf. e.g. Cat. ڧbڦڨ-ڧڦ).
ڥڧ
Opposites (enantia) are principles (i.e. irreducible) because they come out of, but not from each other: the hot comes
out of the cold, but not from the cold, because the cold does not have in itself a tendency to annihilate itself. In
I.ک, Aristotle argues that this is true of all change: if something becomes F , it comes out of being not-F ; if it ceases
to be F , it comes out of being F ; if it becomes a house, it was not a house before; if it ceases to be a house, it was
a house before.
After having established in I.ک that change needs diversity, i.e. a pair of opposites, Aristoteles argues in I.ڪ that
οὐθενὸς γὰρ ὁρῶμεν τῶν ὄντων οὐσίαν τἀναν-
τία, τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου δεῖ λέ-
γεσθαί τινος. (ڥڬڭaڦڭ-ڧڤ)
[w]e do not find that the contraries constitute
the substance of any thing[; b]ut what is a first
principle ought not to be predicated of any
subject. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڥڪ)
[w]e never see opposites serving as the reality
of anything, and yet a principle ought not to
be something said of some underlying thing.
(Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڥڧ)
Because opposites are predicables, they presuppose an ousia (“reality”, “substance”) as their hupokeimenon. This is
a clear echo of the Categories, where Aristotle distinguishes ten categories of things, according to the grammatical
type of the words that represent them in sentences.
Aquinas finds another echo of the Categories in this passage:
Sed si ponamus sola contraria esse principia, oportet principium esse
aliquod accidens de subiecto dictum: quia nullius rei substantia est
contraria alteri, sed contrarietas solum est inter accidentia. (Com-
mentaria in octo libros Physicorum liber I lectio XI, §ڭڥ, Leoninum
edition)
…if we hold that only the contraries are principles, it is necessary that
the principles be an accident predicated of a subject. For no substance
is the contrary of something else. (St. Thomas Aquinas ڥڭڭڭ: ad loc.)
The two reasons are perhaps connected: they are if only predicables can be opposite to anything. This would be
so if to be ‘opposite’ already presupposes a dimension of comparison, if comparison is possible with respect to how
things are and if, finally, to say how things are is to predicate something of them.
In the quote above (ڥڬڭaڦڭ-ڧڤ), Aristotle construes ‘predication’ (i.e.: exemplification, the having of a property)
as a relation of ontological dependence: what is an ‘opposite’, i.e. a dimensional characteristic (such as being hot
and being cold on the temperatur scale and being a house and not being a house along the temporal dimension of house-
construction), is placing something else on that dimension: that something else is the thing it qualifies. Opposites
are ways to be and every way to be must be a way for some thing to be. Things that something else to be the things
they are are dependent on such other things for their essence and identity; they are not self-standing entities and
cannot be principles.
Aristotle briefly considers the possibility that there might be more than one pair of opposites, more than one way of
things being different from each other than by either having or lacking qualitative characteristics. The argument
he gives to rule out this possibility is very interesting:
ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον πλείους εἶναι ἐναντιώ-
σεις τὰς πρώτας. ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἕν τι γένος ἐστὶ
τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διοί-
σουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ γέ-
νει· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ γένει μία ἐναντίωσις ἔστιν,
πᾶσαί τε αἱ ἐναντιώσεις ἀνάγεσθαι δοκοῦσιν
εἰς μίαν. (ڥڬڭbڦڦ-ڦګ)
Moreover, it is impossible that there should be
more than one primary contrariety. For sub-
stance is a single genus of being, so that the
principles can differ only as prior and poste-
rior, not in genus; for in a single genus there is
always a single contrariety, all the other con-
trarieties in it being held to be reducible to
one. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڥڬ)
Moreover, there cannot be more than one pri-
mary opposition. Reality is a single kind of
thing, so that the principles can differ only in
being prior or posterior to one another, and
not in kind. In any one kind there is always
one opposition, and all oppositions seem to
reduce to one. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڥڨ)
“ousia” is here to be understood as “thing”, whatever fundamentally is, so that its genus encompasses absolutely
everything.ڨ
”ARISTOTLE-FORMS.TEX”
ڨ. It is an interesting fact that Aristotle is both a pluralist about modes of being (“being is spoken of in many ways”…) and at the same time
allows for absolutely unrestricted quantification, over the genus of ousia.
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Even though we have, both in (ڦ) and (ڧ), something new coming to be (a musician in the first case, a musical man
in the second), the change of Socrates’ learning music as a whole is a qualitative, not a substantial change: this is
because the underlying thing remains the same (cf. p. ڥڪ below):
Ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἄν τι ὑπομένῃ πάθος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν-
αντιώσεως ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ καὶ τῷ φθαρέντι,
οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ, εἰ ἄμφω διαφανῆ
ἢ ψυχρά, οὐ δεῖ τούτου θάτερον πάθος εἶναι
εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἔσται ἀλλοίωσις,
οἷον ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐφθάρη, ἄνθρωπος
δ' ἄμουσος ἐγένετο, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ὑπομένει
τὸ αὐτό. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τούτου μὴ πάθος ἦν καθ'
αὑτὸ ἡ μουσικὴ καὶ ἡ ἀμουσία, τοῦ μὲν γένε-
σις ἦν ἄν, τοῦ δὲ φθορά· διὸ ἀνθρώπου μὲν
ταῦτα πάθη, ἀνθρώπου δὲ μουσικοῦ καὶ ἀν-
θρώπου ἀμούσου γένεσις καὶ φθορά· νῦν δὲ
πάθος τοῦτο τοῦ ὑπομένοντος. Διὸ ἀλλοίωσις
τὰ τοιαῦτα. (ڧڥڭbڦڥ-ڧڥ)
If, however, in such cases, any property (be-
ing one of a pair of contraries) persists, in
the thing that has come-to-be, the same as
it was in the thing which has passed-away –
if, e.g., when water comes-to-be out of air,
both are transparent or cold – the second thing,
into which the first changes, must not be a
property of this. Otherwise the change will
be alteration. Suppose, e.g., that the musical
man passed-away and an unmusical man came-
to-be, and that the man persists as something
identical. Now, if musicalness (and unmusi-
calness) had not been in itself a property of
the man, these changes would have been a
coming-to-be of unmusicalness and a passing-
away of musicalness; but in fact a property of
the persistent thing. (Hence these are proper-
ties of the man, and of musical man and unmusi-
cal man, there is a passing-away and a coming-
to-be.) Consequently such changes are alter-
ation. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڥڥڨڨ–ڥڥڨک)
If some affection in that which passes out of
existence remains in that which comes into ex-
istence, as transparent and cold do when air
turns to water, the thing which the change is
a change to must not be an affection of this.
If it is, the change will be an alteration. Thus
suppose a man who knows music ceases to ex-
ist, and aman who is ignorant of music comes
into being: the man remains the same. Now
if knowledge and ignorance of music were not
affections of this, it would be a case of coming
to be and passing away […] but as they are,
it is a case of alteration.
It is because the end-product, the terminus ad quem, of the change (musical man) is not describable except by reference
to its starting point, the terminus a quo (man, i.e. unmusical man), and thus “parasitic on, called real because of its
relation to, anything which remains throught the change” (Charlton ڥڭڭڦ: ګک), that the change is an alteration.
It is to substantial change that Aristotle turns next. Substantial change occurs when something comes to be some-
thing, a thing (ousia); but whatever the process (change of shape, addition, substraction, composition or alteration),
something undergoes the process and thus must enter into it.
”ARISTOTLE-FORMS.TEX”
This analysis, according to Aristotle, applies to all change: everything that comes to be is composite and composed
of and coming out of the underlying thing (hupokeimenon) and the form (morphē), in the way musical man is composed
of man and knowing music and its analysis (dialusis) is complex, in terms of these two. This allows for all three answers
to the question how many principles of change there are:
one, because the thing that changes (that comes to be), musical man, is numerically one with amusical man;
two, because the thing that changes is two in form (eidei duo): the musical man is, essentially, the underlying thing,
man, but also, by concurrence (i.e. accidentally), the lack (steresis): amusical.
three, because in addition to these two, we have the form (knowledge of music which is one, and which also comes
to be.
ڦ.ڦ.ڧ The ‘Aufhebung’ of the predecessors
”ARISTOTLE-FORMS.TEX”
The Platonists, by contrast, attribute the principle of change to the form and take their dual matter (which Aristotle
takes to be the space/receptacle of the Timaeus) to be uniformly non-existent.ک Because they thus think that all
change is from what-is-not, they cannot explain why the forms would undergo or initiate a change: their forms
are both absolute and unchanging, after all.
ک. Or, at least: part of what is not. Charlton mentions that Cherniss (ڥڭڨڨ: ڭڦ) points out that Aristotle says in Met. N ڥڤڬڭaڦڤ-ڦڥ that by
“what is not” Plato meant what is false, or, at least, what is negative described (as not earth, not air, not fire, nor water, Tim. کڥaک).
ڥک
(Physics I.ڭ is one of the rare places where we find some discussion of what some think is a doctrine of Plato’s
different from the theory of ideas: the theory of principles or the ‘unwritten doctrine’. It seems that Aristotle is
discussing a passage from the Timaios (uploaded). The bits at the end of the October ڭ session that were cut off
and not recorded consisted of some jokes I made about the receptacle story (and its sexism).)
ڦ.ڧ The puzzle of matter
In Aristotle’s preliminary analysis of change, talk of the hupokeimenon of change plays a double role: it may designate
that of which we say that it changed, the logical subject of change, always a substance; and also that within which
the change takes place, which typically is not a substance but matter, hule. That it is both is required by the fact
that the hupokeimenon is both what is constant during the change and what comes to be, though it is not the only
thing that comes to be – what comes to be is something which is both a form and matter.
ڦ.ڧ.ڥ Matter as the subiectum / hupokeimenon of change
The hylomorphic account of change is in terms of an underlying matter changing its form between opposites: the
man is underlying, only potentially knowing music; the form changes from ignorant of music (or: that which is
ignorant of music) to knowing music (or: that which knows music); the thing that comes to be is knowing music
man, a composite of man and knowing music.
Charlton (ڥڭڭڦ: ګڧ) says that “Aristotle’s matter-form distinction is primarily […] a distinction between constituent
and thing constituted, between what a thing is made of and what that of which it is made makes or constitutes”.
The third thing – matter – is “not a third factor over and above the opposites; it is the same thing as one of the
opposites, viz. that from which the change takes place, but under a different description.” (Charlton ڥڭڭڦ: ګڧ) –
they are one in number but two in logos (ڥڭڤaڥک-ڥڪ).
Shields ڦڤڥک reads I.ګ-ڬ as an “argument for matter and form”:
Encapsulating Aristotle’s discussions of change in Physics i ګ and ڬ, and putting thematter more crisply
than he himself does, we have the following simple argument for matter and form: (ڥ) a necessary
condition of there being change is the existence of matter and form; (ڦ) there is change; hence (ڧ)
there are matter and form. The second premise is a phainomenon; so, if that is accepted without
further defense, only the first requires justification. The first premise is justified by the thought that
since there is no generation ex nihilo, in every instance of change something persists while something
else is gained or lost. In substantial generation or destruction, a substantial form is gained or lost; in
mere accidental change, the form gained or lost is itself accidental. Since these two ways of changing
exhaust the kinds of change there are, in every instance of change there are two factors present. These
are matter and form.
How do we argue in favour of (making) a distinction? By making it and showing the benefits of doing so; these
benefits are cashed out in terms of explanation: it has to be shown that the explanation of some phenomenon,
p, is better, other things being equal, if it is given in two parts, i.e. with respect to p-under-the-aspect-F and to
p-under-the-aspect-G. For this to work, there must be such things as ‘p-under-the-aspect-F ’, and the two must
be different. That they are, i.e. that the distinction is not empty, is something presupposed, not shown by such an
explanation.ڪ
Even granting that this is an ‘argument for’ the distinction, the problemwith it is that the crucial premiss – that there
is no generation ex nihilo – requires an analysis of substantial change (the coming or ceasing to be of substances, i.e.,
in Aristotelian terminology, of generation and corruption) that seems to presuppose the matter/form distinction.
ڪ. Perhaps an example helps. We are all familiar with the talk of ‘motives’ or of actions being ‘motivated’, done ‘on purpose’ or ‘intentionally’.
Suppose we want to explain what motives are, what it is for an action to be done ‘for the sake of something’. At this point, many philosophers
will want to distinguish between reasons and causes. Whether or not this is helpful then of course depends on whether there is such a distinction
and whether both reasons and causes, at least potentially, fall within the remit of “motive”.
ڥڪ
Within the broader category of change, De Gen. et Corr. distinguishes alteration and other types of non-substantial
change from generation in terms of what underlies:
Since there is something which underlies, and the affection whose nature is to be predicated of this is
something else, and since either of these can change, it is alteration when the underlying thing remains,
being perceptible, but changes in its affections (whether they are opposites or intermediate) …But
when the thing changes as a whole, without anything perceptible remaining as the same underlying
thing (for example, when the seed as a whole becomes blood,  or water air, or air water), a case of
that sort is generation. (ڧڥڭbڬ–ڥڬ)
When the change of opposites is in quantity, we have increase or decrease; when it is in place, we have
locomotion; when it is in an affection and a quality, we have alteration. But when nothing remains
of which the other is an affection, or any kind of accident, then we have generation or destruction.
(ڧڥڭbڧڦ–ڧڦڤaڦ)
A substance x comes into being not from nothing, but from another substance y. But to distinguish generation
from non-substantial change, x has to be new, i.e. x and y have to be different, which is expressed as there being
nothing perceptible remaining (first quote) or there being nothing at all remaining (second quote). The thing which
does not remain (or at least is not seen to remain), but underlies, is matter.
According to Bostock (ڥڭڭک: ڪ), in ڥڭڤaڧڥ–bڥڤ “Aristotle is arguing that any case of coming to be is a case of coming
to be from something, so that there is always something that forms the starting point of the change”, and any case
of coming to be is a case of becoming:
…considering now the mere concept of becoming we may argue that if one thing is properly said
to become another then obviously there must be something which does not persist throughout the
change, for otherwise there would be no change; but equally there must be something which does
persist throughout the change, for otherwise the change would merely consist in one thing coming to
be where another had ceased to be, and there would be no reason to say that the one became the other.
(ڥڭڭک: ڪ)
Again, what there is ‘reason to say’ depends very much on the example: it is perfectly appropriate, e.g., to say that
when there was light, the world became illuminated, but it is much less clear that ‘the world’ is the kind of thing
that underlies, that the coming-to-be of light was a change in something (air, presumably). That it is is a substantial
claim about light, not something to be read off the grammar of the description.
ڦ.ڧ.ڦ There cannot be genesis ex nihilo: the puzzle of prime matter
ڦ.ڧ.ڧ What, on earth, are Aristotelian forms?
”ARISTOTLE-FORMS.TEX”
ڥګ
Chapter ڧ
Physics II: Nature, teleological
explanation, chance and necessity
ڧ.ڥ Nature, natures, and the natural
After having shown that the analysis of change in terms of variation and constancy requires a distinction between
matter and form, Aristotle starts the second book with a different question. Rather than asking what the world
must be like in order to exhibit change, we now ask what is characteristic of changing things and introduce the
fourfold distinction of ‘causes’ or principles. According to Charlton (ڥڭڭڦ: xvi-xvii), the leading question is: What
is explanation in the natural sciences? Aristotle then takes us through the following steps:
II.ڥ its objects are natural things, distinguished from artefacts: things that have a nature = a source of their be-
haviour in themselves
II.ڦ natures can be form, but they can also be matter
II.ڧ+ګ fourfold classification of causes / types of explanatory factor
II.ڨ-ڪ chance and luck can be fitted into this classification
II.ڬ validity of teleological explanation (= explanation by form)
ڧ.ڥ.ڥ Natural things and artefacts
A central conclusion of the whole of the Physics is that nature, phusis, itself is a final cause. “Nature” is used in
two ways: as a subject of predication – “nature is an internal source of movement and rest” – and as a predicate,
“…is natural” or “…has a nature”: nature (in the first sense) is, according to some, the matter (and, according to
others and Aristotle himself, the form) of things that have natures, i.e. things that are substances. The first sense is
reducible to the second: to say that the nature of something is F is just to say that it is F by nature, i.e. naturally F .
Aristotle starts Phys. II.ڥ by stating what natures are. Some nature is a principle of change in the things in which
it inheres (a) primarily (not in virtue of inhering in something else) and (b) per se, i.e. not per accidens (ڥڭڦbڦڥ–ڦڧ).
Both conditions distinguish natural things from product of craft: (a) artefacts, such as a bed or a coat, have inner
principles of change, but only indirectly so, because their matter has them; (b) while healing of the doctor by herself
also has an ‘inner’ principle, this is only accidentially so. The two distinctions cross-cut:
• The first distinction is between things to which natures belong: they may belong to two things, but only
to one of them primarily (protos and then are principles of change only for the latter. The nature of the
wooden bed is the principle of change only of the wood, though it also belongs to the bed. It belongs to the
bed, however, only “per accidens” (Aquinas, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum liber II lectio ڧ, §ڥڨڦ,
Leoninum edition).
ڥڬ
• The second distinction, between having a property kath’auto (per se) and kata sumbebēkos (per aliud) rules
out the doctor curing herself having a principle of change in herself and thus being a natural thing. Even
though she produces a change in herself, she is not her own patient kath’auto, but only kata sumbebēkos, by
concurrence’.ڥ
Artifacts and natural beings are contrasted in terms of the efficient cause involved in their production: “None of
them [that is, artifacts] has in itself the principle of its own production” (ڥڭڦaڦګ–ڦڬ). Can we then conclude that a
thing is natural iff it has an inner principle of change? Yes, if we understand “principle” in a broader sense than
“efficient cause”: while natural things may rely and depend on things external to them for exercising their natural
capacities (as e.g. nutrition, perception, locomotion), the change is still appropriately ‘internal’ to them (and not
to its external efficient cause) if the ‘good of ’ the change (its telos) is internal to them.ڦ
This is so even in substantial changes, i.e. where an animal or a plant ‘brings forth’ / produces an animal or a plant
of the same kind. In such cases, “the nature of an entity is the element common between it and what generated
it” (Stavrianeas ڦڤڥک: کڬ) and is transmitted – this last feature is what distinguishes natural generation from the
generation of artefacts, where the form is typically changed (medicine, e.g., brings about health, not medicine):
Even though its efficient cause is the form of the parent, the coming-to-be of the child still has a principle that is
‘in it’, because it shares its form with the parent.
We here find the new-age saying “become the person you (already) are” written large, and feel the strength of the
Parmenidean dilemma: if you are already that person, then you cannot become it; but if you are not, then this is
not the person you become. The solution, as in Physics I.ڬ-ڭ is to distinguish what you are actually from what you
are potentially – we get the even more fashionable “realise your potential”.
ڧ.ڥ.ڦ Why natural science is not mathematics
In what way does the study of nature(s) involve the study of form(s)? Aristotle tackles this question in Phys. II.ڦ
from a slightly oblique angle: in what way does the mathematician differ from the person who investigates nature?
Aristotle generates a concern about this by highlighting two related but distinct points: First, the objects investi-
gated by the mathematician, such as points, lines, planes, and solids are features of natural bodies; and second, it
is apparently a goal of the natural scientist to grasp the nature of the sun and moon, and to determine whether
the earth or the cosmos is spherical or not. But these would appear to be the concerns of the astronomer, who is
a type of mathematician (ڥڭڧbڦڦ–ڧڤ).
This initial set-up already puts some distance between Aristotle and the Platonists. This makes sense, as Aristotle
not only wants to explain how natural science differs from mathematics in his sense, but also how it differs from
the Platonist conception of mathematics, which subsumes (according to Aristotle, anyway) natural science. The
Platonists misconstrue natural science by ascribing to it the method of mathematics:ڧ
λανθάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες καὶ οἱ τὰς
ἰδέας λέγοντες· τὰ γὰρ φυσικὰ χωρίζουσιν ἧτ-
τον ὄντα χωριστὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. (ڥڭڧbڧک-
ڥڭڨaڥ)
The holders of the theory of Forms do the
same, though they are not aware of it; for they
separate the objects of natural science, which
are less separable than those of mathematics.
(Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڧڧ)
Those who talk about ideas do not notice that
they too are doing this: they separate physical
things though they are less separable than the
objects of mathematics. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڦڪ)
Quite surprisingly, Aristotle seems to be claiming that the forms of natural objects are separable to some degree! At
Met. H ڥڤڨڦaڦڬ-ڭ, Aristotle says that Aristotelian forms are separable in account:
ڥ. Somewhat confusingly, Aquinas (§ڥڨک) also translates the second term of this second distinction as “per accidens”, opposing it to things
“coming to be through an intrinsic principle” (fiunt a principio intrinseco).
ڦ. Because the telos is not necessarily realised (and may even always fail to be realised), this must be modified: the principle of change is
internal (at best) insofar as its telos would be realised in the thing changing in the ‘natural’ course of events, even if the efficient cause of the
change is external. Two further modifications are then still necessary, as Stavrianeas (ڦڤڥک: کګ–کڬ) points out: Because not all change is even
potentially good for the changing thing, its principle is internal at most in the sense that the change is constrained by the changing thing’s
“formal nature”. Also, the effect produced in the changing thing must stand in a per se, i.e. non-accidental relation to the change.
ڧ. As will be discussed in sct. ڧ.ڥ.ڧ, they also misconstrue mathematics, by ascribing to it the method of metaphysics.
ڥڭ
…an account can be given of the form of thing which is separate from, does not involve, the account
of its matter. Thus if some bronze constitutes a sphere, we can give an account of a sphere without
mentioning bronze. It should be observed that though, in consequence of this, we might say that
sphericality is separate from bronze, or from what it would be to be bronze, we are not entitled to say
that a sphere is separate from bronze. Spheres are not something over and above lumps of material.
(Charlton ڥڭڭڦ: ڭڨ)
It seems quite clear, however, that separability in this sense is not at issue here.
Aristotle’s own distinction between mathematics and natural science is made in terms of the ways in which mathe-
maticians and natural philosophers respectively consider the objects of their study: mathematicians consider them
as separable (whereas they are not), because they are separable-in-account, while the natural philosophers do not.
περὶ τούτων μὲν οὖν πραγματεύεται καὶ ὁ μα-
θηματικός, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ φυσικοῦ σώματος πέ-
ρας ἕκαστον· οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα θεωρεῖ ᾗ
τοιούτοις οὖσι συμβέβηκεν· διὸ καὶ χωρίζει·
χωριστὰ γὰρ τῇ νοήσει κινήσεώς ἐστι, καὶ οὐ-
δὲν διαφέρει, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ψεῦδος χωριζόν-
των. (ڥڭڧbڧڤ-ڧڨ)
Now the mathematician, though he too treats
of these things, nevertheless does not treat of
them as the limits of a natural body; nor does
he consider the attributes indicated as the at-
tributes of such bodies. That is why he sepa-
rates them; for in thought they are separable
from motion, and it makes no difference, nor
does any falsity result, if they are separated.
(Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڧڧ)
…but the mathematician does not consider
them as boundaries of natural bodies. Nor
does he consider things which supervene as
supervening on such bodies. That is why
he separates them; for they are separable in
thought from change, and it makes no differ-
ence; no error results. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڦڪ)
The abstraction mathematicians make of the objects of their study is in turn interpreted by Aristotle as an ab-
straction from change; natural things, on the contrary, cannot be abstracted in this way. Aristotle puts this rather
enigmatically: expressions for natural things are like “snubnosed” and not like “concave”:
γίγνοιτο δ' ἂν τοῦτο δῆλον, εἴ τις ἑκατέρων
πειρῷτο λέγειν τοὺς ὅρους, καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν
συμβεβηκότων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν ἔσται καὶ
τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἔτι
δὲ ἀριθμὸς καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ σχῆμα, ἄνευ κι-
νήσεως, σὰρξ δὲ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐ-
κέτι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ῥὶς σιμὴ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς
τὸ καμπύλον λέγεται. […] ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις δι-
χῶς, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὡς ἂν εἰ περὶ σι-
μότητος σκοποῖμεν τί ἐστιν, οὕτω θεωρητέον·
ὥστ' οὔτ' ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν
ὕλην. (ڥڭڧbڧګ–ڥڭڨaک, ڥڭڨaڥڥ–ڥڨ)
This becomes plain if one tries to state in
each of the two cases the definitions of the
things and of their attributes. Odd and even,
straight and curved, and likewise number,
line, and figure, do not involve motion; not
so flesh and bone and man – these are defined
like snub nose, not like curved. […] Since two
sorts of thing are called nature, the form and
the matter, we must investigate its objects as
we would the essence of snubness, that is nei-
ther independently of matter nor in terms of
matter only. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڧڧ, ګڧڨ)
That becomes clear if you try to define the ob-
jects and the things which supervene in each
class. Odd and even, straight and curved,
number, line, and shape, can be defined with-
out change but flesh, bone, and man cannot.
They are like snub nose, not like curved. […]
Since there are two sorts of thing called na-
ture, form and matter, we should proceed as
if we were inquiring what snubness is: we
should consider things neither without their
matter nor in accordance with their matter.
(Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڦڪ, ڦګ)
“Subnosed”, simos, made its first appearance in the Physics at I.ڧ, ڥڬڪbڦڧ-ڦڨ where it was said to be a per se accident
of / to supervene on nose, because nose enters into the definition of snub.
Simos is thus said of Socrates because of and in virtue of his having a concave nose; or rather: because of and in
virtue of his nose having concavity, being concave. AtMet. Z ڥڤڧڤbڧڦ-ڨ, Aristotle says that “simos” is said of Socrates
not because there is a definite feature, snub in it, but because there is something else (concave) in something else
(Socrates’ nose).
This feature of snub, according to Aristotle, brings out how the student of nature cannot abstract from the matter
and concentrate only on the form (as the mathematicians do) nor abstract from the form and concentrate only on
the matter (as the atomists do). For if we do the former, we only have nose and concave, and we cannot, using just
them, describe Socrates as having a concave nose, rather than, e.g., having a nose and a concave mouth. If we do
the latter, we will similarly not describe him adequately, for we will attribute him both having a nose and being
concave, but not having a nose of a certain form.
This account ‘involves’ matter in at least two ways:
ڦڤ
• By calling Socrates “snubnosed”, we are talking about his matter: we are saying, of his body, that it has a
material part, picked out by “nose”, which has the property designated by “concave”. On the level of forms,
we have: snub is the same form (“the same in account”) as concave nose; it is correctly analysed into these
two simpler forms. But nose and concave are not forms of Socrates, nor of any part of his form, but of some
part of his body which is his matter.
• By calling Socrates “snubnosed”, we are saying that his nose is concave: we are not just co-predicating two
forms, as we do when predicating anthropos musikos, but we are predicating something itself predicationally
structures: having a nose which is concave. It is the matter of the nose that is concave, so in this sense “nose”
occurs in our account as standing for the matter, not the form of Socrates’ nose.
Both these two have consequences with respect to separability. Whereas pale or concave are forms of Socrates and
of his nose respectively because they have definite features, this is not the case for snub, nor is it for man: Socrates
is a man iff and because something is in something else, i.e. because certain capacities are in flesh and bone or a
particular sort of organic body.
I am not sure, however, that the requirement to specify the matter is specific in the way Lennox (ڦڤڥک: ڦڤ) seems to
think it is:
It is of the very essence of a living thing, and more generally of any natural object, to move, behave,
act, and change in specific ways; in fact, in specifying what it is to be an eye or a leaf – or even air –
one must mention capacities to function or change in specific ways. But it is also the case that those
capacities are the capacities of specific materials, and thus any such definition must refer to a material
structure constituted in precisely the way it must be in order to have the capacities to move and change
as an eye or a leaf.
It is clear, however, that Aristotle criticises the “ancients” (specifically mentioning Empedocles and Democritus)
for having been (uniquely, or at least mostly) ‘concerned with matter’ and underestimate the degree to which the
student of nature must also know “the form or essence” (to eidos and to ti estin, ڥڭڨbڥڤ). Against them, he argues that
without asking questions about forms we cannot ask about the final causes and the outcome of natural processes.
ڧ.ڥ.ڧ Why natural science is not metaphysics
Even though natural science must concern both matter and form, it concerns matter en-formed (i.e.: insofar and
to the extent that matter ‘occurs in’, ‘is part of the account of ’ or ‘is required by’ natural forms), and form en-
mattered, i.e. not forms ‘as separable’. It is in this last characteristic that distinguishes it not just from mathematics,
but from ‘first philosophy’ as well:
μέχρι δὴ πόσου τὸν φυσικὸν δεῖ εἰδέναι τὸ
εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν; ἢ ὥσπερ ἰατρὸν νεῦ-
ρον ἢ χαλκέα χαλκόν, μέχρι τοῦ τίνος [γὰρ]
ἕνεκα ἕκαστον, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἅ ἐστι χωριστὰ
μὲν εἴδει, ἐν ὕλῃ δέ; ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον
γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος. πῶς δ' ἔχει τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τί
ἐστι, φιλοσοφίας ἔργον διορίσαι τῆς πρώτης.
(ڥڭڨaڥڤ-ڥک)
How far thenmust the student of nature know
the form or essence? Up to a point, perhaps,
as the doctor must know sinew or the smith
bronze (i.e. until he understands the purpose
of each); and the student of nature is con-
cerned only with things whose forms are sepa-
rable indeed, but do not exist apart from mat-
ter. Man is begotten by man and by the sun
as well. The mode of existence and essence
of the separable it is the business of first phi-
losophy to define. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڧک-ڪ)
Up to what point, then, should the student
of nature know the forms of things and what
they are? Perhaps he should be like the doc-
tor and the smith, whose knowledge of sinews
and bronze etends only to what they are for;
and he should confine himself to things which
are separable in form, but which are in matter.
What it is which is separable, and how things
are with it, it is the work of first philosophy to
define. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڦڬ)
It is not clear how the last remark about first philosophy being occupied with ‘what is separable’ is to be understood.
Charlton seems to think that metaphysics studies ‘forms as such’:
That which is separable (bڥڨ) is probably that which is separated in account, e.g. roundness, what it
would be to be to be [sic] a man (if that is separable); and it is for first philosophy, for discussions like
those in the Metaphysics, to determine how it is with such things, i.e. whether such expressions apply
ڦڥ
to entities in fact separate from quantities of matter, or have application only because it is possible to
give separate accounts, distinguish separate possibilities, etc. (Charlton ڥڭڭڦ: ڭڬ)
We have seen above that whether or not the matter of form/matter composites is itself an object of physical study,
form certainly is. But how is physics concerned with (immutable) forms if it is to study the principles of change
in things? According to Lennox (ڦڤڥک: ڦڧ), it is this quite formal characteristic of physical inquiry (stemming from
Aristotle’s definition of what a science is) which is responsible for Aristotelian physics asking teleological questions
and giving teleological answers:
…the natural philosopher’s investigation of form is distinct from that of the metaphysician. Specif-
ically the natural philosopher is to study the formal nature in so far as it is that for the sake of which the
materials that make up the material nature are present. Thus, the natural scientist should study matter to the
extent that it is for the sake of the form. (Lennox ڦڤڥک: ڦڧ)
I do not think that we should take Aristotle’s focus on teleological explanation to be built into the very demarcation
of natural from first philosophy. Rather, its focus is on natural things, i.e. those exhibiting change, or on kinesismore
generally, and on its four types of causes (that one of them, the final cause, is of particular importance, is a claim
Aristotle argues for, not one he builds into the very conception of natural philosophy). In theMetaphysics, Aristotle
makes a startling claim about what he (there, at least) calls “physics”:
if there is no other substance beyond the ones constituted by nature, physics will be the first science
(Eڥ ڥڤڦڪaڦګ-ڦڭ)
There are two notions of priority in play: between the “first” and all the other sciences and between the objects
of such a first science and the objects of all the other sciences. Even though they closely match, the two ordering
relations are not to be identified: metaphysics, after all, is the science of all being, albeit of being under a special
aspect, qua being.
Commenting on the initial paragraph of Book I of the Physics, Aquinas explains Aristotle’s demarcation of mathe-
matics from metaphysics on the one and from natural science on the other hand thus:
Sciendum est igitur quod quaedam sunt quorum esse dependet a ma-
teria, nec sine materia definiri possunt: quaedam vero sunt quae licet
esse non possint nisi in materia sensibili, in eorum tamen definitione
materia sensibilis non cadit. Et haec differunt ad invicem sicut curvum
et simum. Nam simum est in materia sensibili, et necesse est quod in
eius definitione cadat materia sensibilis, est enim simum nasus curvus;
et talia sunt omnia naturalia, ut homo, lapis: curvum vero, licet esse
non possit nisi in materia sensibili, tamen in eius definitione materia
sensibilis non cadit; et talia sunt omnia mathematica, ut numeri, mag-
nitudines et figurae. Quaedam vero sunt quae non dependent a ma-
teria nec secundum esse nec secundum rationem; vel quia nunquam
sunt in materia, ut Deus et aliae substantiae separatae; vel quia non
universaliter sunt in materia, ut substantia, potentia et actus, et ipsum
ens.
De huiusmodi igitur est metaphysica: de his vero quae dependent
a materia sensibili secundum esse sed non secundum rationem, est
mathematica: de his vero quae dependent a materia non solum se-
cundum esse sed etiam secundum rationem, est naturalis, quae phys-
ica dicitur. (Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum liber I lectio I,
§§ڧ-ڨ, Leoninum edition)
It must be understood, therefore, that there are some things whose
existence depends upon matter, and which cannot be defined without
matter. Further there are other things which, even though they cannot
exist except in sensible matter, have no sensible matter in their defini-
tions. And these differ from each other as the curved differs from the
snub. For the snub exists in sensible matter, and it is necessary that
sensible matter fall in its definition, for the snub is a curved nose. And
the same is true of all natural things, such as man and stone. But sen-
sible matter does not fall in the definition of the curved, even though
the curved cannot exist except in sensible matter. And this is true of all
the mathematicals, such as numbers, magnitudes and figures. Then,
there are still other things which do not depend upon matter either
according to their existence or according to their definitions. And this
is either because they never exist in matter, such as God and the other
separated substances, or because they do not universally exist in mat-
ter, such as substance, potency and act, and being itself.
Now metaphysics deals with things of this latter sort. Whereas math-
ematics deals with those things which depend upon sensible matter
for their existence but not for their definitions. And natural science,
which is called physics, deals with those things which depend upon
matter not only for their existence, but also for their definition. (St.
Thomas Aquinas ڥڭڭڭ: ad loc.)
We have here two types of dependence on matter: something x may depend on something material y either “for
its existence” (in the sense that x could not exist without y) or “for its definition” (in the sense that x could not
ڦڦ
be the thing that it is without y, or perhaps without y being the thing that it is). Metaphysics deals with things
independent in both ways, mathematics with things independent in the second but dependent in the first way and
natural science with things that depend on material things in both ways.
ڧ.ڦ The four causes
INTRO
ڧ.ڦ.ڥ “aition” is said in many ways
In II.ڧ, we find an enumeration of different sorts of things which may be given as aitia:
Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ τῶν
αἰτίων, ποῖά τε καὶ πόσα τὸν ἀριθμόν ἐστιν.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν ἡ πραγματεία, εἰ-
δέναι δὲ οὐ πρότερον οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον πρὶν ἂν
λάβωμεν τὸ διὰ τί περὶ ἕκαστον (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ
τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν) … (ڥڭڨbڥڪ-ڦڤ)
Now that we have established these distinc-
tions, we must proceed to consider causes,
their character and number. Knowledge is
the object of our inquiry, and men do not
think they know a thing till they have grasped
the ‘why’ of it (which is to grasp its primary
cause). (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڧڪ)
These distinctions having been drawn, we
must see if we can characterize and enumer-
ate the various sorts of cause. For since the
aim of our investigation is knowledge, and we
think we have knowedge of a thing only when
we can answer the question about it ‘On ac-
count of what?’ and that is to grasp the pri-
mary cause…(Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڦڬ)
The quest for knowledge is a search for an understanding of the archai and these are here further characterised as
“causes” (aitiai) and the “why” (to dia ti) of things. These are said to be their “primary causes”, the knowledge of
which gives us knowledge of the things.
Again, Aristotle is not seeking to decide between them, but just lists the different ways in which something may be
said to be an aition of something else:
ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ
γίγνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ
ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ
τούτων γένη·
ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δ'
ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου
γένη (οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ
ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμός) καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.
ἔτι ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ
τῆς ἠρεμήσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας αἴτιος, καὶ
ὁ πα τὴρ τοῦ τέκνου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ
ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλ-
λομένου.
ἔτι ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα,
οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ περι-
πατεῖ; φαμέν "ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ", καὶ εἰπόντες οὕ-
τως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον. καὶ ὅσα
δὴ κινήσαντος ἄλλου μεταξὺ γίγνεται τοῦ τέ-
λους, οἷον τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰσχνασία ἢ ἡ κάθαρσις
ἢ τὰ φάρμακα ἢ τὰ ὄργανα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα
τοῦ τέλους ἕνεκά ἐστιν, διαφέρει δὲ ἀλλήλων
ὡς ὄντα τὰ μὲν ἔργα τὰ δ' ὄργανα. (ڥڭڨbڦڧ–
ڥڭکaڦ)
In one way, then, that out of which a thing
comes to be and which persists, is called a
cause, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the sil-
ver of the bowl, and the genera of which the
bronze and the silver are species.
In another way, the form or the archetype,
i.e. the definition of the essence, and its gen-
era, are called causes (e.g. of the octave the re-
lation of ڦ:ڥ, and generally number), and the
parts in the definition.
Again, the primary source of the change or
rest; e.g. the man who deliberated is a cause,
the father is cause of the child, and gener-
ally what makes of what is made and what
changes of what is changed.
Again, in the sense of end or that for the sake
of which a thing is done, e.g. health is the
cause of walking about. (‘Why is he walk-
ing about?’ We say: ‘To be healthy’, and,
having said that, we think we have assigned
the cause.) The same is true also of all the
intermediate steps which are brought about
through the action of something else as means
towards the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, purg-
ing, drugs, or surgical instruments are means
towards health. All these things are for the
sake of the end, though they differ from one
another in that some are activities, others in-
struments.(Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڧڪ-ګڧګ)
According to one way of speaking, that out
of which as a constituent a thing comes to
be is called a cause; for example, the bronze
and and the silver and their genera would be
the causes respecively of a statue and a loving-
cup.
According to another, the form or model is
the cause; this is the account of what the be-
ing would be, and its genera – thus the cause
of an octave is the ratio two to one, and more
generally number – and the parts which come
into the account.
Again, there is the primary source of the
change or the staying unchanged: for exam-
ple, the man who has deliberated is a cause,
the father is a cause of the child, and in
general that which makes something of that
which is made, and that which changes some-
thing of that which is changed.
And again, a thing may be a cause as the end.
That is what something is for, as health might
be what a walk is for. On account of what
does he walk? We answer ‘To keep fit’ and
think that, in saying that, we have given the
cause. And anything which, the change be-
ing effected by something else, comes to be
on the way to the end, as slimness, purging,
drugs, and surgical instruments come to be
as means to health: all these are for the end,
but differ in that the former are works and the
latter tools. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڦڬ-ڦڭ)
ڦڧ
In this very first introduction of “aition is said in many ways”, Aristotle characterises the different ways in terms of
participle constructions:
that out of which as a constituent (to ex ou gignetai ti enuparchontos), asked of something that comes to be;
that what it really is (to ti ēn einai), asked of something that has an account of what it’s being would be;
the where it comes from (archē), asked of something that is changed (or stays unchanged) or is made;
the what something is for (to hou heneka), asked of something that is for an end, as a tool or as an activity.
In particular with respect to the final cause, Aristotle presents these constructions as means of picking out that of
which we speak if we understand the question “on account of what?” (dia ti?) in one of the respective senses.
He then illustrates how several of these participative constructions apply to a statue: that out of which is the bronze,
that where it comes from is the art of statue-making. They both are causes of the statue as a statue, but not in the
same way: The bronze is a cause of the statue asmatter, the art of statue-making is a cause of it as that from which
the change proceeds. Labour is where strength comes from (its efficient cause), while strength is what labour is
done for (its final cause).
MORE
Aristotle then proceeds to make the evenmore startling claim that not just can be different things causes in different
ways in which “cause” is said, but that one and the same thing can be one type of cause in different ways: “the
same thing is the cause of opposites”. The presence of the steersman is the efficient cause of the ship’s being saved;
the absence of the steersman is the efficient cause of the ship’s being lost, in the sense that the loss of the ship is
“set down to it”.
Especially in this last use, it is clear that Aristotle is using the ways in which “cause” is said to distinguish between
different types of explanation.
ڧ.ڦ.ڦ The four causes as explanations
In Met. D, we have the following list:
material “constituent out of which” (ڥڤڥڧaڦڨ)
formal “form and pattern” (ڥڤڥڧaڦڪ)
motive / efficient “first origin of alteration or rest” (ڥڤڥڧaڦڭ)
final “a thing’s fulfilment” (ڥڤڥڧaڧڦ)
To the question, ”why is this a statue?”, Aristotle can give four sorts of answers: This is a statue because it is made
of marble; because it is in the shape of David; because Michelangelo sculpted it; because Michelangelo wanted to
depict the figure of David in marble (because he needed the money, perhaps).
Shields ڦڤڥک illustrates and summarises this as follows:
Aristotle’s attitude towards explanation is best understood first by considering a simple example he
proposes in Physics ii ڧ. A bronze statue admits of various different dimensions of explanation. If
we were to confront a statue without first recognizing what it was, we would, thinks Aristotle, spon-
taneously ask a series of questions about it. We would wish to know what it is, what it is made of,
what brought it about, andwhat it is for. In Aristotle’s terms, in asking these questions we are seeking
knowledge of the statue’s four causes (aitia): the formal, material, efficient, and final. According to
Aristotle, when we have identified these four causes, we have satisfied a reasonable demand for ex-
planatory adequacy.
More fully, the four-causal account of explanatory adequacy requires an investigator to cite these four
causes:
material that from which something is generated and out of which it is made, e.g. the bronze of a
statue.
ڦڨ
formal the structure which the matter realizes and in terms of which it comes to be something
determinate, e.g., the shape of the president, in virtue of which this quantity of bronze is said to
be a statue of a president.
efficient the agent responsible for a quantity of matter’s coming to be informed, e.g. the sculptor
who shaped the quantity of bronze into its current shape, the shape of the president.
final the purpose or goal of the compound of form and matter, e.g. the statue was created for the
purpose of honoring the president.
In Physics ii ڧ, Aristotle makes twin claims about this four-causal schema: (i) that citing all four causes
is necessary for adequacy in explanation; and (ii) that these four causes are sufficient for adequacy in
explanation.
ڧ.ڦ.ڧ The four causes as ‘becauses’
In De Anima, however, things seem a little more complicated:
The soul is the cause and source of the living body. But cause and source are meant in many ways [or
are homonymous]. Similarly, the soul is a cause in accordance with the ways delineated, which are
three: it is (i) the cause as the source of motion [= the efficient cause], (ii) that for the sake of which [=
the final cause], and (iii) as the substance of ensouled bodies. That it is a cause as substance is clear,
for substance is the cause of being for all things, and for living things, being is life, and the soul is also
the cause and source of life. (DA ڨڥکbڬ–ڥڨ)
ڧ.ڧ Chance and necessity
INTRO
ڧ.ڧ.ڥ Aristotelian chance
II.ڨ asks whether there is chance, II.ک what it is and II.ڪ then distinguishes two type of chance: luck, and to automaton.
He starts in II.ڨ by pointing out that even if, as many believe, everything has a cause, there might still be chance.
But even if there is chance, it is not responsible (II.ک) for things which come to be, in the same way, always or at
least for the most part. This is, at first, an almost linguistic observation: if we know of something that happens a
certain way, that similar things always happen this way or that it is natural for them to happen this way, we have the
justification we need to question someone else’s claim that it happened by chance. Observations of exceptionless
and ‘natural’ (ceteris paribus) regularities are inimical to diagnoses of chance because, rightly or wrongly, we take
the former as evidence for the presence of an underlying cause.
Physics II.ڨ introduces “luck” and “the automatic” as causes, both for the being and the coming to be of things. Call-
ing luck the cause of the unexpected encounter at the market (or calling the encounter an “automatic outcome”) is
opposed to saying that it has a “definite cause”, and to saying that is has a cause among the list recognised e.g. by
Empedocles. II.ک then narrows down the things that may be said to be caused by luck or the automatic, excluding
first things that are “of necessity and always”, then “that which is for the most part”, and finally restricting its
application to things which “come to be for something”, said to include things that “might be done as an outcome
of thought or nature”.
The things that come to be ‘for something’ are the outcome either of nature or of thought. Things that come to
be by chance belong to the latter group, and, within it, are those that come about by virtue of concurrence, i.e. are
the things which, though they might have been done for something, in fact were not. So we get as the Aristotelian
definition of chance: a cause by virtue of concurrence of things which come to be neither always nor for the most
parts and are such as to be for something.
II.ک then says that things that are comes to be by virtue of concurrence, i.e. things that have causes which are its
causes by concurrence, may be said to come about by luck (to be outcomes of luck or automatic outcomes), even if
ڦک
they also have determinate causes. With actions, such determinate causes are the intentions to bring them about,
and actions which realise another, concurrent intention than the one that motivated them are outcomes of luck.
The example of going to the market is instructive: when Socrates both intends to go to the market and also intends
or wishes to meet his friend Theatetus (though does not intend to meet him by going to the market), it may happen
that by realising his first intention, he also realises his second intention: going to the market, he meets Theatetus
by chance, as we say. We may assume that the going to the market and the meeting of Theatetus are one and the
same event, or even action; though both intentions are realised by it, the action was motivated (i.e.: caused) only by
the first one; it was not done for the second intention of meeting the friend.
II.ڪ extends the category of what comes about by luck (ie. by concurrence) to the wider category of automatic
outcomes. Luck is a characteristic of intended outcomes of actions that were not motivated by what they brought
about, and thus restricted to activites of things capable of choosing, excluding inanimate objets, animals and
children. Automatic outcomes are things that happen for someone’s good, because of an activity of them, but
include unintended consequences.
II.ګ brings us back to the four causes, not introduces as “the many things the quesiton ‘On account of what?’
embraces: the ‘what is it?’ (formal cause), ‘what in the first instance effects the change?’ (efficient cause), ‘what
is the thing for?’ (final cause) and ‘what is the thing of ?’ (material cause). Aristotle notes that often we have
coincidence, not just of the formal with the final cause (where what a thing is is what it is for), but also of the
formal/final cause with the form of the efficient cause, as when“a man gives birth to a man”.
In II.ګ, Aristotle argues that we need not just three causes, but all four (i.e. that a full explanation of natural
phenomena must appeal to all four causes), because the final cause is implicitly presupposed in the questions what
something is and what causes its motion (cf. Kelsey ڦڤڥک: ڨڤ). II.ڬ argues that nature (in the sense of form), because
it is a principle (arche), is a final cause:
…Aristotle’s use of the definition [of nature as the principle of kinesis] here complements the use he
makes of it in II.ګ. There the moral was that nature (as form) can be a motive principle if it is an end;
here [in II.ڬ] the moral is that nature will be such a principle only if it is an end. (Kelsey ڦڤڥک: ڨڧ)
Physics II.ڬ presents Aristotle’s case for the centrality of final causation for the study of nature. The main argument
is that it is only by appeal to final causes that we can explain regularities, both those that hold by necessity (i.e.:
without exception, always) and those that hold for the most part. The reason given is that the only alternative
explanation (that things are the outcome of luck or coincidence) is acceptable only for things we recognise as
exceptions.
Natural things – i.e. things that have an inner principle of change – are and come to be due to nature; their inner
principle of change is thus their ‘for something’, the final cause of their being and coming to be, and this is also
their form, i.e. their nature-understood-as-form. It is the final = formal cause, its nature-as-form that explains the
progression in the changes a natural thing naturally undergoes:
φύσει γάρ, ὅσα ἀπό τινος ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχῆς συν-
εχῶς κινούμενα ἀφικνεῖται εἴς τι τέλος· ἀφ'
ἑκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάστοις οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν,
ἀεὶ μέντοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ. τὸ
δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ ὃ τούτου ἕνεκα, γένοιτο ἂν
καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης …ἀλλ' ὅταν τοῦτο αἰεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ
τὸ πολὺ γένηται, οὐ συμβεβηκὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ τύ-
χης· ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσι κοῖς ἀεὶ οὕτως, ἂν μή τι
ἐμποδίσῃ. (ڥڭڭbڥک-ڦڤ, ڦڨ-ڦڪ)
For those things are natural which, by a con-
tinuous movement originated from an inter-
nal principle, arrive at some end: the same
end is not reached from every principle; nor
any chance end, but always the tendency in
each is towards the same end, if there is no im-
pediment. The end and the means towards it
may come about by chance. […] But when
an event takes place always or for the most
part, it is not accidental or by chance. In
natural products the sequence is invariable, if
there is no impediment. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګکڧ)
A thing is due to nature, if it arrives, by a con-
tinuous process of change, starting from some
principle in itself, at some end. Each princi-
ple gives rise, not to the same thing in all cases,
nor to any chance thing, but always to some-
thing proceeding towards the same thing, if
there is no impediment. What something is
for, and what is for that, can also come to
be as the outcome of luck …[…], but when
a thing comes to be always or for the most
part, it is not a concurrent happening, nor the
outcome of luck. Now with that which is nat-
ural it is always thus if there is no impediment.
(Aristotle ڥڭڭڦ: ڨڥ–ڨڦ)
ڦڪ
ڧ.ڧ.ڦ Autonomous causation
When Aristotle characterises natural things as those that have an inner principle of change, does he not contradict
what he will later say in Phys. VIII that nothing changes itself ? It depends on what we mean by “change”. If the
change that something x undergoes is by its form, then this is what changes it; if the ‘change’ is by its matter, it is
not really change.
The latter claim – of ‘autonomous causation’ – concerns those cases of a passage from potentiality to actuality
that do not, according to Aristotle, constitute a change. In De An. II ڨڥګbڥ-ڥڪ, Aristotle makes the claim that a
man who passes from (i) having knowledge (of what a dog is) but not exercising it to (ii) exercising this knowledge
(encountering a dog, she knows that this is a dog) does not thereby undergo change. The lack of opportunity for the
exercise of the knowledge, i.e. the fact that the perceptual situation of the knower does not present her with a dog,
is an impediment, and the impediment is an impediment for the manifestation of the change, not for the change
itself.
That natural things have an inner principle of change means that nothing additional, nothing external is needed for
them to change: their change is initiated by themselves and this initiation can only be impeded by something ex-
ternal. Such ‘changes’ (or rather: passages from potentiality to actuality) that happen by themselves are attributed
by Aristotle to nature-as-matter. It is in this context that he uses “a word for nature which seems to mean active
striving: hormē, An. po. II ڭکaڥ, Phys. II ڥڭڦbڥڬ-ڦڭ, Met. D ڥڤڦڧaڭ,ڥڬ,ڦڧ, and, most importantly because it is a careful
passage, E.E. II ڥڦڦڨaڥڬ-bڭ.” (Charlton ڥڭڭڦ: ڭڦ).
ڧ.ڧ.ڧ The priority of teleological explanation
II.ګ. often, the three non-material causes coincide: the form / what a thing is = (the form of) the thing which
effects the change = what the thing is for. E.g. a human x produces a human; cause is: human. Human is the
form of x; x effects the change (in the underlying matter); human is what the change (the becoming human) is for.
(the standard interpretation seems very different: that the efficient cause is a form operating a tergo, and the final
cause a form operating a fronte) – cf Mure (ڥڭڧڦ: chڥ)) cf De An II ڨڥکbڬ-ڦګ
ڬ. the ‘for something’ is present in things which are and come to be due to nature
ڭ. if there is absolute necessity (as opposed to ‘necessity only on some hypothesis’), it is teleological (on the distinc-
tion of necessities, cf Met D ک)
ڦګ
Chapter ڨ
Physics III: Motion and the Infinite
ڨ.ڥ Aristotelian change
That there is change, according to Aristotle, is something we may just assume. To think we have to argue for
the existence of change is “to seek an explanation whenwe are in the position of not needing one” and shows a
lack of metaphysical taste (ڦکڨaڧڤ-ڧڥ, ڥڭڭڭ: ڭ). Nevertheless, Aristotle argues for this fundamental and self-obvious
presupposition: to assume otherwise, to assert that there is no motion, is to be in a pragmatically instable state,
because, for metaphysical reasons, no one could ever become convinced of immutabilism. This argument is made
by Aristotle in Physics VIII.ڧ:
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐχ οἷόν τε πάντ' ἠρεμεῖν, εἴ-
ρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, εἴπωμεν δὲ καὶ νῦν.
εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχει καθάπερ
φασί τινες, εἶναι τὸ ὂν ἄπειρον καὶ ἀκίνητον,
ἀλλ' οὔτι φαίνεταί γε κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ
κινεῖσθαι πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων. εἴπερ οὖν ἔστιν
δόξα ψευδὴς ἢ ὅλως δόξα, καὶ κίνησις ἔστιν,
κἂν εἰ φαντασία, κἂν εἰ ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως δοκεῖ
ὁτὲ δ' ἑτέρως· ἡ γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα κι-
νήσεις τινὲς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. (ڦکڨaڥڪ-ڦڭ)
Now we have said before that it is impossible
that all things should be at rest: nevertheless
we may now repeat the point. For even if it is
really the case, as some assert, that what is is
infinite and motionless, it certainly does not
appear to be so if we follow sense-perception:
many things that exist appear to be in motion.
Now if there is such a thing as false opinion or
opinion at all, there is also motion; and simi-
larly if there is such a thing as imagination, or
if it is the case that anything seems to be dif-
ferent at different times; for imagination and
opinion are thought to be motions of a kind.
(Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڭڧڦ)
We have in fact already argued that itis not
possible for all things to be at rest, but we
shall argue the point again now. For if things
are truly like this, as some claim, and what-is
is infinite and motionless, at least this is not
at all how it appears to the senses, but many
being seem to move. If, then, there is false
opinion, or opinion in general, there is also
motion, and even if there is only imagination,
or even if opinion varies, still there is motion.
For imagination and opinion are considered
to be kinds of motion. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڭ: ڬ)
ڨ.ڥ.ڥ What change is
Physics III.ڥ starts with an investigation of change, culmination in a definition (ڦڤڥaڭ-ڥڭ); III.ڦ then characterises
change further, as transmission of a form (ڦڤڦaڧ-ڥڦ) and III.ڧ locates change in that which is changed.
III.ڥ says that everything is either only actually or actually and potentially of one of the categories of being (“that-
which-is”):
ἔστι δὴ [τι] τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχείᾳ μόνον, τὸ δὲ
δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ, τὸ μὲν τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ
τοσόνδε, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοῦ
ὄντος κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. […] οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κί-
νησις παρὰ τὰ πράγματα· μεταβάλλει γὰρ ἀεὶ
τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ ποσὸν ἢ
κατὰ ποιὸν ἢ κατὰ τόπον, κοινὸν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων
οὐδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν, ὡς φαμέν, ὃ οὔτε τόδε οὔτε
πο (201a.) σὸν οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων
κατηγορημάτων οὐθέν· (ڦڤڤbڦڪ-ڦڬ, ڦڤڤbڧڥ-
ڦڤڥaڥ)
Some things are in fulfilment only, others
in potentiality and in fulfilment—one being
a this’, another so much, another such and
such, and similarly for the other categories of
being. […] There is no such thing as motion
over and above the things. It is always with re-
spect to substance or to quantity or to quality
or to place that what changes changes. But
ڦڬ
it is impossible, as we assert, to find anything
common to these which [ڦڤڥaڥ] is neither ‘this’
nor quantity nor quality nor any of the other
predicates. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګکګ)
Things are – some only actually, some poten-
tially and actually – either (a) a ‘this’; or (b)
so much; or (c) of such a kind, and likewise
they are in the other categories of that-which-
is. […] There is no change apart from actual
things; for whatever alters always does so in
respect either of substance, or of quantity, or
of qualification, or of place, and there is, as we
assert, nothing to be found as a common item
superior to these, which is neither a ‘this’ nor
a quantity nor a qualification nor any of the
other occupants of the categories …(Aristotle
ڥڭڭڧ: ڥ)
This is an expression of both Aristotelian realism and of his ontological pluralism: there is no such abstract thing
as ‘the’ change or ‘the’ motion – what changes or moves are always actual things that underlie the movement or
change. Everything there is belongs to one of the ten categories, and this is also why there is no such thing as
“everything”, “the universe”, “being”: there is no highest genus of being, nothing which transcends the categories
and does not belong to any single one of them.
Of things said without combination, each signifies either: (i) a substance (ousia); (ii) a quantity; (iii) a quality; (iv) a
relative; (v) where; (vi) when; (vii) being in a position; (viii) having; (ix) acting upon; or (x) a being affected. (Cat.
ڥbڦک–ڦګ)
DISCUSS EARLIERDISCUSSION THAT, IF THEREWERE AHIGHESTGENUS, THEREWOULD BE
JUST ONE DIMENSION OF VARIATION
With things in every category, there is a dimension of contrast characterised by ‘opposites’:
ἕκαστον δὲ διχῶς ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, οἷον τὸ τόδε
(τὸ μὲν γὰρ μορφὴ αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ στέρησις), καὶ
κατὰ τὸ ποιόν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸν τὸ δὲ μέ-
λαν), καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ μὲν τέλειον τὸ δ'
ἀτελές. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φορὰν τὸ μὲν
ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω, ἢ τὸ μὲν κοῦφον τὸ δὲ βαρύ.
ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἔστιν εἴδη το-
σαῦτα ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος. (ڦڤڥaڥ-ڭ)
Now each of these belongs to all its subjects in
either of two ways: namely, substance – the
one is its form, the other privation; in quality,
white and black; in quantity, complete and in-
complete. Similarly, in respect of locomotion,
upwards and downwards or light and heavy.
Hence there are as many types of motion or
change as there are of being. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ:
ګکګ–ګکڬ)
But each [occupant of a category] is present
in everything in two ways, e.g. the ‘this’ (one
case of it is the form, the other is the priva-
tion); and in respect of qualification (one case
is white and the other black); and in respect of
quantity (one case is complete and the other in-
complete). So too in respect of locomotion, one
case is above, the other is below, or one case is
light, the other is heavy. So that there are just
as many species of change and alteration as of
that-which-is. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڧ: ڦ)
MORE ABOUT DEGREES OF FREEDOM AND DIMENSIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIATION
Having noted that for each of the things in any of the categories, we can say that it is a certain way, Aristotle
notes that it can change the way it is, giving his famous definition of change in terms of the actuality/potentiality
distinction, as relativised to one of the categories:
διῃρημένου δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν ἐν-
τελεχείᾳ τοῦ δὲ δυνάμει, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος
ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν, οἷον τοῦ
μὲν ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ᾗ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἀλλοίωσις, τοῦ
δὲ αὐξητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου φθιτοῦ (οὐ-
δὲν γὰρ ὄνομα κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν) αὔξησις καὶ
φθίσις, τοῦ δὲ γενητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ γένεσις
καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά. (ڦڤڥaڭ-ڥک)
We have distinguished in respect of each class
between what is in fulfilment and what is po-
tentially; thus the fulfilment of what is poten-
tially, as such, is motion – e.g. the fulfilment
of what is alterable, as alterable, is alteration;
of what is increasable and its opposite, de-
creasable (there is no common name for both),
increase and decrease; of what can come to
be and pass away, coming to be and passing
away; of what can be carried along, locomo-
tion. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګکڬ)
There being a distinction, in respect of each
kind [of being], between [being] actually and
[being] potentially, the actuality of that which
potentially is, qua such, is change. For ex-
ample: the actuality of what admits of qual-
itative change, qua admitting of qualitative
change, is qualitative change; of what admits
of increase and decrease (there is no com-
mon term to cover both), it is increase and
decrease; of what admits of coming-to-be and
ceasing-to-be, it is coming-to-be and ceasing-
to-be; of what admits of locomotion, it is loco-
motion. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڧ: ڦ)
For each of the categories, we get a type of change: (THIS IS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE)
substances have the potentiality to come to be and there is change when they have come to be (substantial
change);
ڦڭ
quantities have the potentiality to increase and there is change when have increased (increase);
qualities have the potentiality to alter and there is change when they have altered (alteration);
relatives have the potentiality to be gained and lost and there is change when they have been gained or lost
(Cambridge change);
places have the potentiality to be occupied and there is change when they become occupied (motion);
times have the potentiality to be present and there is change when they become present (time);
REMARKSONTHEACTUALITY/POTENTIALITYDISTINCTION BEING BROADERTHAN the mat-
ter/form distinction
‘Being is said in many ways’: according to the categories, with respect to degree: opposites (which are not proper-
ties), and with respect to mode: actual / potential, to be potentially F is a way of being F .
Why is change the actuality of a potentiality as potentiality and why is it not the actuality of a potentiality as
actuality?
THIS IS IN ”ARISTOTLE-RELATIONS.TEX”
ڨ.ڥ.ڦ Active and passive change
In III.ڦ, Aristotle argues that the account of change as the actualisation of a potentiality as potentiality solves
the problems of his predecessors. To ‘locate’ change in (i.e.: to identify it with) the opposites (hot and cold, e.g.)
between which the change (of getting warmer, e.g.) occurs would require locating it (identifying it) more specifically
with the privation: the getting warmer cannot be the being hot, so it must be the privation of cold.
Already in III.ڥ, Aristotle said that natural things that produce change are themselves changed because they have
an inner principle of change. When they produce change, a potentiality is actualised and in this respect and
because this potentiality is ‘in’ them, they change. This becomes clearer at ڦڤڦaڧ-ک: things that produce change
are themselves changed if (and also because) they are potentially changeable, i.e. have an inner principle of change.
ڨ.ڥ.ڧ The location of change
III.ڧ addresses the question of the location of change. “Location” is not to be understood just spatially; because
change is, one the one hand, nothing over and above what undergoes it – because “change is in the changeable”
–, but also, on the other hand, between opposites, i.e. between some F and some G such that nothing in actuality
can be both F andG, we have to distinguish between what changes and what is changed and we have to ask which
of the two the changeable (i.e.: the change) is.
Aristotle first gives his ‘one in number, but two in account’ account of the manifestation of reciprocal powers. The
change, the warming of the air, occurs when the potentiality of the fire to warm is activated, as potentiality, and
when the potentiality of the air to be warmed is activated, as potentiality. The two potentialities, as potentialities,
are different, for it is one thing to warm and another thing to be warmed (for not everything that warms is also
thereby warmed). As actualities and “in operation”, however, they are one and the same:
Καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δὲ φανερόν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ
κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινητῷ· ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τού-
του [καὶ] ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ. καὶ ἡ τοῦ κινητι-
κοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἄλλη ἐστίν· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ
εἶναι ἐντελέχειαν ἀμφοῖν· κινητικὸν μὲν γάρ
ἐστιν τῷ δύνασθαι, κινοῦν δὲ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλ'
ἔστιν ἐνεργητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ, ὥστε ὁμοίως
μία ἡ ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ διά-
στημα ἓν πρὸς δύο καὶ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ τὸ
ἄναντες καὶ τὸ κάταντες· ταῦτα γὰρ ἓν μέν
ἐστιν, ὁ μέντοι λόγος οὐχ εἷς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ τοῦ κινοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου. (ڦڤڦaڥڧ-ڦڥ)
The solution of the difficulty is plain: motion
is in the movable. It is the fulfilment of this
potentiality by the action of that which has
the power of causing motion; and the actu-
ality of that which has the power of causing
motion is not other than the actuality of the
movable; for it must be the fulfilment of both.
A thing is capable of causing motion because
it can do this, it is a mover because it actually
does it. But it is on the movable that it is capa-
ble of acting. Hence there is a single actuality
of both alike, just as one to two and two to
one are the same interval, and the steep as-
cent and the steep descent are one—for these
are one and the same, although their defini-
tions are not one. So it is with the mover and
the moved. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڪڥ)
ڧڤ
Again – a point which makes difficulty – it
is manifest that the change is in that which
is changeable. For it is the actuality of this,
brought about by that which is productive of
change. Yet the operation of that which is pro-
ductive of change, also, is not other – there
must in fact be an actuality of both – for it is
productive of change by its being capable of
so doing, and it produces change by its oper-
ation, but it is such as to operate on what is
changeable; so that the operation of both is
one in the same way as it is the same interval
from ڥ to ڦ as from ڦ to ڥ, and as the uphill
and the down-hill – these are one, yet their
definition is not one, and similarly with that
which produces and undergoes change. (Aris-
totle ڥڭڭڧ: ڨ)
There is just one process of warming and it realises both the potentiality of a to warm b and b’s potentiality of
being warmed by a. But where is it, where does it take place and what things are undergoing it? Aristotle discusses
what he calls a “formal difficulty” (aporia logikē) with respect to the warming (“A”) of b by a and the being warmed
(“B”) of b by a.
We assume, first, that A and B have different operations in that A is active and B passive: A is the action of a and
B is the being acted upon of b. Even under that assumption, however (and also independently of it), A and B are
both changes and have equally good claims to be ‘the’ change in the situation. But then we have no good answer
to the question where A is:
• If A is ‘in’ a then, because A is a change, either a changes or it is the case that a ‘has’ change (in itself) but
does not change.
• If A and B are ‘in’ b, then b undergoes one change in virtue of ‘having’ two changes.
Both horns of the dilemma lead to absurdity and we have to deny the assumption that created the dilemma: A
and B do not have different operations.
We thus conclude that A and B have the same operation – they are in one sense one, even though they differ in
form. Aristotle notes two difficulties with this view:
ڥ. Will it not then follow that everything that warms is also warmed? A, after all, is the warming and B is the
being warmed and if they are one and are a’s (in the sense that A is a’s), will it not then follow that a both
warms and is warmed?
ڦ. If B is in b and A and B are one, will it not follow that A is in b as well? If A is in b, however, what prevents
us from saying that b warms (and not just: is warmed)?
Aristotle gives a negative answer to the first and a positive answer to the second question, explaining why in both
cases the absurd consequences do not follow.
With respect to the second problem, Aristotle points out that A is in b in the sense in which b is A’s object (and not
in the sense in which b would be A’s subject): A is on b and in this sense in b.
With respect to the first problem, Aristotle introduces another, sui generis type of identity, in addition to identity-in-
form and identity-in-reality:ڥ
ἢ οὔτε τὸ τὴν ἄλλου ἐνέργειαν ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἶναι
ἄτοπον (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ δίδαξις ἐνέργεια τοῦ διδα-
σκαλικοῦ, ἔν τινι μέντοι, καὶ οὐκ ἀποτετμη-
μένη, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε ἐν τῷδε), οὔτε μίαν δυοῖν κω-
λύει οὐθὲν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι (μὴ ὡς τῷ εἶναι τὸ
αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπάρχει τὸ δυνάμει ὂν πρὸς τὸ
ἐνεργοῦν), οὔτ' ἀνάγκη τὸν διδά σκοντα μαν-
θάνειν, οὐδ' εἰ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ αὐτό
ἐστιν, μὴ μέντοι ὥστε τὸν λόγον εἶναι ἕνα τὸν
<τὸ> τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα, οἷον ὡς λώπιον καὶ
ἱμάτιον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ Θήβηθεν Ἀθήναζε
καὶ ἡ Ἀθήνηθεν εἰς Θήβας, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ
πρότερον; οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ πάντα ὑπάρχει τοῖς
ὁπωσοῦν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς τὸ εἶναι
τὸ αὐτό.
[…] ὅλως δ' εἰπεῖν οὐδ' ἡ δίδαξις τῇ μαθή-
σει οὐδ' ἡ ποίησις τῇ παθήσει τὸ αὐτὸ κυρίως,
ἀλλ' ᾧ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, ἡ κίνησις· τὸ γὰρ τοῦδε
ἐν τῷδε καὶ τὸ τοῦδε ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἐνέργειαν εἶναι
ἕτερον τῷ λόγῳ. (ڦڤڦbک–ڥک, bڥڭ–bڦڦ)
It is not absurd that the actualization of one
thing should be in another. Teaching is the
activity of a person who can teach, yet the op-
eration is performed in something – it is not
cut adrift from a subject, but is of one thing
in another. There is nothing to prevent two
things having one and the same actualization
(not the same in being, but related as the po-
tential is to the actual). Nor is it necessary
that the teacher should learn, even if to act
and to be acted on are one and the same, pro-
vided they are not the same in respect of the
account which states their essence (as raiment
and dress), but are the same in the sense in
which the road from Thebes to Athens and
the road from Athens to Thebes are the same,
as has been explained above. For it is not
ڥ. We will come back to this passage in more detail in sct. ?? on p. ??.
ڧڥ
things which are in any way the same that
have all their attributes the same, but only
those to be which is the same.
[…] To generalize, teaching is not the same
as learning, or agency as patiency, in the full
sense, though they belong to the same subject,
themotion; for the actualization of this in that
and the actualization of that through the ac-
tion of this differ in definition. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ:
ګڪڧ)
Or can it be that: (a) it is not absurd that the
operation of one thing should be in another
(for teaching is the operation of that which is
disposed to teach, but it is on something, and
not cut off, but is of this on this); and (b) there
is, also, nothing to prevent the operation of
two things being one and the same, not as
the same in being, but in the way that what
potentially is is related to what is operating,
and (c) it is also not necessary that the teacher
learns, even if to act upon and to be acted
upon are the same thing, provided they are
not the same in the sense that the definition
that gives the ‘what it was to be’ is one (as with
‘raiment’ and ‘clothing’), but in the sense in
which the road from Thebes to Athens is the
same as the road from Athens to Thebes, as
was said earlier? For it is not the case that all
the same things are present in things that are
the same in any sense whatever, but only of
those of which the being is the same.
[…] But speaking generally, the teaching is
not the same, in the primary sense, as the
learning, nor the acting-upon as the being-
acted-upon, but that in which these things are
present, namely the change, [is the same as
being acted upon]; for to be the operation of
A in B, and to be the operation of B by the
agency of A, are different in definition. (Aris-
totle ڥڭڭڧ: ک-ڪ)
Even if A and B are the same in being, as long as they differ in form (in what it is to be an A and to be a B), they
may manifest this formal difference without contradiction.
ڨ.ڦ The nature of kinêseis
ڨ.ڦ.ڥ Powers, processes and events
ڨ.ڦ.ڦ The location of change
ڨ.ڦ.ڧ Change is of forms
There is an apparent tension between two Aristotelian claims:
• The ‘variation’ element in change is the pair of opposites; it is with respect to this pair of opposites, i.e. to
form, that the starting-point of a change differs, and is opposed to, its end-point.
• Forms, including those forms involved in change, do not change – not because they are un-changing, as
Plato thought, but because they are not the right kind of thing to be changeable at all.
Aquinas makes this quite clear in his commentary on Physics I.ک:
Album enim non fit ex musico nisi forte secundum accidens, inquan-
tum musico accidit esse album vel nigrum; sed album fit per se ex non
albo, et non ex quocumque non albo, sed ex non albo quod est ni-
grum vel medius color: et similiter musicum ex non musico; et non
ex quocumque non musico sed ex opposito, quod dicitur immusicum,
idest quod est natum haberemusicam et non habet, vel ex quocumque
medio inter ea. (Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum, liber I, lec-
tio X, §ګڬ, Leoninum edition)
For white does not come to be from musical except accidentally inso-
far as white or black happen to be in the musical. But white comes to
be per se from the non-white, and not from just any non-white, but
from that non-white which is black or some mean colour. And in like
manner, the musical comes to be from the non-musical, and again not
from just any nonmusical, but from its opposite, which is called the un-
musical, i.e., from that which is disposed to be musical but is not, or
from some mean between these two. (St. Thomas Aquinas ڥڭڭڭ: ad
loc.)
ڨ.ڧ The Aristotelian infinite
The third book of the Physics started with the observation that “change is thought to be something continuous”
(suneches, ڦڤڤbڥګ) and that it thereby has to to with the infinite (to apeiron. III.ڨ now distinguishes different senses
of “infinite” and III.ک argues that there cannot be a self-subsistent infinite, while III.ڪ discusses the sense in which
there can be, and is, a potential infinite, which III.ګ characterises as derivative and with respect to which III.ڬ
argues that it is not a principle.
ڧڦ
ڨ.ڧ.ڥ Against the actual infinite
If there is such a thing as ‘the infinite’, then it is either a substance (as the Pythagoreans and Plato think) or of a
substance (as the natural philosophers think). If it is a substance, we can ask a number of unanswerable questions
about it:
origin If there is an infinite, where does it come from? It cannot come from anything (outside itself), so it must be
a principle (arche).
composition If there is an infinite, what is it composed of ? It cannot be itself divisible, but only insofar as it has a
quantity; but then it is its quantity and not it itself that is infinite.
complexity If there is an infinite, does it have parts? If it has parts, and finitely many of them, some of them must
be infinite themselves; this infinite part will then be both a proper part and identical to the whole (because
it, too, is infinity), which is impossible. If it does not have parts, it is not infinite as a substance, but in some
other way. If it has infinitely many parts, it is not itself infinite, but infinite-in-number. If the infinite is
infinite-in-number only, then this number cannot be ‘separated’, i.e. “existing as the number of an actually
realized totality” (Hussey ڥڭڭڧ: ګڭ), for such a number is essentially countable and it is impossible to count a
number that is an infinite plurality of units, for each unit would have to be counted separately.
place If there is an infinite, where is it? The infinite cannot be a body, because bodies are essentially bounded
(‘formal’ argument) and because such a body would have to be in a place. It cannot be in any place because
such a place would have to be infinite and infinite places are impossible because we cannot characterise
them in terms of above/below, left/right, forwards/backwards.
motion If there is an infinite, is it in motion or at rest? It cannot be in motion, for it takes up a place that is infinite
in extent and so cannot change. It cannot be at rest, for to be at rest means not to be in some adjacent place.
ڨ.ڧ.ڦ The potential infinite
III.ڪ opens with the other horn of the dilemma: there must be an infinite, in some sense, and as an accident of
things, because we cannot otherwise understand the series created by time, divisions of magnitudes (continuity)
and number. He then says the following about the mode of being of the potential infinite:
ὅλως μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔστιν τὸ ἄπειρον, τῷ ἀεὶ
ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο λαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ λαμβανό-
μενον μὲν ἀεὶ εἶναι πεπερασμένον, ἀλλ' ἀεί γε
ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον· [ἔτι τὸ εἶναι πλεοναχῶς λέ-
γεται, ὥστε τὸ ἄπειρον οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς
τόδε τι, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἢ οἰκίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ
ἡμέρα λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀγών, οἷς τὸ εἶναι οὐχ
ὡς οὐσία τις γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐν γενέσει ἢ
φθορᾷ, πεπερασμένον, ἀλλ' ἀεί γε ἕτερον καὶ
ἕτερον·] (ڦڤڪaڦګ-ڦڤڪbڧ)
For generally the infinite has this mode of ex-
istence: one thing is always being taken af-
ter another, and each thing that is taken is al-
ways finite, but always different. [Again, ‘be-
ing’ is spoken of in several ways, so that we
must not regard the infinite as a ‘this’, such
as a man or a horse, but must suppose it to
exist in the sense in which we speak of the
day or the games as existing—things whose
being has not come to them like that of a sub-
stance, but consists in a process of coming to
be or passing away, finite, yet always differ-
ent.] (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګګڪ), adding “Ross ex-
cises the bracketed sentence as an alternative
version of ڦڤڪaڥڬ–ڦڭ.” (ڦڤڥڨ: ڭڬڤ)
In general, the infinite is in virtue of one
thing’s constantly being taken after another –
each thing taken is finite, but it is always one
followed by another; but in magnitudes what
was taken persists, in the case of time and the
race of men the things taken cease to be, yet
so that [the series] does not give out. (Aristo-
tle ڥڭڭڧ: ڥڨ)
In III.ګ, Aristotle contrasts the two types of potential infinity he accepts. Number is infinite ‘upwards’, but not
‘downwards’: one / unity / ڥ is indivisible, and numbers are pluralities of it and for any number, there is more. But
there is no infinite number, and the infinity of arithmetical operators is not ‘separable’:
ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ πλεῖον ἀεὶ ἔστι νοῆσαι· ἄπειροι γὰρ
αἱ διχοτομίαι τοῦ μεγέθους. ὥστε δυνάμει μὲν
ἔστιν, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὔ· ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὑπερβάλλει
τὸ λαμβανόμενον παντὸς ὡρισμένου πλήθους.
ἀλλ' οὐ χωριστὸς ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὗτος [τῆς διχο-
τομίας], οὐδὲ μένει ἡ ἀπειρία ἀλλὰ γίγνεται,
ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ χρόνου.
(ڦڤګbڥڤ-ڥک)
But in the direction of largeness it is always
possible to think of a large number; for the
number of times a magnitude can be bisected
is infinite. Hence this infinite is potential,
never actual: the number of parts that can be
taken always surpasses any definite amount.
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But this number is not separable, and its in-
finity does not persist but consists in a process
of coming to be, like time and the number of
time. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ګڬڤ)
But in the direction of more it is always possi-
ble to conceive of [more] – since the halvings
of magnitude are infinite. Hence [the infinite
in number] is potentially, but not in actual op-
eration, though what is taken always exceeds
any deflnite multitude. But this number is not
separable, and the inflnity does not stay still
but comes to be, in the same way as time and
the number of time. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڧ: ڥګ)
Quantity, by contrast, is infinite ‘downwards’, but not ‘upwards’: continuous quantities can be divided into in-
finitely many parts (and thus have these parts ‘by division’ potentially), but we cannot add infinitely many separate
parts to anything and construct ‘by addition’ something which is actually infinitely big.
ڨ.ڧ.ڧ Beginningless time
Hussey (ڥڭڭڧ: xxv) describes Aristotle’s “startling onclusion about the past” as follows:
Straightforward realism about the past is no longer possible, since Aristotle holds that there was no
beginning of time. He wishes therefore to say e.g., that there have been infinitely many yearly cycles
of the sun before the present. But this cannot refer to a completed infinity. On his own account of
infinity, it has to be true that, for some number n, there have been n previsous yearly cycles and there
have not been, but could have been n+1 previous cycles. It is difficult to give any sense to this unless
the past is in some sense a creation of the present. On such a view, the past is some thing created by
memory and historical records in a lawlike fasion, just as the number series is something created by
mathematical operations in a lawlike fasion.” (Hussey ڥڭڭڧ: xxv)
ڧڨ
Chapter ک
Physics IV.ڥ-ڭ: Place and the Void
ک.ڥ The ontology of places
We get, I think, a good grasp of the intellectual distance between Aristotle and us by noting that for Aristotle the
existence of places, and the pressing need to give a philosophical account of them and their nature, follows just from
the claim that at least some things are somewhere; and that, at the same time, uncovering the ‘quantificational’
character of the “…is somewhere” predicate does not commit us, by his lights, to treat places as items in our
ontological inventory of what there is. To treat them as such would be to treat them as subjects (hupokeimena) or
perhaps even as substances (ousiai).
ک.ڥ.ڥ The need for an account of place
Aristotle starts in IV.ڥ by noting an aporia with respect to place (topos) – where things are:
in favour: One thing can come to occupy the same place that was occupied by another thing before, so we should
distinguish between a place and what occupies it. Places are not just where things are, but also where they
go and where they come from. Places have dimensions and are extended in those.
against: Places are not bodies (somata), but share their dimensions. Place can be two-, one- or zero-dimensional:
but can we similarly distinguish two-dimensional and zero-dimensional places from their occupants (surfaces
and points)? What are places composed of, how are they causally active, where are they, can they change?
In IV.ڦ he notes, in addition, reasons for and against identifying it with either the form or the matter:
the form: Its place is where a thing is, what the thing is in, what surrounds the thing – so it is its form (eidos) or
shape (morphē). But it cannot be its form, because it is separable from it (and can come to be occupied by
something else).
the matter: The place where a thing is has a magnitude and is extended; what is extended and formed a certain
way is matter (hylē). But place cannot be the matter of a thing if it surrounds and contains it (that is: its
matter).
The place of a thing both surrounds it (periechein), i.e. “circumscribes [it] without including [it] as a component
part” (Hussey ڥڭڭڧ: ڥڤڨ), and is also coextensive with it. Because it surrounds, it is outside and cannot be its matter;
because it is coextensive, it is extended and cannot be its form.
FROM HERE ON, THE STUFF IS IN ”ARISTOTLE-PLACE.TEX”
ک.ڥ.ڦ Places as what is changed in motion
”ARISTOTLE-PLACE.TEX”
ڧک
ک.ڥ.ڧ Inner and outer boundaries
”ARISTOTLE-PLACE.TEX”
ک.ڦ The superiority of Aristotle’s account of places
INTRO
ک.ڦ.ڥ Places as derivative
Aristotle’s account of places as derivative, lower-dimensional limits of bodies has some interesting consequences:
”ARISTOTLE-PLACE.TEX”
ک.ڦ.ڦ The location of places: places are not shadows
”ARISTOTLE-PLACE.TEX”
ک.ڦ.ڧ The location of the universe and its rotation
”ARISTOTLE-PLACE.TEX”
ک.ڧ Nine arguments against the possibility of void
TO BE DONE
ک.ڧ.ڥ There cannot be void around things
ک.ڧ.ڦ There cannot be void within things
ک.ڧ.ڧ The world as a plenum
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Chapter ڪ
Physics IV.ڥڤ-ڥڨ: Time
ڪ.ڥ Time and change
As with space, Aristotle starts his discussion of time with a consideration of reasons for and against its existence.
The considerations against it are the following:
Passing away If there is time, some of it has been and is not, and some will be and is not. So if there is time,
some parts of it are not.
Constitution Time is complex and a whole, but it never (i.e. at no time) has all its parts, it never is the whole
they compose.
Extension Time is temporally extended, but the only part of it that is (and hence the only part it has, for to have
a part that part must exist) is an unextended instant, and an instant, lacking temporal extent, cannot make
up time.
Change Time is dynamic, it passes, but it is difficult to see how the only part of it that exists – the present – may
be said to change at all.
The present For time to pass, the present must recede; but it cannot pass into utter non-existence, because there
is some time that is past; to say, on the other hand, that it recedes (only) in the sense of stopping to be present,
is not saying anything, because it cannot be present at any other time than it is. Neither does it help to say
that the present is extended, because then it has two boundaries, and only one of them can be the present.
These are difficult problems: even if time exists – and this, after all, we have presupposed when we have presup-
posed that there is change – it seems a rather strange beast. One thus understands why some may want to say that
time, if it exists at all, exists only “dimly” or “barely”.
The contrary case, that there is time, is made only cursorily. This may have two reasons: we may, if not of all then
certainly of many things, ask when they are – so there is a time at which they are, so there are times and there is
time. We have also presupposed at the outset that there is change, and change is always in time.
If there is time because there is change, however, can we identify the two? Aristotle considers several ways to do
and concludes that we cannot. Time could be change in the sense of being the thing that (primarily) changes,
e.g. the revolution of the universe. If this is a thing, however, then it does not change (and there could be several
of it); if it is a process, then it does change, but within time, so it cannot be itself time. Time could be change in the
sense of being identical to each and every alteration: but these are in the things that change, and time is not; they
are fast or slow, and thus in time in different ways, but time cannot be faster or slower than it is.
ڪ.ڥ.ڥ No time without change
With time, we have, at least, a double problem. The first one concerns the reality of time: to be real, time must
be temporally extended and it is difficult to see how it can be. This problem is the problem of what Aristotle calls
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“the before” (to proteron) and “the after” (to husteron), of instants that are past or future (green arrow) in relation to
the one instant that is the present (red arrow):
In what sense is time ‘made up’ of all these instants, what ontological status have the green ones, in what sense are
they part of time? We want to say, of course, that some of them will be red and others have been red – but as in the
case of the problem of change, the difficulty is to see why saying this should help.
The other, correlative, but distinct problem concerns the passage of time. Not only does time extend into non-
being, but it also changes with respect to it; it passes and things that were future become present and then past.
This is the problem of understanding the difference between the situation pictured above and the following:
The two situation do not differ in their ontology, one might say, they depict the same elements; but they depict
them differently, and as differently: between the first and the second situation, time has ‘moved on’, and brought
about a change in which of the instants is present. But how can that be?
After having concluded in IV.ڥڤ that time is not the same thing as change, Aristotle reconsiders their intimate
relationship in IV.ڥڥ. The first link is epistemological: it is our own undergoing of change that makes us notice
change. I find it plausible to assume that for Aristotle there is even a tighter link. Noticing change is undergoing
change oneself: I cannot see the cat moving, e.g., if I do not see it differently at different times. When there
is change in my perception, I always notice it (though perhaps not all of it): seeing a difference is seeing things
differently and this difference is itself (part of what is) seen.ڥ
Aristotle concludes from the epistemological link that time and change stand in a relation of ontological depen-
dence, that even though time is not identical with change, it is not ‘separable’ from it either, that time is an ‘aspect’
of change. This explains, in his view, the mutual dependence of their perceptions: time and change are “perceived
together”. Being an aspect of change, time inherits the extrinsicness of some of its essential properties. A change is
e.g. said to be continuous because it is a change in a continuous magnitude. The time of that change, which itself
is of the magnitude, is thus continuous for the same reason: because the magnitude in question is continuous.
Our perception of time thus has a quite different epistemological status than our perception of e.g. stones. Temporal
experience is, if it is of temporality, i.e. change, necessarily itself temporal, i.e. changing: to say of a given clock
that it runs fast or slow, goes more or less quickly or that it has stopped, is to say these things of the given clock in
relation to another one that is ‘held steady’. We do not need a ‘clock’ in the normal sense of the word to do this:ڦ
any regular process, e.g. (normally) our heart-beat will do – “regular”, of course, itself being a relative temporal
qualification. We measure temporal change in relation to temporal change; there is no ‘outside perspective’ on
time at all.
These remarks about the centrality of time measurement are followed by a difficult passage, where Aristotle dis-
cusses whether the same can be said of the dimensionality of time:
ڥ. This does not mean that Aristotle here has to postulate an introspective faculty, which monitors the perceptions (perceives them?) and
notices their difference. Difference may be ‘given’ in perception in other, cognitively less demanding ways, as when we see something surprising
– we are surprised to see this (pupil dilated, startled), but for this it is not necessary that we see something as surprising.
ڦ. Indeed, it appears quite doubtful that there is such a thing: “clock” does not appear to be a semantically unified concept at all.
ڧڬ
τὸ δὴ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τόπῳ πρῶτόν
ἐστιν. ἐνταῦθα μὲν δὴ τῇ θέσει· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῷ
μεγέθει ἔστι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάγκη
καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον,
ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ
ἔστιν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διὰ τὸ ἀκολου-
θεῖν ἀεὶ θατέρῳ θάτερον αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ
πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει ὃ μέν ποτε
ὂν κίνησις [ἐστιν]· τὸ μέντοι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕτερον
καὶ οὐ κίνησις. (ڦڥڭaڥڨ-ڦڥ)
The distinction of before and after holds pri-
marily, then, in place; and there in virtue of
relative position. Since then before and af-
ter hold in magnitude, they must hold also in
movement, these corresponding to those. But
also in time the distinction of before and af-
ter must hold; for time and movement always
correspond with each other. The before and
after in motion identical in substratum with
motion yet differs from it in being, and is not
identical with motion. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڬڦڤ)
Now the before and after is in place primar-
ily; there, it is by convention. But since the
before and after is in magnitude, it must also
be in change, by analogy with what there is
there. But in time, too, the before and af-
ter is present, because the one always follows
the other of them. The before and after in
change is, in respect of what makes it what it
is, change; but its being is different and is not
change. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڧ: ڨڧ–ڨڨ)
Aristotle here discusses the difficult question if, and if so, in what sense, we can attribute temporal qualifications to
time itself and wants to exhibit a way in which we can. It was said earlier that it makes no sense to talk of “time in
time”, i.e. to say of some part of time, e.g. the present, that it was future and will be past. Every time is essentially
the time it is and could not be at any other time, for that would mean that it were another time. As an aspect of
change, which is a change in some intrinsically ordered ‘pair of opposites’, e.g. the continuum from hot to cold,
time may indirectly be said to exhibit temporal order. Let us picture Socrates sitting by the fire, warming up:
t
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We have a change, of an underlying thing (Socrates), between a pair of opposites, i.e. from cold to warm. This
change is a change in magnitude: it is between a lower point in the temperature dimension (depicted in the middle)
and a higher point in that dimension. It is also directed: it is from cold to hot and this is why it is a warming-up,
rather than a cooling-down of Socrates. Saying that it is a warming-up, however, is already saying that the process
is temporarily directed, that the lower point in temperature is before the higher point, which is after.
Aristotle discusses here the ontological status of the green arrows in the first picture above and asks what it means
to call them “before” and “after” respectively. He answers that these denominations mark the inner temporal
structure of a process which is intrinsically directed, i.e. which is a change from one of two opposites to the other.
The change is from the cold to the hot (and thus a different change than the change from hot to cold would be),
and gives the magnitude a ‘before’ and ‘after’ structure: before the warming up, Socrates was cold, and after it, he is
now warm. Time, because it is an aspect of this change, inherits this structure: the time when Socrates was cold
may be said to be before the time when Socrates is warm, even though the times themselves have not receded into
the past.
The temporal characterisation of what is happening with Socrates is in this way derivative on and posterior to the
process we are observing: it is because this process is a warming up that t1 is related to the blue end of the arrow
and t2 is related to the red end of the arrow. If they were differently related (t1 to red and t2 to blue), the process
would be a cooling-down. That the two instants are so related is all there is about them: nothing in the situation
makes it impossible that it could also be pictured this way:
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This is the same picture because the intrinsically temporally directed process is the same: the earlier instant is still
associated with the blue end of the arrow, the later instant with the red end. The situation, of course, would be
different if we changed only one direction of the two arrows: we would then depict a cooling-down rather than a
warming-up.
In the last sentence of the quoted passage, Aristotle addresses the question of the ontological status of non-present
instants, saying that they are not different in number or reality from the ongoing process: they are what makes
that process what it is (i.e. a warming-up, rather than a cooling down): they are its moments, but they differ from
it in being or in account. What is is to be a process of warming up is not the same as what it is to be an instant
of high-temperature (nor what it is to be an instant of low-temperature). What it is to be the before and the after
is for the instants to be related in some way to different stages of that process, not what it is to be these different
stages.ڧ
But what exactly is it what we do when we describe a intrinsically temporally structured process in terms of the
before and the after, two instants differing not in reality but only in being? To temporally locate the successive
parts of a process, we ‘clock’ them, i.e. we notice their passing by marking off two ‘nows’:
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν ὅταν
ὁρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστε-
ρον ὁρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρό-
νον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κι-
νήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν. ὁρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο
καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτά, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν
ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ ἄκρα τοῦ μέσου νο-
ήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν
πρότερον τὸ δ' ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτό φαμεν
εἶναι χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ ὁριζόμενον τῷ νῦν χρόνος
εἶναι δοκεῖ· καὶ ὑποκείσθω. (ڦڥڭaڦڦ-ڧڤ)
But we apprehend time only when we have
marked motion, marking it by before and af-
ter; and it is only when we have perceived be-
fore and after in motion that we say that time
has elapsed. Now we mark them by judging
that one thing is different from another, and
that some third thing is intermediate to them.
When we think of the extremes as different
from the middle and the mind pronounces
that the ‘nows’ are two, one before and one af-
ter, it is then that we say that there is time, and
this that we say is time. For what is bounded
by the ‘now’ is thought to be time – we may
assume this. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڬڦڤ)
But time, too, we become acquainted with
when we mark off change, marking it off by
the before and after, and we say that time has
passed when we get a perception of the before
and after in change. We mark off change by
taking them [the before and after in change]
to be different things, and some other thing
between them; for whenever we conceive of
the limits as other than the middle, and the
soul says that the nows are two, one before
and one after, then it is and this it is that we
say time is. (What is marked off by the now is
thought to be time: let this be taken as true.)
(Aristotle ڥڭڭڧ: ڨڨ)
Aristotle here makes the step from temporal perception to perception of time and to what it is we then perceive,
i.e. time itself. What the step exactly consists in is difficult to say. Here is an attempt: The marking-off is done by
us, functioning as a clock, and it is done by positing one identical mark – the ‘now’ – twice in succession, marking
two boundaries and thus an interval, i.e. (part of) what time is. What we judge to be different from one another
are the two instants which are identical in number but different in being. The way we judge this is by ‘marking off ’
two ‘nows’. We can do this, while watching the cat move or Socrates warming up, by saying “now” and “now”.
By saying that we say the “same thing” twice, we automatically say that we say it at different times, and so that we
‘mark off ’ different instants.ڨ As these two instants do not differ intrinsically, however, we cannot but ‘mark’ them
‘off ’ in the same way, by “now” and we are right in doing so (they are present when we ? mark’ them ‘off ’, after
ڧ. Perhaps a way of making sense of this is the following: the temporal qualifications qualify directly only the magnitude, and only indirectly
the process.
ڨ. We can make this explicit by saying “Socrates is warming up” first, and “Socrates has warmed up” later – we would still have said, in a
sense, the same thing twice. We will return to this point later.
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all). They are both nows and differ only in that the one is ‘marked off ’ as the before and the other one is ‘marked
off ’ as the after.
What we ‘mark off ’ in this way is time. We thus get the famous account of time as the number (measure, rate) of
change:
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως
κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. οὐκ ἄρα κί νη-
σις ὁ χρόνος ἀλλ' ᾗ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κίνησις. ση-
μεῖον δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον κρί-
νομεν ἀριθμῷ, κίνησιν δὲ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω
χρόνῳ· ἀριθμὸς ἄρα τις ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀρι-
θμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον
καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀρι-
θμοῦμεν), ὁ δὴ χρόνος ἐστὶν τὸ ἀριθμούμενον
καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν. (ڦڥڭbڥ-ڭ)
For time is just this – number of motion in
respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’. Hence time is
not movement, but only movement in so far
as it admits of enumeration. An indication of
this: we discriminate the more or the less by
number, but more or less movement by time.
Time then is a kind of number. (Number,
we must note, is used in two ways – both of
what is counted or countable and also of that
with which we count. Time, then, is what is
counted, not that with which we count: these
are different kinds of thing.) (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ:
ڬڦڥ)
For that is what time is: a number of change
in respect of the before and after. So time is
not change but in the way in which change
has a number. An indication: we discern the
greater and the less by number, and greater
and less change by time; hence time is a kind
of number. But number is [so called] in two
ways: we call number both (a) that which is
counted and countable, and (b) that by which
we count. Time is that which is counted and
not that by which we count. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڧ:
ڨڨ)
The two marks by which we mark off an interval are in one sense the same and in one sense different: they are the
same in reality and in number, because they are both borders between the past and the future, and what it is to
be such a border (‘whatever it is that makes it a now’) is thus the same. Though the now remains numerically the
same, it undergoes a change (it is the underlying thing of the change which is the passing of time): the two ‘nows’
are different in definition (‘their being is not the same’) because each of them is the now of something changing,
and what it is to be that changing thing changes during (and because of) the change.
The being of the now changes from before to after (i.e.: it was the before, and becomes the after), and it is this
difference in being that is counted by our marking off the two respective instants.
ڪ.ڥ.ڦ Time is a number
If he could have heard Aristotle saying that time is a number, Plato would probably have felt vindicated: what good
is it building your whole philosophy around the assumption that there is change, if you end up saying that time,
indispensable for and inseparable from change, is an abstract mathematical object, unchanging and absolute? To
not give Plato such shallow satisfaction, it is very important for Aristotle to be able to say that time is a number
only in a sense. But in which sense? This question is answered in the last sentence of the quote above: While time
is a number and numbers essentially are for counting, it is not that by which we are counting but that which is
counted.
Number words, in Greek, English and any other language I know of, are systematically ambiguous between a
predicative and a noun-use. When I say that there are three horses, I say that their number is three, and vice
versa: in its first occurrence, however, “two” was qualifying predicatively the horses (collectively, of course, not
individually), while in its second occurrence, it stands for that thing which is the number two. At least for “one”, the
first use is marked in many languages by gender: I cannot say “ein Frau” or “un femme”, even though the number
of women (salient in a certain context) may be said to be “eins” (German even uses a noun that is syntactically
different from the male number predicate) or “un”. In its second meaning, “two” stands for what we count by (the
number), in its first for what we are counting (the horses).
The two uses of number words are connected, however: when I say that there are two (flowers, say), I am number-
ing them by “two”, but also saying of their number (two) that it is two. I am counting them, but also their number.
What I am counting are units, one horse and then another horse: the units are the same (what it is to be one for
the first horse is what it is to be one for the second horse), but I am counting them/it twice, so in this sense I am
counting two units, i.e. am counting to two, i.e. am counting the number of the two horses.
What we mark off when we measure time are nows, and time is the number of them, i.e. a measure of how many
of them there are (counting by difference in being, not by numerical difference). The length of what we mark out
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is recurring (“we’ve been waiting for him again for five minutes”), even though what is recurring (this five minute
wait, that five minute wait) is not: it is not recurring identically, as it were, but only with respect to its length.
ڪ.ڥ.ڧ Continuity
Because the ‘now’ is extrinsically individuated by the thing it is the border off, there would be no ‘now’ in an
instantaneous or atemporal universe: there would be no ‘now’ if there were no time and there would be no time
(nothing counted) if there were no now.
ڪ.ڦ The reality of time
What kind of reality does “time is the number of change” attribute to time? Hussey, along with many others, takes
Aristotle to think that time is a quantity:
Aristotle’s thought is that (roughly) there is nothing more to time tna that it is a measurable quantity
which attaches to changes in just the same sort of way as e.g. length and heaviness attach to material
bodies. There is, in particular, no unified, all-embracing, self-subsistent ‘Time’: there are just changes
having greater and lesser quantities of time-length. (Hussey ڥڭڭڧ: xxxviii)
While I agree with the second assertion, the first one is straightforwardly false: Aristotle does not say that time is a
quantity or magnitude, but says that it is the number, i.e. a measure of some such quantity or magnitude.
ڪ.ڦ.ڥ Two different nows
ڪ.ڦ.ڦ Ways of being in time
ڪ.ڦ.ڧ The infinity of time
ڪ.ڧ Measuring and counting
ڪ.ڧ.ڥ Sortal-relativity
ڪ.ڧ.ڦ Aristotle’s structuralism
ڪ.ڧ.ڧ Time as a number
ڨڦ
Chapter ګ
Physics V+VI: Motions
ګ.ڥ The change that is motion
Physics V.ڥ distinguishes three ways in which one and the same change may be described:
accidental change (kata sumbebekos): the musician walks, who happens to be Socrates – a change of the musician,
but which happens to be of the musician (rather than of a non-musician) only accidentally;
intrinsic change (kath’auto): the body is healed because the eyeis healed – a change of the body, which it undergoes
in virtue of a change in one of its parts;
essential change: a thing becomes actually what is was potentially – the body which is capable of being healed
is healed and thus realises the potentiality it has.
It is the third type of transition that is directly attributed to the thing underlying the change – the matter changing
from one opposite to the other – and the change is ‘named’ after its end-point: after “warm” if it is a warming-up
and after “cold” if it is a cooling-down. This ‘endpoint’, a form, is not itself changed in the change.
A change from a non-subject to a subject is a coming-to-be (genesis). If the change is between opposites, what comes
to be is a so-called ‘accidential unity’, white Socrates or a musician. If the change is from unqualified non-being
to being, what comes to be is a self-standing Aristotelian substance, e.g. a house. A change from a subject to a non-
subject is a ceasing-to-be (“perishing”, phthora), either of accidential unities or of substances. Changes between
subjects are the third category, and every motion (kinesis) is such a change from subject to subject, i.e. neither a
coming-to-be nor a ceasing-to-be.
Change in the category of quality is alteration (alloiosis), change in quantity is increase (auxēsis) or decrease (phthisis),
change in place is
ګ.ڥ.ڥ Types of change
In V.ڦ, Aristotle considers the question whether there can be change of change and argues that there can only be
accidental change of change. For the conclusion that there cannot be non-accidental change of change, he offers
four arguments:
• change requires a subject / underlying thing, and change is no such thing;
• if there were (genuine) change of change, change would never start: for it would have to change first in order
to start, i.e. undergo a change which itself would have to change to start etc.;
• a problem at the level of potentialities: if a becoming-to-be would also be a ceasing-to-be, it would have to
have the potentiality to cease-to-be; to have this potentiality, it would have to exist; but if it already exists, it
cannot have the potentiality to become-to-be;ڥ
ڥ. The analogue for non-substantial change is less plausible: if a darkening would also be a whitening, it would have to have the potentiality
to become white; to have this potentiality, it must be dark; but if it already is dark, it cannot have the potentiality to become dark.
ڨڧ
The cases of accidential changes of changes he has in mind seem to be ‘pendulum’ changes, as when someone gets
sicker and sicker, reaches a turn point and then becomes healthier again. Changes between substances are from
one form to another and the ‘accident’ involved at the turning point is that the opposite which is the end-point
(sickness) is concurrent with its opposite (health) being present in potentiality.
V.ڧ defines a number of terms that, while themselves topic-neutral, will be applied to both time and change, starting
with the most general and primitive one: being in succession. Something a is said to be “in succession” if it is after
/ succeeds something b and does so directly, i.e. without having anything of the same kind as a between a and b.
Something which is in succession and in contact with what it succeeds is said to be “contiguous”. Two things are
said to be “in contact” if their extremities are together, i.e. in one primary place.
Something contiguous is said to be “continuous” if it not only is in contact (“touches”) the thing it succeeds but
“the touching limits of each become one and the same and are, as the word implies, contained in each other” –
i.e. if it shares its border (that by which it is in contact with the thing it succeeds) with the thing it succeeds.
ګ.ڥ.ڦ The unity of motion
V.ڨ discusses identity criteria for types and tokens of motions: two motions are type-identical if they are of the
same of the three types (“one generically”) and if they belong to the same lowest species with respect to their pair
of opposites (“specficially one”).
Two token motions of the same type are identical (“one in an unqualified sense”) only if they are the same in three
respects:
that which: they have the same underlying thing;
that in which: they have the same medium;
that during which: they take up the same time.
With respect to the question whether token motions are repeatable, Aristotle explores both possibilities. If we are
happy to accept intermittent existence, we can say that Socrates undergoes the very same alteration twice; if not,
not.
ګ.ڥ.ڧ The nature of steresis
In V.ک, Aristotle distinguishes different ways in which changes may be opposed to each other. If A and B are
contraries (e.g.: warm and cold), the following may be said to be contrary motions:
ڥ. from A and to A
ڦ. from A and from B
ڧ. to A and to B
ڨ. from A and to B
ک. from A to B and from B to A
He first excludes case (ڨ): these are not really contrary, for they are the same in number and reality, and differ only
in account. By the same reason, cases (ڦ) and (ڧ) are really just one phenomenon; and it is in turn the same as (ک)
and (ڥ), for the motion to A is always, mediately or immediately, from B (and vice versa).
In V.ڪ, states of rest (hēremia) are characterised as contraries of motions, in the following way:
• resting in A is the contrary and privation of the motion from A to B
• resting in B is the contrary and privation of the motion from B to A
They inherit their contrariness from the motions they are privations of: just as the motion from A to B is contrary
to the motion from B to A, so it the rest state A to the rest state B.
ڨڨ
ګ.ڦ The instant of change
In VI.ڥ, Aristotle draws some surprising consequences out of the seemingly innocent definitions of topological
terms in book V.ڧ.
Everything that is not scattered must be gunky (“nothing continuous can be composed of indivisibles”).
Because motion is gunky, so must be the magnitude within which it moves, the time during which it moves and
the thing that is moved by it. The reasoning is per absurdum: if any of these was composed of indivisibles, motion
would have partless parts.
The connection between the continuity of motion and of time is then exploited to solve Zeno’s paradox of the
runner in VI.ڦ
Aristotle first gives an argument that time is continuous
and so is magnitude
Everything continuous has parts
ګ.ڦ.ڥ What can happen in an instant
It was asserted already that the present (to nun) does not have parts. That time is continuous now allows to fill in a
missing premiss in the argument given earlier. The argument was:
ڥ. The present is the boundary of the past.
ڦ. The present is the boundary of the future.
ڧ. If these two boundaries were different, they would be apart from each other, and there would be time
intermediate between them.
ڨ. This intermediate time would be divisible, and so the present itself would be divisible.
ک. The present would be divisible in time, so part of it would be in the past and part of it in the future.
ڪ. But then it could not be the boundaries it is.
Because the present is also in time, time contains an indivisible part.
From the indivisibility of the present it follows that there cannot be instantaneous motion, nor instantaneous rest.
In VI.ڨ, Aristotle argues that every change is temporally divisible, and that every change is divisible into sub-
changes.
Aristotle next (VI.ک) addresses the problem of the starting-point of a change. If something changes from A to B, it
ceases to be A at the start of the change. So what is it while it is changing? B, Aristotle answers.
To make this palatable, Aristotle distinguishes the ongoing of a change from its completion.
Changes do not have starting-points, nor do they have a first stage.
ګ.ڦ.ڦ The progressive paradox
Every change has a ‘primary time’, i.e. an exact duration, and it fills it in the sense that it happens at every part of
it. Because time is infinitely divisible, so is change: whenever something is changing, it has been changing before.
VI.ګ: There cannot be a finite motion in an infinite time, nor can there be an infinite motion in a finite time.
VI.ڬ: Rest.
In VI.ڭ, Zeno’s arguments against the possibility of motion are addressed. Aristotle ascribes to him four:
Bisection
Achilles
the flying arrow
Race-course
ڨک
VI.ڥڤ argues that the quantitatively indivisible can only move per accidens, by being a part of something that moves.
ګ.ڦ.ڧ The ‘at-at’ theory of velocity
ګ.ڧ Answering Zeno
ګ.ڧ.ڥ Zeno’s arguments
ګ.ڧ.ڦ The Aristotelian continuum
ګ.ڧ.ڧ Infinite motion
ڨڪ
Chapter ڬ
Physics VII+VIII: Movings, the First
Motion and the First Mover
INTRO
ڬ.ڥ Physics VII: A first stab
get on book ګ, in biblio: Wardy (ڥڭڭڤ)
ڬ.ڥ.ڥ The regress of motions
At the very start of VII.ڥ, Aristotle gives a somewhat curious argument for the conclusion that everything moving
is moved by something else than itself. Let a be something that moves, and “p” abbreviate the desired conclusion
that a is moved by something different than a:
ڥ. If it is not the case that a has the source of its motion in itself, then p.
ڦ. Let us suppose a has the source of its motion in itself.
ڧ. A sufficient condition for a is moved by b: necessarily, if b were to stop (“cease from its motion”), then this
would cause a to be at rest.
ڨ. a has a proper part, c (“everything that is in motion is divisible”).
ک. If c were not in motion, then a would not be in motion, or at least it would not be in motion “essentially
and primarily”.
ڪ. So a is moved by c, hence p.
From the irreflexivity of “…is moved by …”, Aristotle argues for the existence of a first mover:
Pڥ Nothing moves itself.
Pڦ Something, a1, moves.
Pڧ Whatever it is that moves anything, must also be in motion.
Cڥ a1 is moved by a2, which is moved by a3, etc. an being moved by an+1, the series is infinite. (from Pڥ-Pڧ)
Pڨ The motions of all members of the series are simultaneous.
Cڦ Each motion of a member of the series lasts for the same (amount of) time than the motion of a1. (from Pڨ?)
Cڧ Themotion of the whole series is infinite, because it contains infinitely many numerically different sub-motions.
(from Cڥ and Cڦ)
Pک There can be infinite motion in a finite time only if it is done by (or, at least, is attributable to) many things.
Pڪ Being moved by something requires being either in contact with it or continuous with it.
Cڨ All members of the series are in contact or continuous with each other. (from Cڥ and Pڪ)
Cک Hence they are not “many things” in the sense of (Pک). (from Cڨ)
Cڪ The time of the motion of the whole series in finite. (from Cڦ?)
ڨګ
We derive a contradiction and have to deny one of the premisses. Aristotle thinks that we should deny (Pڧ) and
stop the regress with a first mover which is unmoved.
There are, of course, plenty of gaps in the argument. Here are some of them:
• It does not follow from the irreflexivity of “…is moved by…” that there may not be circles, i.e. that there may
not be some i < n such that an is moved by ai. This violates reflexivity only if the relation is also transitive
and if for every thing in the series there is just one thing it is moved by.
• It is not clear why we should think that the combined motion of the series takes up a finite time (or even the
same time as motion of a1, as Aristotle seems to think).
• What justification is there for (Pک)? Will not (Pک) lead to Zenonian paradoxes?
In VII.ڦ, Aristotle explicates the requirement that for a to move b, a and b have to be ‘together’ (to hama) or in
contact (to haptomenon), for the three types of motion:
local, i.e. wrt place if b’s locomotion is ‘from a’, a imparts it and so a must be adjacent to b. There cannot be
something in between a and b, because a is changing b’s position with respect to its own place (pushing it
away or pulling it towards it)
qualitative if b’s alteration is ‘from a’, then, because b’s alteration could occur in animate things, a is a sensible
thing that changes the sensible characteristics of b or their degree. If a changes b’s sensible characteristics, it
is either continuous with it (via air in hearing and smelling, via light in sight) or adjacent to it (as the flavour
is in tasting).
quantitative if b’s increase/decrease is ‘from a’, a either starts the increase by becoming attached to b and one
with b or a starts the decrease by being a part that becomes detached from b, and in both cases a is continuous
with b.
ڬ.ڥ.ڦ Regresses and types of well-foundedness
STILL TO COME, FROM THE ”BEING WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS” PROJECT
ڬ.ڥ.ڧ Alterations
VII.ڧ is a defense of the presupposition made just before in VII.ڦ that alteration is always ‘from’ sensible things,
and only of things that are “said to be essentially affected by sensible things”. The argument is, at first sight at
least, a blatant non-sequitur. Aristotle discusses two cases of change, argues that none of them are alterations and
notes that, in many cases at least, changes of the second kind (acquisitions of states of the soul) occur in sensible
things, more particularly in the sensitive part of the soul, concluding from this that alterations always occur, except
accidentally, only in the sensitive part of the soul.
• When form or figure are changed, this change is not an alteration. When the bronze is sculpted into a statue,
or the wood into a bed, this is not a qualitative change, attributable to the wood or the bronze. Rather, we
have a bronzen statue and a wooden bed. When a quantity of iron is melted into a bronze and changes its
figure, this is also no qualitative change, attributable to the hot fluid. Rather, we now have bronze (and not
just iron in a different shape). In substantial change generally, what comes into being is not altered (changed
qualitatively), and the coming into being is not an alteration, even if there is an underlying thing (which
perhaps necessarily there is).
• The acquisition of a state is also not an alteration, for the state is either perfect or less than perfect and more
or less corrupt. If it is perfect, its acquisition is not gradual: only the endpoint is the perfect state. If it is
less than perfect, it falls short of its thing’s nature and this is again not a gradual transition, but a binary
change from perfect to less-than-perfect. This binary change depends upon particular relations to other
things, and whether or not these relations hold is a yes-no question, even when alterations in the other relata
are necessary for the relation to hold.
VII.ڨ discusses the commensurability of motions. and notes first that local, qualitative and quantitative changes are
pairwise incommensurable, for lengths (of local mouvements), affections (of qualitative change) and magnitudes
ڨڬ
(of quantitative change) cannot be equal to each other. With respect to locomotion, he discusses at some length
what diagnosis can be given of the (assumed) incommensurability of the length of a straight and the length of a
circular line. To assess questions of commensurability of motions of a given type (local, qualitative or quantitative),
we have to divide the type into species, and these species are derivable from the species of things that undergo
these motions naturally and primarily.
For alterations (qualitative changes), this recipe is applied thus: a becoming white and a becoming healthy cannot
be compared with respect to their speed because white and health are specifically different, i.e. differ as species
(of affections).
VII.ک observes that among motive force, restive force (e.g. weight), time and distance, the last three are pairwise
directly proportional to each other, but that motive force is not, as it is subject to a threshold principle: it must be
of some quantity to be able to move at all. The same is then said to be true of alteration: the amount, the extent of
alteration and its time are pairwise proportional (half the alteration in half the time; alteration of half the object in
half the time; half the time for half of the alteration or for alteration of half of the object; double the alteration for
half of the object; half of the object altered for half of the alteration), but this does not hold for that which causes
the alteration: it must be active or become activated beyond a certain threshold to cause any alteration at all.
ڬ.ڦ A fresh start: Physics VIII
ڬ.ڦ.ڥ The eternity of motion
In VIII.ڥ, Aristotle argues for the eternity of motion: that there always were things moving. The starting point is
an instance of the general definition of change (Phys. III.ڥ ڦڤڥaڥڤ-ڥڥ), specialised to the special case of motion, and
the observation that, even as actualised, a potentiality is always a potentiality of something:
φαμὲν δὴ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι ἐνέργειαν τοῦ κι-
νητοῦ ᾗ κινητόν. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ὑπάρχειν τὰ
πράγματα τὰ δυνάμενα κινεῖσθαι καθ' ἑκά-
στην κίνησιν. (ڦکڥaڬ-ڥڦ)
Motion, we say, is the actuality of the mov-
able in so far as it is movable. Each kind
of motion, therefore, necessarily involves the
presence of the things that are capable of that
motion. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڭڦڥ)
Now we say that motion is the actuality of the
movable in so far as it is movable. It is nec-
essary, therefore, that there should be objects
which are able to move with each kind of mo-
tion. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڭ: ڦ)
To show the eternity of motion, Aristotle proceeds to show that the coming to be of motion “implies a change
previous to the first motion”, which is absurd:
Pڥ If there is motion, there must be something movable.
Pڦ If the movable does not exist eternally, it came into being.
Pڧ If it came into being, then this coming to be itself was a change or a motion (metabolē or kinesis), prior to the
motion in (Pڥ).
Pڨ The movable cannot exist eternally and always be at rest, for rest is the privation of motion and in need of a
cause (aition).
Pک So if the movable did not come into being, it was either already moving or it came to be in a state of rest, in
both cases by a motion prior to the motion in (Pڥ).
C In both cases, there was motion before the motion in (Pڥ).
(Pڨ) is widely regarded as the least plausible premise:ڥ it says that we need a cause for the fact that the potential
of the movable to move was not activated before. It is true that Aristotle does not in general require causes for
states of rest (and instead accepts the absence of a cause for motion as a sufficient explanation),ڦ but the situation
here is special, because we are inquiring about the possibility of some movable’s rest-state that has no beginning in
time. That this is impossible will Aristotle try to show next: the only thing that could have prevented the movable
from moving from eternity is a lack of ‘contact’; overcoming such a lack of ‘contact’, however, requires motion, so
ڥ. Graham (ڥڭڭڭ: ڨڧ) calls it “the most puzzling step”.
ڦ. This is why Graham (ڥڭڭڭ: ڨڧ) feels obliged to add an extra premise: “There must be some change to cancel to cause of [the mover’s]
being at rest” – “the need for a cause to eliminate the obstacle or to ‘turn on’, as it were, [the movable]”. But not only is this premise not
needed, it is also not Aristotelian: Aristotelian powers, as we have seen, do not need to be ‘turned on’.
ڨڭ
there must have been a prior motion to bring the movable into contact with its ‘manifestation partner’, to produce
motion. For there to be motion, there has to be contact, and this itself has to be brought about by a prior motion.
This is said, in so many words, in ڦکڥaڦڬ-bڥڤ:
ἀλλ' οὖν ὅσα γε δυνατὰ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν
ἢ κινεῖν, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι, οὐ πάντως δυνατά
ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡδὶ ἔχοντα καὶ πλησιάζοντα ἀλλή-
λοις. (ڦکڥbڥ-bڧ)
But at any rate all things that are capable of
affecting and being affected, or of causingmo-
tion and being moved, are capable of it not
under all conditions, but only when they are
in a particular condition and approach one
another…(Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڭڦڦ)
But things that are able to act or to be acted
on, or to move things and be moved, respec-
tively, are not able to interact under any con-
dition whatsoever, but only if they are in a
certain condition and approach each other.
(Aristotle ڥڭڭڭ: ڦ)
So perhaps we can grant Aristotle (Pڨ). (Pڧ), however, is perhaps even more problematic: while becoming-to-be
certainly counts as a ‘change’, why should we take it to be kinesis in the sense of the type of thing of which the
argument is supposed to show that there cannot be a first one?
The second argument infers the eternity of motion from the eternity of time:
Pڥ If time has come to be, it has come to be at an instant. (“Time cannot be thought of apart from the now.” /
adunaton estin kai einai kai noēsai chronos aneu tou nun).
Pڦ The now is a ‘middle’ (mesotēs), it has a beginning and end at the same time, “for it is the beginning of the future
time and the end of the past” (archē tou esomenou chronou) and teleutē tou parelthontos [chronos]).
Pڧ Because it has both a beginning and an end, there must be time on both sides of the now.
Cڥ So time has not come to be.
Pڨ If there is time, there must also be motion, “if indeed time is a kind of property of motion” (ho chronos pathos ti
knēseos).
Cڦ So motion has not come to be.
The argument from (Pڥ-Pڧ) to (Cڥ) assumes that if time has to come to be, it has come to be at an instant in the
sense of a ‘now’ in the sense of (Pڦ).ڧ (Pڥ) is the crucial premise: it is perhaps an instance of the more general
claim that whatever ‘happens’ to time ‘happens’ in time. I find even the more general claim rather plausible:
time, among other things, is a temporal expanse and its topological and metrical properties are properties of that
expanse, i.e. give it an inner structure. This inner structure, by the nature of time, is itself temporal and can only be
temporal: there is no way for time to have properties that are not also ascribable to its parts and so are temporal.
(Pڨ) is not just a statement of ontological dependence: the conceptual connection between time and motion is
closer than metaphysically necessary covariation of existence. The idea that time has come into being does not
make sense, according to Aristotle, because it would have to happen at some one time. But not only cannot it be
at a time (for then there would be a time before that), it also cannot happen at all. The becoming-to-be of time, like
any other becoming-to-be, would be a motion and so have an intrinsic temporal structure – but this is impossible,
if it is time itself that comes to be, for time just is this: the intrinsic temporal structure of comings-to-be. If such
structure cannot come to be, it must have always existed, and so there always were things it was the structure of.ڨ
At ڦکڥbڦڬ-ڦکڦaک, Aristotle says that the ‘same argument’ as the first shows that motion does not cease to exist: if
some motion ceases to exist, only the actuality does, not the movable of which it is the motion; if this movable also
ceases to exist, then this is a motion later than the first one, presupposing another movable the actuality of which is
the second motion, the ceasing to exist will be a third, subsequent motion etc. I frankly do not find this argument
convincing at all. It is one thing to say that if the mover ceases to move that which is moved, then this requires a
earlier motion, e.g. a loss of contact. But why think that this earlier motion also has to be later, that it has to go on
ڧ. Though my reconstruction makes it depend on that assumption, I still find it more plausible as the one ascribed to Aristotle by Graham
(ڥڭڭڭ: ڨګ), which depends on two premises I find problematic: (i) that “[t]he existence of the now is a necessary condition for the existence of
time”, which ascribes to Aristotle a two-way dependence relation between the now and time, of “mutual entailment” (ڥڭڭڭ: ڨڬ); and (ii) that
we inductively infer that what is true of the now is true for any arbitrary moment of time.
ڨ. One may think that (Pڨ) clashes with the priority of change over time: if time is posterior to change, we cannot also make change posterior
to time by inferring properties of the former from properties of the latter. Such a circularity objection, however, is much too quick: Aristotle has
a rich repertoire of different notions of priority and can easily distinguish the two relations: he could say, e.g., that while time measures change,
but change realises time.
کڤ
until after the first motion has ceased to be? Why could not the actuality go out of existence at the same time as
the potentiality? Why must the potentiality linger on even after the actuality has ceased to exist?
Fortunately, there is no need for a parallel to the first argument (from the definition of motion) if the second
argument (from the eternity of time) works: for the second one is perfectly symmetric with respect to past and
future and equally plausibly shows that motion cannot have a beginning and that it cannot have an end.
The third argument is perhaps meant to back up (Pڨ) of the first argument. It seems to involve something like
a causal closure condition (in Aristotle’s sense of “cause”, i.e. perhaps something more akin to a version of the
principle of sufficient reason). Again, it proceeds by an investigation of what it would mean for motion to have a
beginning, but now asks whether this would be compatible with the “orderly” course of nature (ڦکڦaڥڥ-ڥڦ). It would
not, answers Aristotle, if time is linear, because the coming into being of motion would divide such a time into
parts (the time before there was motion, the time after there was motion) that do not stand in a proportion: there
would thus be no possible explanation of why motion came into being at this, rather than any other time.
Aristotle concludes VIII.ڥ by claiming that motion is eternal.ک
In VIII.ڧ, Aristotle argues that (i) some things never move, (ii) some always move and (iii) some only sometimes
move. He does so by arguing against four alternatives: that nothing ever moves (establishing 9a), that nothing ever
is at rest (establishing (i)_ (iii)), that whatever is at rest (or moves) always is at rest (or moves), and that everything
which is at rest (or moves) sometimes moves (or is at rest) (establishing (i)_ (ii))
no motion It is not possible that nothing ever moves, for we may assume that nature is a source of motion, as
the contrary claim (that nothing ever moves) “calls into question the whole of experience rather than some
part of it and not only in relation to the natural scientist, but in relation to virtually all the sciences and all
judgemetns, since they all make use of motion” (ڦکڧaڧڨ-ڦکڧbڥ, ڥڭڭڭ: ګ).ڪ
no rest It is not possible that nothing ever is at rest, for “nature is a principle of rest no less than of motion” (ڦکڧbڭ,
ڥڭڭڭ: ګ), and there is a threshold principle for all four types of motion. For increase/decrease, there must a
turning-point: nothing can grow indefinitely (as the universe is finite), not decrease indefinitely (as there are
no points); when increase turns into decrease or decrease into increase, the thing underlying the change is
at rest. For alteration, a fixed amount of underlying gradual change gives rise to some discrete change at a
higher-level: with respect to these higher-level qualities, the thing is at rest before and after that change. For
locomotion, it is merely asserted that at least sometimes, things are (at rest) in their natural place.
no starting/stopping It is not possible that nothing ever comes to rest or comes to move, for there would be no
coming-to-be and no ceasing-to-be, “[f]or if something changes into this, it comes to be this or to occupy this,
and if it changes from that, it ceases to be that or to occupy that” (ڦکڨaڥڥ-ڥڦ, ڥڭڭڭ: ڬ). This is an interesting
observation:ګ because every qualitative change also brings into being something – at least an accidental
unity, white Socrates, or a lesser entity such as the place of the yellow billard ball (which was the place of the
red billard ball just seconds ago), it is plausible to assume that every substantial change is underwritten by
some qualitative change: this change, to be what brings into being something that did not exist before, has
to start and cannot have been going on forever. This establishes (iii).
only starting/stopping That it is not possible that everything starts or stops, is here not shown but merely asserted.ڬ
The unmoved mover of VIII.ک is always at rest (never starts), the outermost cosmic sphere of VIII.ڪ is always
moving (never stops).
ک. It is not clear to what extent Aristotle’s arguments apply not only to Anaxagoras’ cosmological model where motion begins once and for
all after an indefinite period of rest, but also to Empedocles’ view that motion and rest forever alternate (cf. Graham ڥڭڭڭ: کڬ–کڭ). Perhaps this
is partially addressed in VIII.ڦ, where Aristotle considers an objection from the analogy with animal motion, starting seemingly spontaneously.
He rejects the analogy, holding that animals, because they are living things, are always in motion.
ڪ. He backs this up with an additional argument which we discussed already at p. ڦڬ.
ګ. It is not, contra Graham (ڥڭڭڭ: ګڤ-ګڥ), an illicit assimilation of coming/ceasing-to-be to “corollaries of motion”, nor an attempt to reduce
substantial change to another species of change.
ڬ. Even if this fourth scenario were excluded, Aristotle would not yet have established (i) and (ii). From the exclusion of the first two scenarios
we only get that there is something that sometimes moves and something that sometimes is at rest. The exclusion of the fourth does not show
that these things did not start to move nor start to be at rest, but only that there are some things that move (or are at rest) always if they ever
move (or are at rest) at all.
کڥ
Aristotle does not take his argument to be conclusive, but says that we still have to show that not all things fall
under (iii), and that some fall under (i) and some under (ii).
ڬ.ڦ.ڦ Motion is always owed
Having established that there always is motion, i.e. that always, some things are moving, Aristotle asks why they
are moving, concluding in VIII.ڪ that they are moved by something which itself is unmoved, an unmoved mover.
Physics VIII.ڨ argues that everything that moves is moved by something, distinguishing between incidental / ‘acci-
dental’ (kata sumbebēkos) and intrinsic / ‘essential’ (kath’auto) motion and between motion by nature and motion by
force.
Things moved by nature seem to be the easier case: they seem to be moved by themselves, for nature is their inner
principle of change.
Things moved by force move either incidentially or intrinsically. If they are moved incidentially, then this coinci-
dence is what moves them, and so they are moved by something. The difficult case is intrinsic motion by force:
why is due to something? This class is discussed by Aristotle under the heading of elemental motion: to what is
the motion of the four elements due? Aristotle says that while they move by nature, they do not, strictly speaking,
move themselves. While it is true that everything that moves by itself also moves by nature, the converse is more
difficult to establish: while the elements move by nature, they do not seem to initiate their own movement. Moving
‘by nature’ thus cannot just mean, as it does in the case of animals and natural things more generally, having an
inner principle of change whereby one is moved. In the case of the elements it means having a potentiality that is
actualised in a way that makes its manifestation spontaneous in the absence of blockers.
Aristotle illustrates this with the help of the first/second actuality distinction and the example of knowledge. Ac-
tualising one’s potential to know dogs, by learning about dogs, brings us into a state where our knowledge about
dogs is spontaneously applied whenever the conditions are right (e.g. whenever we see a dog): no further trigger
is needed, though of course the manifestation of our knowledge may be impeded (e.g. by sleep). Movement by
force of the elements is such an impediment, and their natural motion is a second actuality, a manifestation of an
already activated potentiality:
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, τοῦτ'
αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ φανερὸν εἶναι ὑπὸ τίνος τὰ τοι-
αῦτα κινεῖται, οἷον τὸ πῦρ ἄνω καὶ ἡ γῆ κάτω.
ἔστι δὲ δυνάμει ἄλλως ὁ μανθάνων ἐπιστήμων
καὶ ὁ ἔχων ἤδη καὶ μὴ ἐνεργῶν. ἀεὶ δ', ὅταν
ἅμα τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν ὦσιν, γί-
γνεται ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ δυνατόν, οἷον τὸ μανθάνον
ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος ἕτερον γίγνεται δυνάμει (ὁ
γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ δυνάμει
ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμων πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς καὶ πρὶν
μαθεῖν), ὅταν δ' οὕτως ἔχῃ, ἐάν τι μὴ κωλύῃ,
ἐνεργεῖ καὶ θεωρεῖ, ἢ ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει
καὶ ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ. (ڦککb)
But the fact that the term ‘potentially’ is used
in more than one way is the reason why it is
not evident whence such motions as the up-
ward motion of fire and the downward mo-
tion of earth are derived. One who is learn-
ing a science knows potentially in a differ-
ent way from one who while already possess-
ing the knowledge is not actually exercising
it. Wherever something capable of acting and
something capable of being acted on are to-
gether, what is potential becomes actual: e.g.
the learner becomes from one potential some-
thing another potential something (for one
who possesses knowledge of a science but is
not actually exercising it knows the science
potentially in a sense, though not in the same
sense as before he learnt it). And when he is in
this condition, if something does not prevent
him, he actively exercises his knowledge: oth-
erwise he would be in the contradictory state
of not knowing. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڭڧڪ)
It is because ‘potentially’ is said in many ways
that it is not apparent by what such things are
moved – e.g. fire up and earth down. There
are different senses in which the learner and
one who already has knowledge but is not
exercising it are potentially knowers. Every
time the active and the passive powers come
together, the potential always becomes ac-
tual; e.g. the learner moves from being poten-
tially one thing to being potentially another
thing (for the person who possesses knowl-
edge but is not using it is potentially a knower
in a way, but not in the way he was potentially
a knower before he learned). And whatever
he is in this latter condition, if nothing pre-
vents him, he actualizes and uses his knowl-
edge – otherwise he would be in the contradic-
tory condition of ignorance. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڭ:
ڥڥ)
When the cold changes into the hot, it automatically and spontaneously burns – no further change is necessary.
It will not burn if it is impeded, but this is a mere defeater condition: the lack of impediment is not an enabling
condition for the burning, it is not part of its causal history.
کڦ
But why do they move the way they do, i.e. what are their natural motions? Aristotle’s answer to this question is
instructingly laconic:
καίτοι τοῦτο ζητεῖται, διὰ τί ποτε κινεῖται εἰς
τὸν αὑτῶν τόπον τὰ κοῦφα καὶ τὰ βαρέα. αἴ-
τιον δ' ὅτι πέφυκέν ποι, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ
κούφῳ καὶ βαρεῖ εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῷ ἄνω τὸ δὲ
τῷ κάτω διωρισμένον. δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν κοῦφον
καὶ βαρὺ πολλαχῶς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· ὅταν τε
γὰρ ᾖ ὕδωρ, δυνάμει γέ πώς ἐστι κοῦφον, καὶ
ὅταν ἀήρ, ἔστιν ὡς ἔτι δυνάμει (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ
ἐμποδιζόμενον μὴ ἄνω εἶναι)· ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἀφαι-
ρεθῇ τὸ ἐμποδίζον, ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ἀεὶ ἀνωτέρω
γίγνεται. (ڦککbڥڧ-ڦڥ)
But, be it noted, this is the question we are
trying to answer – how can we account for
the motion of light things and heavy things to
their proper places? The reason for it is that
they have a natural tendency towards a cer-
tain position; and this is what it is to be light
or heavy, the former being determined by an
upward, the latter by a downward, tendency.
As we have said, a thing may be potentially
light or heavy in more ways than one. Thus
not only when a thing is water is it in a sense
potentially light, but when it has become air
it may be still potentially light; for it may be
that through some hindrance it does not oc-
cupy an upper position, whereas, if what hin-
ders it is removed, it realizes its activity and
continues to rise higher. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڭڧګ)
This brings us to the crucial question: just
why do the light and the heavy move to their
own place? The explanation is that it is their
nature to go somewhere, and this is what it
is to be light or heavy, the one being defined
by up and the other by down. Things are po-
tentially light and heavy in many ways, as we
have stated. For when something is water, it
is potentially light in a way, and when it is air,
it is still potentially light, for something may
impede it from being up. But if the impedi-
ment is removed, it becomes active and goes
ever upward. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڭ: ڥڥ)
The contraries of ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ define a dimensional magnitude that is itself ‘spatial’: to be light just is to have
a natural upwards tendency: what is light is what goes upwards and what goes upwards is what is light. When
water actualises its potentiality to become light / air, it retains its potentiality: it realises it further by an upward
movement, and does so spontaneously, i.e. unless it is impeded. The distinction between the first and the second
actualisation of water’s potential to go up (by becoming air) thus both explains why water cannot go up (but only
air does) and why, when it has become air, it does not need a further cause to go up.
This account of elemental motion concludes the argument that everything that moves is moved by something.
Things that move by force are moved incidentially, hence moved by something. Things that move by nature either
move by themselves (cause themselves to move, as animals do) or (as the elements do) they move in virtue of having
a source of motion by being acted on: they are moved by their very essence, by retaining their potentiality to move
as a potentiality even when it is actualised by elemental transformation.
ڬ.ڦ.ڧ Elemental motion and the transmutation of elements
My account of Aristotle’s reasoning in VIII.ڨ that the elements move by nature, not by themselves but still by
something (i.e.: their nature) has been harshly criticised by many authors. Graham (ڥڭڭڭ: ڬک) says about a similar
proposal by Lang (ڥڭڬڨ):
The element surely actualizes itself, but Aristotle never says here or elsewhere that the elements are
moved by, much less primarily moved by, their actuality. To say this would, I believe, be a category mistake:
an essential cause cannot satisfy the phrase ‘moved by –’. […] …‘The air was moved by its lightness’
would be ill-formed in Aristotelian logical grammar (though the sentence ‘The air moved up because
it was light’ would be both well-formed and true.)
The worry about logical grammar is quickly dismissed: there is no reason that natures must be expressed by words
like “lightness”, “humanity” or “equininity”. The error is deeper, however: Aristotle does not (try to say) that
air moves by its lightness, but that it moves by its nature. Natural things generally are movable by their natures,
insofar as having a nature is having an inner principle of change. The elements are special in that they are not
just movable, but actually moved by their natures: their nature is to have a certain tendency of motion, and that
tendency is always actualised, though not always fully so (as it can be impeded).
That Graham accepts the because-statement and even thinks that it “give[s] a self-sufficient explanation [and]
make[s] the explanation the equivalent of an irreducible law of nature in modern physics” (ڥڭڭڭ: ڬک) is also quite
puzzling: if the because-statement is true and irreducible, then it gives the aition of the motion, and the aition in
question can only be the formal cause, which in the case of elemental movement is also the final cause.
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“The air moved up because it was light”, if not of the form “p because p” and true at all, is – as a whole, and not
just on its right-hand side – a statement about what air is: “air”, “light” and “moving up” are just descriptions of
the very same element. This explains why the moving of some air is caused, according to Aristotle, by whatever
caused the existence of the air in question: that by which the air came to be is the thing that moves it, because for
it to be is for it to move a certain way (namely up).
MOVEMENTOFTHEELEMENTSVII.ڨ andVIII.ڨWHERE ISTHIS FROM?Aristotle denies that elements
are self-movers, and holds that their local motion has an external efficient cause (i.e. the active power that moves
them is always external), while they themselves possess merely a passive principle of change (Phys. vii.ڨ, ڦککaڪ–ڥڬ;
ڦکڪaڥ–ڦ). Stavrianeas (ڦڤڥک: کګ–کڬ) , following Bodnár ڥڭڭګ and Gill ڦڤڤڭ: even though elemental motion needs a
per se efficient cause that is external to it, it requires no external stimulus to become active and is thus a capacity
to be changed in itself qua itself, and hence natural. AGAINST Matthen ڦڤڤڥ, Scharle ڦڤڤڬ, Katayama ڦڤڥڥ
ڬ.ڧ The unmoved mover
ڬ.ڧ.ڥ The regress of movers
Physics VIII.ک argues that there is a first mover and that it is unmoved, by way of a number of regress arguments,
showing the relative priority of types of movings,
• distinguishing between direct and indirect transmission of motion, arguing that there must be some direct
transmission;
•
The first regress argument reduces indirect to direct transmission of motion. Motion is transmitted indirectly from
a to b if amoves b by moving something else, c; cmay move b also indirectly, by moving d, etc. In this progression,
we have a relation of priority: while a could be moving b in some other way, c would not be moving b if it were
not the thing by which a moves b.ڭ It is also a regressive progression: b may be said to be moved by d (the thing
by which it is moved by c), and by c (the thing by which it is moved by a), but ultimately it must also be moved by
a first member in the series, a. If there were no first member, it would not be moved by any of the intermediate
members, for all they do is to transmit the motion they received from the original source of the movement.
In cases where motion is transmitted indirectly, the transmitting elements must themselves be moved, and indi-
rect transmission must ultimately reduce to direct transmission: something moving something by itself. Aristotle
presents a second version of this argument, focussing on the attribution of the moving: to attribute b’s movement
to a (and not just to d and c), we have to reach back from b, via d and c, to a. If the series of intermediate causes
were infinite, we would not be able to do this and never reach a, i.e. never be able to attribute the movement of b
to a.
Aristotle adds a second argument: transmitted motion is contingent, so if every motion were transmitted, every
motion were contingent, so it would be possible that there is no motion, which it is not:
εἰ γὰρ ὑπὸ κινουμένου κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον
πᾶν, ἤτοι τοῦτο ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, ὥστε κινεῖν μὲν κινούμενον, οὐ
μέντοι διὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι αὐτό, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ καθ'
αὑτό. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινοῦν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο,
δῆλον ὡς ἐνδέχεταί ποτε μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι τῶν
ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ'
ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι. ἐὰν οὖν θῶμεν τὸ δυνα-
τὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβήσεται, ψεῦδος
δ' ἴσως. ἀλλὰ τὸ κίνησιν μὴ εἶναι ἀδύνατον· δέ-
δεικται γὰρ πρότερον ὅτι ἀνάγκη κίνησιν ἀεὶ
εἶναι. (ڦکڪbڨ-ڥڧ)
If everything that is in motion is moved by
something that is in motion, either this is an
accidental attribute of the things (so that each
of them moves something while being itself in
motion, but not because it is itself in motion)
or it belongs to them in their own right. If,
then, it is an accidental attribute, it is not nec-
essary that that which causes motion should
be in motion; and if this is so it is clear that
there may be a time when nothing that exists
is in motion, since the accidental is not neces-
sary but contingent. Now if we assume some-
thing possible, nothing impossible will follow
(though something false may). But the non-
existence of motion is an impossibility; for we
have shown above that there must always be
motion. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڭڨڤ)
ڭ. I interpret ڦکڪaڥڤ-ڥڥ thus as being concerned with essential dependencies between movings, rather than some general ontological depen-
dence in the way Graham (ڥڭڭڭ) does.
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If everything that is moved, is moved by a
moved, either this attribute belongs to things
incidentally, so that what is moved causes mo-
tion – not, however, because it itself is moved
– or it does not belong to them incidentally
but intrinsically. In the first case, if the mover
is moved incidentally, it was not necessary for
it to be moved. But if so, clearly it is possible
that at some time no entity is in motion. For
the incidental attribute is not necessary but
contingent. Thus, if we assume what is possi-
ble, nothing impossible will result, although a
falsehood may. But for there to be no motion
is impossible. For it has been proved earlier
that motion is impossible. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڭ: ڥڧ)
The argument may be laid out as follows:
A Suppose every thing that is moved is moved by something else that is moved.
Pڥ Being moved by something else that is moved (= F ) is a property had either incidentially (kata sumbebēkos) or
intrinsically (kath’auto).
Pڦ If F is had incidentally, it is had contingently (not necessarily: ouk anagkē).
Pڧ If F is always had contingently, it is possible that it could not be had at all.
Pڨ If it is possible that F is not had at all, it is possible that there is no motion.
Pک It is not possible that there is no motion.
C Hence our supposition is false: there is a thing that is moved but not moved by something else that is moved,
but rather either moved by something self-moved or by something unmoved.
Aristotle’s explication of (Pڦ) is very interesting. If an attribute (e.g. F ) belongs to some thing incidentally, he says,
“what is moved causes motion – not, however, because it itself is moved” (ڦکڪbڪ-ګ). Some thing, a, would thus have
F by coincidence iff (i) a is moved by b, (ii) b is moved but it is not the case that (i) because (ii), but (i) has some
other explanation: (i) because of some fact involving some other thing. But in this case there is no link between (ii)
and (i) and they could, at least in principle, fail to co-obtain: (i) could be the case even if it were not the case that
(ii), in which case we had no assurance that F is had by a.
The crucial premise, of course, is (Pڧ), the step from distributive contingency (for any x, it is possible that it is G)
to collective contingency (it is possible that for all x, Gx). This is clearly not a logical step,ڥڤ, so it is in need of an
argument which Aristotle unfortunately does not provide.
In addition, (Pڨ) is quite questionable: if nothing is such that it is moved by something else that is moved, then
either (i) nothing moves or (ii) everything that moves is either unmoved or moved by something that is not moved.
Why should, under the possibility operator, (ii) collapse under (i), i.e. why should we be able to conclude from the
possibility of (either (i) or (ii)) the possibility of (ii)?
The third argument is introduced by a tripartite distinction between the mover, the moved and the means: the
mover moves, but is perhaps not moved; the means transmits motion, moves and is moved; the moved is moved,
but does perhaps not move. With respect to this distinction, Aristotle claims that the transmission of motion must
originate in something that is – at least under a certain aspect – not itself in motion:
τὸ δὲ κινοῦν οὕτως ὥστ' εἶναι μὴ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἀκί-
νητον. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁρῶμεν τὸ ἔσχατον, ὃ κινεῖσθαι
μὲν δύναται, κινήσεως δ' ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ
ὃ κινεῖται μέν, οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλου δὲ ἀλλ' ὑφ' αὑ-
τοῦ, εὔλογον, ἵνα μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἴπωμεν, καὶ
τὸ τρίτον εἶναι ὃ κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ὄν. (ڦکڪbڦڤ-ڦڨ)
…and the mover – that is to say, that which
causes motion in such a manner that it is not
merely the instrument of motion – must be
unmoved. Now we see the last things, which
have the capacity of being in motion, but
do not contain a motive principle, and also
things which are in motion but are moved
by themselves and not by anything else: it
is reasonable, therefore, not to say necessary,
to suppose the existence of the third term
also, that which causes motion but is itself un-
moved. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڭڨڥ)
But the mover, in so far as it is not the means,
is unmoved. Whenwe observe the last moved,
which is able to be moved but does not have
its own source of motion, and what is moved,
not by another but by itself, it is reasonable,
not to say necessary, to suppose that there is
a third thing which causes motion while being
unmoved. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڭ: ڥڨ)
This is a quasi-conceptual argument: distinguishing, as we can, among the things at least partly responsible for
some motion between those that are themselves moving and those that are not, we characterise those of the first
class as ‘means’ or ‘instruments’, vehicles through which the motion is imparted. It then appears very plausible
ڥڤ. Though perhaps Aristotle regards it as such.
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to suppose that not everything responsible for the motion can be of this kind, i.e. that the second class cannot be
empty: something must originate and not just transmit the motion.
As in the previous regress, we start with something which is moved and moving by itself, not accidentally. We then
look at the chain of its moving movers (its F-chain, in the terminology from before) and conclude (because there
cannot be an infinite F-regress) that it has a last member. This last member, because it is a member of the chain,
has a mover, but because it is the last member, this mover does not belong to the chain, i.e. is not itself moved.
Perhaps unsure of the soundness of the first three, Aristotle produces yet two other arguments to show that there
is a first (i.e. unmoved or self-moving) mover. The first one addresses the regress of movers directly, arguing that,
because there is only a finite number of types of motion and because moving is transitive, every agent of a motion
of type F will itself be a patient of a motion of the same type F , which is said to be impossible. But it clearly is
not: far from being “absurd” (alogon) and “impossible” (adunaton), it is quite often actually the case that the teacher
is learning (I hope it is the case in our very own situation). This is why Aristotle says that “one must carry to the
individual cases”, i.e. consider the regress not with respect to teaching but with respect to, e.g., teaching-that-p,
not with respect to throwing but with respect to, e.g., throwing in a certain manner. If we do this, however, I see
no reason to grant Aristotle the assumption that (even by his own lights) the number of these infima species of motion
is finite.ڥڥ
The fifth argument considers a regress not of movers, but of movables. “The movable” / “to kinēton” in English as
in Greek is ambiguous between “what can move” and “what can be moved”. The fifth argument, however, does
not really concern the existence of a first mover. Taken as such an argument, it simply asserts and does not argue
that if we individuate the ways of being movable finely enough, it will be absurd that whatever is potentially an
agent of a certain type of motion, necessarily is also potentially a patient of it.
The ambiguity is much more relevant for the next step in the overall-argument, which, “making another begin-
ning”, is to ask in what sense self-moving is possible. The claim with respect to the ambiguity of “movable” is that
nothing can be ‘it’s own’ movable in both senses of that word, i.e. be agent and patient of the very same process
of moving. The overall conclusion will then be that the first mover is intrinsically such that it moves, that it itself
is unmoved and that it does not move its parts.
Aristotle starts by recalling the earlier claim that everything that is moved is continuous, i.e. “is divisible into parts
that are at every stage divisible”. If something moved is moved by itself, it thus must have parts. In order to show
that a thing, as a whole, cannot move all its parts conjunctively, Aristotle gives a better argument for the irreflexivity
of the infima species of motion, i.e. that e.g. nothing can teach and learn the same thing by the same process:
ἔτι διώρισται ὅτι κινεῖται τὸ κινητόν· τοῦτο
δ' ἐστὶν δυνάμει κινούμενον, οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ,
τὸ δὲ δυνάμει εἰς ἐντελέχειαν βαδίζει, ἔστιν
δ' ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια κινητοῦ ἀτελής. τὸ δὲ
κινοῦν ἤδη ἐνεργείᾳ ἔστιν, οἷον θερμαίνει τὸ
θερμὸν καὶ ὅλως γεννᾷ τὸ ἔχον τὸ εἶδος. ὥσθ'
ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θερμὸν ἔσται καὶ
οὐ θερμόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον,
ὅσων τὸ κινοῦν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸ συνώνυμον. τὸ
μὲν ἄρα κινεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται τοῦ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κι-
νοῦντος. (ڦکګbڪ-ڥڨ)
Moreover, we have established the fact that it
is the movable that is moved; and this moves
potentially, not in fulfilment, and the poten-
tial is in process to fulfilment, and motion is
an incomplete fulfilment of the movable. The
mover on the other hand is already in actual-
ity: e.g. it is that which is hot that produces
heat, and in general that which produces the
form possesses it. Consequently, the same
thing in respect of the same thing will be at the
same time both hot and not hot. So, too, in
every other case where the mover must have
the synonymous property. Therefore when a
thing moves itself it is one part of it that is the
mover and another part that is moved. (Aris-
totle ڦڤڥڨ: ڭڨڨ)
Further, we have explained that the mov-
able is what is in motion; but it is in motion
through potentiality, not through actuality,
and the potential is in process to realization,
and motion is the incomplete realization of
the movable. But the mover is already actual
– for instance, the hot heats, and in general
what has the form produces it in others. So
the same thing will be hot and not hot at the
same time in the same respect, and likewise
with everything else in which the mover must
have the same name as the moved. Therefore
one part of the self-mover causes motion, and
one part is moved. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڭ: ڥک–ڥڪ)
That this argument is supposed to be conclusive is shown by the invocation of the law of non-self-contradiction.
The contradiction is supposed to arise from the supposition that the very same thing moves itself, is a movable in
both senses of potentially being moved by itself and actually moving itself. Motion, it is recalled, is the actualisation
ڥڥ. Indeed, there will necessarily be an infinity of them, at least if velocities are counted among the ‘manners of locomotion’.
کڪ
of the potentiality as a potentiality, so it is as movable that themovable is moved; to be the efficient cause of suchmoving,
it must also be moving as actually movable. In the first, passive sense of “movable” (being potentially moved), the
actualisation must not yet have been completed (for otherwise the thing would not be being moved, but rather
having been moved); in the second, active sense of “movable” (potentially moving something), the actualisation (of
the power to move) must have been completed (for without actualisation of the its power to move, the thing would
not be moving anything). The very same potentiality, therefore, must and cannot be completely actualised, which
is a contradiction.
Having established that nothing can move itself in its entirety, Aristotle excludes the other case where the self-
moving thing would not have an unmoved part: something could be self-moving in the sense of having two parts,
a and b, such that a moves b and b moves a.
ڬ.ڧ.ڦ Material for a cosmological argument?
Barry Miller (ڥڭڬڦ, cf. also his ڥڭڭڦ: ڭڪ–ڥڥڧ, where the argument is included under the heading “Why existence?
The ultimate answer”). Miller allows that a series of causes can stretch back indefinitely, but he thinks that one
particular kind of series needs to terminate: a series where the cause is “unfolded” into further causes on which it
depends. So it may be true that a is caused by b, and that a is caused by (b insofar as b is caused by c), and that a
is caused by (b insofar as b is caused by (c insofar as c is caused by d)), and so on. Such a series, Miller argues, has
to terminate, because we would otherwise have what he calls an “open sentence”.
ڬ.ڧ.ڧ The primary motion: eternal, of place, continous, in a circle
Physics VIII.ڪ argues that the first mover is eternal, on the grounds that some of the moving it does is eternal.
Physics VIII.ګ spells out different ways in which locomotion, change of place, is the primary motion. Growth and
decrease (change in size) cannot be primary, because it by itself only accounts for the element of constancy in
change; the variation element must be accounted for in terms of qualitative change, i.e. alteration. This alteration
is brought about by a change in something else, an intensification or weakening of some external influence. Ulti-
mately, such intensification or weakening must be due to a change in relative distance, the mover moving closer
to or away from what it moves. Aristotle then distinguishes three notions of priority:
τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ ἐφ' ἑτέρων, οὕτω καὶ
ἐπὶ κινήσεως ἂν λέγοιτο πλεοναχῶς. λέγεται
δὲ πρότερον οὗ τε μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔσται τἆλλα,
ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ,
καὶ τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν. (ڦڪڤbڥګ-ڥڭ)
As in the case of other things so too in the case
of motion the word ‘primary’ may be used in
several ways. A thing is said to be prior to
other things when, if it does not exist, the oth-
ers will not exist, whereas it can exist without
the others; and there is also priority in time
and priority in being. (Aristotle ڦڤڥڨ: ڭکڨ)
For the primary in the case of motion as well
as of other things is said in many ways. For
that is said to be prior without which other
things will not exist, while it can exist without
them, and there is also priority in time and
priority in essence. (Aristotle ڥڭڭڭ: ڦڦ)
In all three senses, locomotion is primary:
existence Locomotion is primary with respect to existence, for (i) growth/decrease and alteration presuppose
(the existence of) locomotion and (ii) there would be locomotion even if there were no growth/decrease nor
alteration, for there must be continuous motion and only locomotion can be continuous.
time Locomotion is primary with respect to time becaues eternal things cannot grow nor decrease and cannot
alter.
essence Locomotion is primary with respect to essence because growth/decrease and alteration of natural things
is for their locomotion, i.e. locomotion is the telos of the changes of the other two types.
Physics VIII.ڬ argues that primary locomotion is in a circle, on the grounds that only circular motion is continuous.
VIII.ڭ further characterises the eternal circular motion as uniform.:
Physics VIII.ڥڤ finally argues that the first mover must be simple, on the grounds that because its power must be
infinite (causing motion that goes on eternally, i.e. for an infinite amount of time), it cannot have any magnitude
(either finite nor infinite).
کګ
Chapter ڭ
On the relevance of the Physics
ڭ.ڥ Aristotelian power structuralism?
ڭ.ڥ.ڥ Marmodoro on Aristotelian physics
In her also otherwise quite excellent defense of the Aristotelian view that perception is uptake of form without
matter, Marmodoro (ڦڤڥڨ) gives a brief, and very readable overview of Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics. I find
it interesting because it connects an interpretation of Aristotle’s view to contemporary strands in metaphysics, and
for this reason propose it as an interpretive foil, to be ‘tested’ as we go along.ڥ
In her ch. ڥ, Marmodoro (ڦڤڥڨ) presents the hylomorphic account of change in terms of an underlying matter
changing its form between opposites. She attributes to Aristotle two main views of contemporary relevance (ڦڤڥڨ:
ڧ):
• that all properties are causal powers (δυνάμεις, potentialities);
• that causation is the activation of such powers (ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ or ἐνεργείᾳ, actuality).
Contrary to many contemporary theorists (who normally think that the disposition does not ‘survive’ its manifes-
tation), Marmodoro’s Aristotle will accepts activated powers as such, i.e. things that are both powers and actual:
…the actuality of a power is to be interpreted as its state of activation; its exercising powerfulness. For
Aristotle, a power does not cease to be powerful while activated, nor is its powerfulness reducible to
mere potentiality…The powerfulness of a power is either the potentiality to bring about change, or
the actuality of bringing about change. (Marmodoro ڦڤڥڨ: ڨ–ک)
Marmodoro illustrates the point with the first vs. second actuality distinction from De Anima (cf. II.ڥ ڨڥڦaڥڤ-ڥڥ, ڦڥ-ڦګ
and II.ک ڨڥګaڦڦ-ڦڭ, ڨڥګbڦ-ڥڪ). I potentially know Finnish, because I have the capacity to learn Finnish which I would
then actualise by speaking Finnish. Learning Finnish is the first actualisation of the my capacity to know Finnish,
speaking it the second. The potentiality to second-actualise my potential knowledge of Finnish (i.e. the capacity
to speak) is not only compatible with but presupposes its first-actualisation (my learning Finnish).
In the context of De Anima, the distinction (I surmise) is supposed to allow Aristotle to combine two intuitively
plausible claims: (i) that the colours we see depend for what they are (and not only: for how we see them) on how
we see them, inter alia on our (types of) eyes; (ii) even before the first eye evolved, burning lava (e.g.) was red (i.e.: it
is not the case that coming into being of the first eye made things have the colours they (now) have). It allows him
to do this because eyes enter only into the second actualisation of the colours, light is responsible for the first one:
ڥ. An initial suspicion with respect to its overall interpretational adequacy arises from the quite startling fact thatMarmodoro does not discuss
the matter-form contrast at all. While I think it is true that it serves the same, or at least a very similar purpose as the potentiality-actuality
distinction, I still surmise that both have to be taken into account to get the full picture. But we will have to assess this suspicion during what
lies ahead.
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light makes colours visible (and actualises them, for they are visibilia), but eyes make them seen and thereby realise
their ‘full’ potential.
Marmodoro seems to generalise this account quite widely (though perhaps I’ve misunderstood). The potentiality
of water to break, for example, is first-actualised by its freezing, and second-actualised by its being crushed. When
the ice is crushed, it is no longer breakable (“brittle”), but its potentiality to break is retained at the stage of its first
actualisation (when it is ice). So this is a case where some power (to break) is actualised (by freezing) and retained
as a power (at least at the stage of its first actualisation).ڦ
Not only is the actualisation of the power (ie. the change it produces under the right circumstances) compatible
with its continued existence as a power, it is also intrinsic to the power:
Being activated is simply exercising the powerfulness that defines what the power is. (Marmodoro
ڦڤڥڨ: ڥڤ)
While the ‘powerfulness’ of powers has to be distinguished from their activation, it is not in need of a categorical
basis: powers do not need to be grounded in something which is not a power – they are “pure”, in contemporary
parlance.
The activation of a power is a state of it, an “activity” the power is “engaged in” (Marmodoro ڦڤڥڨ: ڥڧ), either
instantaneous (energeia, praxis) or temporally extended (kinesis in the strict sense, process). The latter allow for a
distinction between partial and full realisation; only when fully realised does the product ‘follow’ and its end (telos)
is realised; however, the process is actualised already before and the change is taking place: the change is the
house-building, the actualisation of the potentiality qua potentiality (while, presumably, the house would be the
actualisation of the potentiality qua actuality).
The actualisation of a power depends on contact (thixei, Phys. ڦڤڦaک-ڭ) with its correlative power, on which it
is existentially dependent (the power to heat is activated when its bearer is in contact with something heatable).
Powers are thus relative, but not for this reason relations: the power to heat, e.g., is ontologically dependent on the
power to be heated (if the second were not to exist, neither would the first, and vice versa), but this dependence is
grounded in some of its monadic properties. The power to heat and the power to be heated can only exist (i.e., for
Aristotle: be exemplified) together, but not because they are de-relativisations of a conceptually and ontologically
prior ‘x heats y’ relation, but primitively so. To make it plausible that this applies not just to the activation of
powers, but to powers-in-potentiality, Marmodoro refers to Aristotle’s views of possibility:
…if there is nothing that can be so affected, how can there be a power whose nature is to bring about
that effect? Aristotle believes in some form of the Principle of Plenitude – namely, that what is possible
will happen. If so, then it follows that he believes that the end of each power in potentiality must be
realizable. (Marmodoro ڦڤڥڨ: ڧڦ)
When the activation conditions are fulfilled, the activation follows by natural necessity: unless something external
interferes and for the most part, both the active and the passive powers become activated. When the resulting powers
are different from those activated (but also: only then),ڧ we have change. When the active and the passive power
come together, they become activated. This mutual activation of the powers is causation (rather than: has a causal
effect):
The interdependence of the relative powers translates into their mutual qualitative transition to exercising
their powerfulness, which is what their causal interaction consists in. (Marmodoro ڦڤڥڨ: ڧڨ)
In this causal interaction, Aristotle says, we have a transmission of a form from the active to the passive power (or
rather: from the thing exercising the active power to the thing (possibly itself, but qua another) exercising the passive
ڦ. One may be forgiven to wonder whether really it is plausible that water (i.e.: the liquid, here in the glass in front of me) is breakable? It
has, for sure, the potentiality to turn into something (perhaps: something identical to it) that is breakable, namely ice, but does it (the liquid, the
contents of the glass in front of me) have the capacity to break?
ڧ. This additional claim is made by Marmodoro on p. ڦڤڥڨ: ڧڧ, though on p. ڦڤڥڨ: ڧڭ she calls “change” the “actuality or activation of the
passive power”.
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power). The transmitted form is then the “principle or cause” (arche or aition) of the motion (kinesis) (Phys. ڦڤڦaڭ-ڥڦ).
Even though causation is symmetric (it is the joint activation of correlative powers), the form is transmitted from
the one to the other, though Marmodoro stresses that this is just a figurative way of talking (though also admitting
that we cannot explain for what it is a metaphor):
The transference of the form of the active power to the passive one is not a description of the mecha-
nism of causal efficacy, but only of the type of qualitative change that takes place in the passive power.
Aristotle has identifed a ground-level activity that cannot be explained by more primitive ontological
tools. (Marmodoro ڦڤڥڨ: ڧګ)
While it is, in her view, inexplicable (and only metaphorically expressable), the ‘transmission of form’ has to be itself
a process, which takes time and may be interrupted before it is completed: the change is thus the gradual reception
of the form by the passive power (i.e.: the activation of a thing’s power to receive the form), itself a process.
The so-called ‘Actualities of Motion’ dilemma in Physics III.ڧ may be understood as questioning the compatibility
of symmetric causation with asymmetric (even anti-symmetic) transmission of form. We will come back to this
argument when discussing the third book.
ڭ.ڥ.ڦ Criticism
Non-exhaustibility of powers. Crucial to Marmodoro’s conception of Aristotelian powers is her conception of
their ‘powerfulness’: that they become activated and produce change while at the same time remaining powers, i.e.
powerful. In other words: for Marmodoro, in contrast to most contemporary friends of dispositions, the activation
/ manifestation of a power is not an event (produced by that power, or by the power and its ‘manifestation partners’),
but a state of that very power.
The first-vs.-second actualisation contrast does not quite do this, as it allows for a weaker reading according to
which the first potentiality is strictly speaking only the potentiality to acquire a certain skill (speaking Finnish, for
example), which is lost when activated, while it is only loosely describable as the potentiality to activate the skill
(which, of course, is retained when the skill is acquired). This may be corroborated by the earth-wood-casket case
(Met. ڥڤڨڭaڥڬ-ڦڧ) Marmodoro (ڦڤڥڨ: ڪڪ, fn. ڥڨ) herself cites: while earth is potentially wood and wood is potentially
a casket, earth, strictly speaking, is not a casket.
Intrinsicness of the activation to the power. Though Marmodoro (ڦڤڥڨ: ڪګ-ڪڬ, fn. ڦڪ) is right to distinguish
her view from the even more extreme position of Martin (ڦڤڤڬ: کڥ) that not only the activation but the very manifes-
tation of the power is intrinsic to it, that ‘directedness’ is intrinsic is still a strong and somewhat implausible claim.
Powers are not activated all by themselves, but only under certain circumstances (the heater has to be turned on,
for instance)ڨ – why should we not then attribute this activation not partly to the other factors too?
It is true that Aristotle takes the occasion (I should not say: cause) of the activation (fulfilment, the passage from
potentiality to actuality) to be something he calls “contact” and conceives of it as something like (what we would
call today) an “enabling” or “triggering condition”; it is equally true that the type of contact needed and the type of
possible activation partners may be, perhaps even have to be, mentioned in the definition of the power in question.
But it still does not follow that the activation is intrinsic, for things may be defined by extrinsic properties.
Presumably, Marmodoro’s reason not to think that powers are extrinsically individuated is that their telos, the form
they are able to ‘transmit’, is ‘given’ (specified? determined?) by their activation partners, the correlative passive
powers, to which they stand in a relation of ontological dependence which is not a relation. This is certainly true,
but not a sufficient reason. For they also also intimately related to their passive powers in another way: when
power p1 becomes activated together with its passive correlate p2, the process (or activity) which is the activation
of p1 is (the very same thing as) the activation of p2. Aristotle even says that this “sameness-in-actuality” grounds the
ontological dependence:
ڨ. The dependency on other factors is precisely what is missing from Marmodoro’s example of “the relation of a girl to the woman she
becomes [said to be] intrinsic to that person” (ڦڤڥڨ: ڦڤ).
ڪڤ
Since the actualities of the sensible object and of the sensitive faculty are one in actuality, while differ-
ent in their modes of being, actual hearing and actual sounding appear and disappear from existence
at one and the same moment, and so actual savor and actual tasting, etc., while as potentialities one
of them may exist without the other. (DA ڨڦڪaڥک-ڦڥ, cited in Marmodoro (ڦڤڥڨ: ڨڨ), emphasis added)
Purity of powers. While it is certainly an acceptable interpretative hypothesis to take Aristotle’s powers to be
pure, it is not mandated by Aristotle’s characterisation of them as originative sources of change in Met. ڥڤڨڪaڭ-ڥڥ.
Indeed, Marmodoro herself allows for cases where a power (such as weight) is exercised without there being any
change (neither a process nor an activity), such as with the the floor sustaining my weight (ڦڤڥڨ: ڧڧ).
  To me, the ‘purity’ of powers, their lack of non-dispositional properties, makes the existential dependence be-
tween reciprocal powers quite mysterious. The power to heat and the power to be heated, Marmodoro says, are
existentially dependent: neither could exist without the other. This existential interdependence applies to powers
also in their merely potential state:ک even for some piece of wood to have the capacity to heat, there must be things
that can be heated. This is quite startling: why could there not be things that are see-able, in principle, such as
rocks, without there being anything that has the capacity to see them (e.g. because no eyes have evolved)? This
makes only sense to me if see-able things have another, non-dispositional or categorical property that makes them
see-able, present already before the evolution of the eye and in virtue of which things become see-able once an eye
has evolved.
Marmodoro’s invocation of the ‘principle of plenitude’ does not help: even if everything that is possible will even-
tually happen (i.e.: what never happens could not have happened) and thus forever unactivated powers are impos-
sible, ontological dependence is usually taken to be synchronic (and if it is a genuine diachronic relation, we have
a rather new and startling way in which the past determines the future!).
ڭ.ڥ.ڧ The application to the philosophy of perception
TO BE DONE
ڭ.ڦ Relations and their monadic foundations
ڭ.ڦ.ڥ The ‘problem of relations’
Aristotle held that relations are “the least of the things there are”ڪ
ڭ.ڦ.ڦ Correlative powers
ڭ.ڧ The topic of the Physics: kinesis
The Physics is a “lecture concerning nature” (physike akroasis) and what is characteristic of natural things (things that
exist by nature) is that they have in themselves a source or principle (arche) of kinesis (Phys. II.i ڥڭڦbڥڨ). It is often
remarked that the customary translation as “movement” or “motion” is too narrow and that “kinesis” applies to
all kinds of changes. Together with its contrary (stasis, sometimes translated “rest” or “stability”), it covers any
time-occupying physical process (cf. Yavetz ڦڤڥک: xii).
MORE ONWHETHER kineseis CAN BE THOUGHT OF AS PROCESSES tout court
ڭ.ڧ.ڥ Actuality / potentiality vs. form / matter
TO BE DONE
ک. Marmodoro is clear about this implication of her interpretation of the ‘powerfulness’ of powers ڦڤڥڨ: ڪڬ, fn. ڧڦ; ڧڦ, though she also
very misleadingly says: “Pros ti properties are monadic properties such that their manifestation or activation depends counterfactually on the
activation of their correlatives.” (ڦڤڥڨ: ڦڭ) – it is not just their activation, but their very existence which so depends!
ڪ. Cf. Met. N ڥڤڬڬaڦڦ. Ross translates this as “the relative is least of all things a real thing or substance” (ڥڭڦڨ: ڥګڥڭ), whereas Julia Annas
translates “relatives least of all are entities or real objects” (ڥڭګڪ: ڥڥڬ). Aristotle argues against (the fundamentality of) relations partially on the
ground that they give rise to Cambridge changes (cf. Met. N ڥڤڬڬaڧڤ-ڥڤڭڭbڥ).
ڪڥ
In some sense, Aristotle holds the startling thesis that there are two ways of something, a, to be F : to be F in
potentiality or potentially and to be F in actuality or actually. “Actually” and “potentially” are thus ways for
something to be F in the way “quickly” and “slowly” are ways for someone to be walking.ګ This is a startling claim
because we normally understand “potentially” or “in potentiality” as enlarging rather than restricting the field in
which “F” may be correctly applied. But perhaps not always: if I characterise someone as a “singing philosopher”
or as a “red cat”, I am not saying that she is always singing or that the cat is red also when it is is sleeping in the
dark cellar, but rather that she has the (developped, practical) ability to sing and that the cat is such as to appear
red in normal circumstances.
Socrates, if he is anything at all, is a philosopher. But what is this: to be a philosopher? Is it a determining, ‘fully
actualised’ property like being snub-nosed, a way for things to be, a state they are in? Or is it rather implicitly,
‘covertly’ dispositional, a matter of, when triggered and in the right circumstances, to be philosophising? And what
is the latter thing: to philosophise? To manifest a pre-existing disposition, realise an otherwise dormant potential,
or to perform an action (of saying, writing, thinking?) that conforms to certain conditions (topic-wise, quality-wise,
manner-wise?)? Is Socrates a philosopher when he is asleep, dead drunk, permanently lobotomised? When did he
become a philosopher, and in what way? Is he philosophising only when he thinks or speaks clearly, or only when
he says intelligent things about philosophical matters (does he ever?)?
How much philosophising does one have to do to be a philosopher?
Deleuze on virtuality
ڭ.ڧ.ڦ Absolute and relative fundamentality
I AMNOT SO SURE ABOUT THE FOLLOWING, HAVE TO LOOKUPWHAT Fine (ڦڤڥڦ) SAYS ABOUT
THE RELATIVE / FUNDAMENTAL CONTRAST
It is an important, albeit sometimes not sufficiently recognised fact about many of the crucial concepts of Aris-
totelian metaphysics that they have both a relative/comparative and an absolute/maximalist form. We thus speak
of “the essence of ”, “the substance of ”, “the form of ” and “the matter of ” some things, but also of “essences”,
“substances”, “forms” and “pieces of matter”. We may take either of these as prior, and then try to define, or at
least characterise, the other in terms of it:
(rel) x is an essence/substance/form / x is matter def $ 9y(x is the essence/substance/form/matterof y)
Alternatively, we may also choose to take the other direction of explanation:
(abs) x is the essence/substance/form/matter of ydef$ R(x;y)^x is an essence / a substance / a form/ matter to degree n1^ y is an essence / a substance / a form / matter to degree n2^n1 < n2
While (rel) is certainly more natural, it is not without problems. If the relation being the essence (substance/form/matter)
of is irreflexive (i.e. never relates a thing to itself), then there are essences/substances/forms/pieces of matter only
if it bottoms out – i.e. if there are things that have essences but are not essences, have substances but are not
substances, have forms but are not forms and have matter but are not themselves matter.
ڭ.ڧ.ڧ Constructional ontology
As Bostock (ڥڭڭک: ڥ–ڦ, cited after reprint) has remarked, Aristotle, unlike his predecessors, is not so much concerned
just with listing the basic the ‘ultimate ingredients of the world’, but rather to explain the generation (genesis) of the
world as we know it from more fundamental elements.
ګ. The relevant contrast here is with characterisations that either entail or are at least compatible with a’s not being F , as e.g. “false friend”
and “apparent friend”.
ڪڦ
Chapter ڥڤ
Conclusions
ڪڧ
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